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Raportin tiivistelmä 
Arvioimme tässä tutkimuksessa Euroopan unionissa mahdollisesti käyttöönotettavaa 
hiilitullimekanismia (CBAM, carbon border adjustment mechanism) ja sen taloudellisia 
vaikutuksia. Vielä täsmentämättömällä tavalla toteutettavaa mekanismia on ehdotettu 
ratkaisuksi EU:n tiukemman ilmastopolitiikan mahdollisesti kärjistämään hiilivuoto-
ongelmaan. Käytännössä se voidaan toteuttaa monella tavalla, ja toteutustavat luovat 
erilaisia teknisiä haasteita, hallinnollisia rasitteita sekä oikeudellisia ja poliittisten 
vastatoimien riskejä.
Käyttöönottoon liittyviä asioita
Hiilitullimekanismin on arvioitu toimivan hyvin muun muassa keinona, jolla EU:n 
ulkopuolisia maita pyritään painostamaan vähentämään saastuttavaa tuotantoaan. 
Hiilitullia on kuitenkin aikaisemmin tarkasteltu lähinnä teoreettisesti, kun taas meidän 
lähtökohtamme on arvioida niitä käytännön ongelmia ja epävarmuuksia, joita liittyy 
hiilitullien käyttöönottoon.
Teknisestä näkökulmasta saattaa olla hyvin vaikeaa mitata mekanismin vaatimaa 
päästöjen ja hiilen hintaa samalla, kun riittävän luotettavan, asianmukaisen ja 
ajankohtaisen tiedon käyttäminen on onnistuneen toteuttamisen kannalta tärkeää. 
Suppea toteuttamistapa voi olla myös juridisesti helpompi toteuttaa. Hiilitullimekanismin 
esteet ovat todennäköisesti vähäisimpiä, kun se asetetaan koskemaan vain rajallista 
määrää tuotteita. 
Samalla toteutustavan tulisi olla reilu. Toisaalta hiilitullimekanismin tulisi koskea 
tuontia kaikista kolmansista maista eikä rajautua vain muutamiin, millä voidaan välttää 
GATT-sopimuksen artiklan I suosituimmuusehdon (engl. Most Favoured Nation, MFN) 
rikkominen. Toisaalta laaja hiilitullimekanismi, joka kattaisi myös muun muassa monet 
puolivalmisteet ja lopputuotteet, lisäisi huomattavasti hiilitullimekanismin teknistä ja 
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hallinnollista monimutkaisuutta. Se voisi johtaa sen sattumanvaraiseen tai suhteettomaan 
soveltamiseen suhteessa asetettuihin tavoitteisiin ja lopulta sen lainopillisesti kriittiseen 
tulkintaan GATT-sopimuksen artiklan XX kautta. Hiilitullimekanismissa täytyy mahdollisesti 
myös ottaa huomioon hiilen hinta tai muut hiilirajoitteet, joita on asetettu tuontituotteille 
niiden alkuperämaassa.
Laadimme useita skenaarioita, joiden kautta tarkastelemme hiilitullimekanismin 
käyttöönottoon liittyviä kysymyksiä. Ensimmäisen skenaariomme on toteuttamiskelpoinen 
(“Feasible”). Siinä pyrkimyksenä on tarkastella helpoiten toteutettavaa vaihtoehtoa. 
Hiilitullimekanismi otetaan käyttöön vain sementin, kalkin ja kipsin tuonnissa. Niiden 
tuotanto on hyvin päästöintensiivistä, mutta samalla tullin käyttöönotosta seuraa pienempi 
riski juridisiin tai poliittisiin vastatoimenpiteisiin. Laajennettu toteuttamiskelpoinen 
skenaario sisältää lisäksi raudan, teräksen ja alumiinin sekä niistä valmistetut tuotteet. 
Analyysissa ratkaistaan EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden päästöjen mittausongelma käyttämällä 
EU:n keskimääräisiä päästöjä laskettaessa hiilitullin tasoa.
Vaihtoehtoisena skenaariona käytämme laajaa 14 päästöintensiivisen toimialan (ks. 
taulukko 4.1) hiilitullimekanismia ja yksityiskohtaisempaa hiilitullin mittaustapaa, jossa 
voidaan ottaa huomioon kaikki valmistuksessa syntyvät kasvihuonekaasupäästöt. 
Kutsumme tätä skenaariota tehokkaaksi (”Efficient”), sillä siinä on kiinnitetty vähemmän 
huomiota sen käyttöönottoon liittyviin kysymyksiin ja enemmän huomiota sen 
vaikuttavuuteen.
Taloudellinen analyysi
Tarkastelimme aluksi tullin piiriin mahdollisesti joutuvia markkinoita EU:n tuotannon 
näkökulmasta. Sementin, kalkin ja kipsin tuotannon osuus EU:n kokonaistuotannosta on 
hyvin pieni. Sen yhteenlaskettu arvonlisäys oli noin seitsemän miljardia euroa vuonna 
2017 ja osuus koko yrityssektorin arvonlisäyksestä oli 0,11 prosenttia. Toisaalta sementti 
on hyvin tärkeä välituote erityisesti rakentamisen toimialalla. Perusmetallien ja niistä 
valmistettujen tuotteiden tuotannon arvonlisäys EU27-maissa oli 104 miljardia euroa 
vuonna 2017 eli 1,67 prosenttia koko yrityssektorin tuottamasta arvonlisäyksestä. Tämä on 
jo huomattava määrä, kuten on myös näiden tuotteiden merkitys välituotteina erityisesti 
muussa metalliteollisuudessa.
Sementin, kalkin ja kipsin arvo myös EU:n ulkopuolisesta tavaratuonnissa on hyvin pieni, 
vain noin 0,3 mrd. euroa. Sen sijaan raudan ja teräksen sekä niistä valmistettujen tuotteiden 
arvo (52,5 mrd. euroa) on jo paljon suurempi, eli 2,7 prosenttia EU:n ulkopolisesta 
tuonnista. Alumiinin ja niistä valmistettujen tuotteiden osuus on suunnilleen puolet raudan 
11
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48 CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPACT ON FINLAND AND THE EU
ja teräksen, ml. tuotteet, tuonnista. Laajassa, tehokkaassa skenaariossa hiilitullimekanismin 
piiriin kuuluu noin 60 prosenttia kaikesta EU:n ulkopuolisesta tuonnista.
Käytämme ekonometrista gravitaatiomallia laskeaksemme tariffien mahdollisen 
vaikutuksen tuontiin. Arvio perustuu havaintoihin tullien lähivuosikymmeninä 
synnyttämistä keskimääräisistä muutoksista tuonnissa. Niiden avulla arvioimme, miten 
hiilitullit voisivat vaikuttaa EU:n ulkotuontiin. Tulostemme mukaan toteuttamiskelpoisessa 
skenaariossa (joko vain sementti, kalkki ja kipsi tai näiden lisäksi rauta, teräs ja alumiini 
ja niistä valmistetut tuotteet) tariffeilla on vain vähäinen vaikutus (alle kolme miljardia 
euroa) koko bruttotuontiin. Tämä johtuu osittain siitä, että näiden tuotteiden osuus koko 
ulkotuonnista on varsin pieni.
Tehokkaassa skenaariossa vaikutukset ovat huomattavasti suurempia. Kun tullien 
määrittelyssä huomioidaan kaikki suorat ja epäsuorat kasvihuonekaasupäästöt, tuonnin 
arvo vähenee 93 miljardia euroa, mikä on melkein viisi prosenttia koko ulkotuonnista. 
Suorat päästöt ovat niitä, jotka syntyvät itse tuotantoprosessissa, ja epäsuorat päästöt niitä, 
jotka syntyvät em. tuotannossa tarvittavien, muilla toimialoilla tuotettujen välituotteiden 
tuotannossa. Euroissa mitattuna suurin vaikutus on kemikaalien ja kemiallisten tuotteiden 
tuonnissa (–17 mrd. euroa), radio-, televisio- ja tietoliikennevälineiden tuonnissa (–13 mrd. 
euroa), muiden sähkökoneiden ja -laitteiden tuonnissa (–11 mrd. euroa) sekä konttori- ja 
tietokonelaitteiden tuonnissa (–11 mrd. euroa). Kun laskelmassa otetaan huomioon kaikki 
suorat kasvihuonekaasupäästöt, mutta vain epäsuorat sähkön käyttöön liittyvät päästöt, 
EU:n ulkotuonti alenee 53 miljardia euroa.
Toteuttamiskelpoisen skenaarion vaikutus on pieni myös Suomen osalta. Sen sijaan 
tehokkaassa skenaariossa Suomen tuonti EU:n ulkopuolelta vähenee 1,8–3,6 prosenttia 
riippuen siitä, kumpi skenaario epäsuorien päästöjen osalta on käytössä. Nämä ovat hieman 
pienempiä lukuja kuin EU:lle arvioidut keskimääräiset vaikutukset, mikä johtuu tuonnin 
tuote- ja alkuperämaarakenteiden eroista suhteessa EU:n keskimääräiseen tuontiin.
Vastaavasti hiilitullien vaikutus tuontitavaroihin sitoutuneen hiilidioksidin määrään on 
hyvin pieni toteuttamiskelpoisessa skenaariossa. Tehokkaassa skenaariossa negatiivinen 
vaikutus on tuonnin alkuperämaiden osalta suurin Kiinalle sekä EU:n ulkopuoliselle 
Euroopalle (pl. Britannia, Sveitsi ja Venäjä). Suomen ulkotuontiin sitoutuneen hiilidioksidin 
määrä alenee 10,0 ja 13,1 prosenttia riippuen siitä, ovatko kaikki epäsuorat päästöt 
laskelmassa mukana vai eivät.
Koko EU:n tasolla tariffien kokonaistuotto on toteuttamiskelpoisessa skenaariossa 0,8 
miljardia euroa. Huomattavasti laajemmassa tehokkaassa skenaariossa se on 15,2 tai 25,2 
miljardia euroa riippuen siitä, ovatko kaikki epäsuorat päästöt laskelmassa mukana vai 
eivät. Tullien viimekätinen kohtaanto osuu sekä EU:hun että EU:n ulkopuolelle. 
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Mittaamme myös kaupan kehitykseen liittyviä maailmanlaajuisia arvoketjuja sekä 
niihin liittyvää suoraa ja epäsuoraa arvonlisäystä. Yleisesti ottaen muutokset heijastavat 
hyvin bruttokaupan kehitystä eri skenaarioissa. Kun tulli asetetaan suppeimmassa 
toteuttamiskelpoisessa skenaariossa (mukana on vain sementti, kalkki ja kipsi), merkittävin 
yksittäistä maata koskeva arvonlisäyksen menetys nähdään Britanniassa (56,6 % 
koko skenaarion synnyttämästä arvonlisäyksen laskusta tuonnissa) ja Turkissa (9,0 % 
vastaavasti). Kun hiilitulli asetetaan myös raudalle, teräkselle ja alumiinille sekä niistä 
valmistetuille tuotteille, Kiinan menetykset arvonlisäyksessä kasvavat huomattavasti. 
Tehokkaissa skenaarioissa Kiinan osuus nousee vielä merkittävämmäksi. Sen osuus 
on noin puolet kaikesta EU:n ulkopuolelta tuodusta arvonlisäyksestä, joka hiilitullien 
seurauksena häviäisi tuonnista.
Tulostemme mukaan huomattava osa menetetystä arvonlisäyksestä osuu arvoketjuihin, 
joissa lopputuotteiden valmistus on EU:ssa. Tällaisissa tapauksissa EU:n yritysten on 
löydettävä vaihtoehto aiemmin tuodulle välituotteelle.
Suomeen päätyvän tuonnin arvonlisäsisältö on hyvin pieni toteuttamiskelpoisen skenaarion 
tapauksessa. Myös tehokkaassa skenaariossa suomalaisten yritysten arvonlisäyksen tuonti 
välituotekäyttöön tai niiden oma suora arvonlisäys tuonnissa on suhteellisen vähäinen, noin 
100 miljoonaa euroa skenaariosta riippuen. Suhteellisesti ottaen kaupasta riippuvaisimmat 
alat välituotekäyttäjinä ovat tehdasteollisuudessa. Samanlainen tulos koskee myös EU:ta, 
vaikkakin Suomessa riippuvuus on keskimäärin pienempää.
Käytämme talouden rakenteita kattavasti kuvaavaa yleisen tasapainon GTAP-mallia 
analysoidaksemme hiilitullimekanismin mahdollisia vaikutuksia tuotantoon EU:ssa. 
Kun hiilitullien alaisten tuotteiden tuonti EU:n ulkopuolisista maista vähenee, syntyy 
substituutiovaikutus. Välituotteiden ja lopputuotteiden tuontia korvataan EU:ssa 
valmistetuilla tuotteilla, joiden hintaan tullit eivät suoraan vaikuta. Tämä vaikutus lisää 
EU:ssa valmistettujen tuotteiden kysyntää.
Laajassa toteuttamiskelpoisessa skenaariossa ei-metallisten mineraalituotteiden, raudan ja 
teräksen sekä muiden metallien valmistus kasvaa Suomessa ja muissa EU-maissa. Tuotanto 
kasvaa myös niillä toimialoilla (erityisesti kaivannaisteollisuus ja sähköntuotanto), jotka 
toimittavat näille kasvaville toimialoille merkittäviä määriä välituotteita. Tehokkaassa 
skenaariossa suuri määrä toimialoja kuuluu hiilitullimekanismin piiriin. Näin tuotanto 
kasvaa useimmilla toimialoilla.
Kaikki toimialat eivät kuitenkaan ole voittajia EU:ssa. Huomattava osa kaikesta tuonnista 
on välituotteita, joita käytetään EU:n omassa tuotannossa. Välituotteiden hintojen 
nousu lisää lopputuotteiden valmistajien kustannuksia. Heikentynyt kilpailukyky 
näkyy toteuttamiskelpoisessa skenaariossa tuotannon vähenemisenä kulkuneuvojen 
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valmistuksessa, kone- ja laiteteollisuudessa sekä elektroniikkateollisuudessa, jotka käyttävät 
välituotteina EU:n ulkopuolisista maista tuotuja metalleja ja metallituotteita. Tehokkaassa 
skenaariossa kustannusvaikutus on selvästi suurempi, koska hiilitullimekanismi koskee 
paljon useampia toimialoja ja koska asetettu hiilitulli on korkeampi. Tulosten mukaan 
myös hiilitullimekanismilla suojellut toimialat EU:ssa voivat kärsiä, jos nousseiden 
valmistuskustannusten negatiivinen vaikutus on suurempi kuin positiiviset vaikutukset 
suhteellisesta edusta suhteessa EU:n ulkopuolisiin valmistajiin. Näin tapahtuu koneiden ja 
laitteiden sekä elektronisten tuotteiden valmistuksessa, joiden hyödyt hiilitullimekanismista 
ovat rajalliset, koska niitä viedään lähinnä EU:n ulkopuolelle. Muilla toimialoilla vaikutukset 
ovat vähäisiä toteuttamiskelpoisessa skenaariossa. Tehokkaassa skenaariossa resurssien 
uudelleenkohdentuminen hiilitullimekanismin alaisille toimialoille johtaa tuotannon 
vähenemiseen useimmilla muilla toimialoilla, ml. palvelualoilla.
Riippuen hiilitullimekanismin laajuudesta sen vaikutus bruttokansantuotteeseen on 
hyvin vähäinen tai negatiivinen Suomessa ja muissa EU-maissa. EU:n ulkopuolella 
päästöintensiiviset maat kuten Kiina sekä ryhmä Itä-Euroopan ja Keski-Aasian maita 
kärsivät hieman hiilitullimekanismista tehokkaassa skenaariossa, kun maakohtaiset tariffit 
perustuvat EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden tuotannon hiili-intensiivisyyteen. Muissa EU:n 
ulkopuolisissa maissa vaikutukset ovat hyvin pieniä molemmissa skenaarioissa.
Yllä esitetyissä tuonti-, arvoketju- ja kokonaistaloustarkasteluissa hiilitulli perustuu 
päästöoikeuden hintaan 25EUR/tCO2. Vaikutukset pääosin kaksinkertaistuvat, jos 
päästöoikeuden hinta nousee 50 euroon hiilidioksiditonnilta.
Hiilitullimekanismin mahdolliseen käyttöönottoon liittyy riski EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden 
vastatoimenpiteistä. Kauppasodan mahdollisia vaikutuksia analysoitiin globaalilla 
makrotalouden NiGEM-mallilla. Tulosten mukaan on hyvin todennäköistä, että kauppasota 
pyyhkisi pois kaikki hiilitullimekanismin mahdolliset positiiviset talousvaikutukset. Jos 
muu maailman reagoi hiilitullimekanismiin nostamalla muiden kuin raaka-aineiden osalta 
tullitasoaan kahdella prosenttiyksiköllä tuonnissaan EU:sta, Suomen bkt alenee pitkällä 
aikavälillä 0,3 prosenttia ja EU:n bkt keskimäärin 0,25 prosenttia.
Joka tapauksessa analyysimme mukaan hiilivuoto-ongelma täytyy ratkaista, sillä löysimme 
empiirisessä EU:n viennin ja tuonnin päästödataa hyödyntävässä analyysissamme siitä 
merkkejä. Vaikuttaa siltä, että EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmän (ETS) eri vaiheet ovat 
lisänneet tuontituotteiden sisältämän hiilen määrää, erityisesti ETS:n 2. vaiheessa. Lisäksi 
on jonkin verran todisteita siitä, että tuonnin hiilisisältö on noussut niissä tuotteissa, 
jotka ovat päästökauppajärjestelmän alaisia. Estimointitulosten mukaan hiilivuotoaste 
on melkein 20 prosenttia. Tämä estimaatti on aiempien yleisen tasapainon mallien avulla 
tehtyjen tulosten antaman haarukan ylälaidassa.
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Tasapuolisuus, tehokkuus ja hallinta
Arvioimme kolmea hiilitullimekanismin muotoilun näkökulmaa: tasapuolisuutta, 
tehokkuutta ja sen hallinnointia. Vaikuttaa siltä, että eri vaihtoehdot hiilitullimekanismin 
muotoilussa johtavat vääjäämättä kompromisseihin eri näkökulmien välillä. Jotta 
hiilitullimekanismin hallinnointiin liittyvät ongelmat (erityisesti yksityiskohtaisen 
päästödatan keräämiseen liittyen) voitaisiin ratkaista, tarvitaan yksinkertaistettuja, toiseksi 
parhaita (second-best) ratkaisuja. 
Hiilitullia voidaan yksinkertaistaa käyttämällä karkeita sääntöjä sopeutumislaskemissa tai 
rajoituksia sopeutumistarpeessa. Yksinkertainen muotoilu tässä suhteessa voi kuitenkin 
aiheuttaa ongelmia muista näkökulmista. Ne voivat heikentää hiilitullin tasapuolisuutta, 
erityisesti EU-maiden ja kolmansien maiden yhdenvertaisuutta, mikä voisi helposti johtaa 
taloudelliseen tehottomuuteen ja juridisiin kiistoihin. Osaratkaisu tähän ongelmaan 
olisi sallia tuojille yksilöllisesti tuotteiden todellisen hiili-intensiivisyyden todentaminen 
valvotusti.
EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden olisi helpompi hyväksyä tasapuolinen ja oikeudenmukainen 
hiilitullimekanismi WTO:n sääntöjen puitteissa. Reiluus eli oikeammin EU:n kansainväliset 
kauppavelvoitteet edellyttävät, että valittu hiilitullimekanismi on puhdas ratkaisu 
hiilivuoto-ongelmaan ja ettei EU:n sisällä käytetä mitään muuta mekanismia samaan 
tarkoitukseen. Hiilitullimekanismin oloissa olisi paljon vaikeampi perustella ilmaisjaollisten 
päästöoikeuksien jatkuminen turvaamaan teollisuuden kansainvälistä hintakilpailukykyä 
hiilivuodon oloissa. Kompromissi tässä suhteessa voisi olla luopuminen asteittain 
ilmaisjaollisista päästöoikeuksista samalla, kun hiilitullimekanismi otetaan käyttöön.
Tehokkuusnäkökulmasta toteuttamiskelpoisin muotoilu, joka kattaisi vain sementin ja 
siihen liittyvät tuotteet, vaikuttaisi tulostemme mukaan kaikella todennäköisyydellä 
vain hyvin vähän ulkomaankauppaan ja päästöihin. Laajemmissa skenaarioissa 
hiilitullimekanismin vaikutus olisi tietenkin suurempi, jolloin sillä olisi huomattava vaikutus 
myös hiilivuotoon ja päästöihin.
Hiilitullimekanismin laajentaminen laittaisi enemmän painetta yksityiskohtaisen datan 
keräämiselle. Mekanismissa pitäisi olla tieto päästöistä kaikissa tuotannon eri vaiheissa ja 
kaikilla toimialoilla, jotka käyttävät päästöintensiivisiä välituotteita omassa tuotannossaan. 
Arvoketjuanalyysi osoittaa, että suuret määrät päästöintensiivisiä välituotteita käytetään 
erilaisten lopputuotteiden valmistuksessa muun muassa tehdasteollisuudessa. Jos 
hiilitullimekanismia ei uloteta näihin tuotteisiin, se voi jättää kilpailuedun EU:hun tuoduille 
päästöintensiivisille välituotteille, mikä lisäisi hiilivuodon riskiä. 
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Huolellisesti suunniteltu hiilitullimekanismi tuontituotteille voisi kompensoida erilaisen 
ilmastopolitiikan aiheuttamia vaikutuksia kustannustasoon ja siten kilpailutilanteeseen. 
Erot säilyvät edelleen EU:n ulkopuolella, jos vastaavasti kunnianhimoista ilmastopolitiikkaa 
ei harjoiteta siellä. Globaalin ilmastopolitiikan näkökulmasta on tehotonta, jos EU:n 
ulkopuoliset maat alkavat käyttää aiempaa enemmän päästöintensiivisempiä omia 
tuotteitaan, joille ei synny sellaisia hiilikustannuksia, joita EU:n omat tuottajat kohtaavat 
ilmastopolitiikan vuoksi.
Komplementaarisia veroinstrumentteja tai suoria tukiaisia on ehdotettu vaihtoehtoisena 
ratkaisuna ilmaisjaollisille päästöoikeuksille. Yksi tapa olisi lisätä nykyjärjestelmään 
päästölisäinen vero (Stiglitz, 2013). Kuten arvonlisävero, päästönlisävero olisi kulutusvero, 
joka asetetaan tuotteelle aina, kun sen tuotantoketjussa syntyy päästöjä siihen saakka, 
kunnes tuote myydään loppukäyttöön. Kuluttaja maksaa veroa sen mukaan, kuinka paljon 
päästöjä on syntynyt tuotteet valmistuksessa pois lukien ne välituotteiden päästöt, joita on jo 
verotettu. Jos tuote viedään jollekin toiselle alueelle, sitä ei verotettaisi. Toisaalta tuontituote 
kohtaisi samanlaisen verokohtelun kuin EU:n oma tuotanto, kun se myydään EU:n alueella. 
Vaikka tämä järjestely on ajatuksellisesti houkutteleva, siihen liittyy myös monimutkaisia 
hallinnollisia ja metodologisia haasteita, eikä se ratkaisisi EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmästä 
syntyvää hiilivuoto-ongelmaa, jos ETS pidettäisiin yhä voimassa.
Johtopäätökset
Analyysimme perusteella hiilitullimekanismin (CBAM) voidaan odottaa kohtaavan 
merkittäviä esteitä tulevina vuosina. EU:n kansainvälisten velvoitteiden, tehokkuuden, 
tasapuolisuuden ja teknisten haasteiden näkökulmasta siirtymä hiilitullimekanismin 
täydelliseen käyttöönottoon on oleva asteittainen ja hankala.
Aiempien ehdotusten perusteella todennäköisin lähestymistapa olisi testata sen käyttöä 
rajoitetulla määrällä päästöintensiivisiä tuotteita, jotka ovat helppoja hallinnoida 
ja yksinkertaisia tuottaa. Tulostemme mukaan tällaisen toteuttamiskelpoisen 
hiilitullimekanismin taloudellinen ja ympäristöllinen vaikutus olisi todennäköisesti pieni. 
Suppean hiilitullimekanismin toteuttaminen olisi siten enemmän vain signaali EU:n 
päättäväisyydestä vastata ilmasto- ja hiilivuoto-ongelmaan kuin varsinainen ratkaisu 
niiden korjaamiseksi.
Toisaalta, jos EU ottaa käyttöön kunnianhimoisemman hiilitullimekanismin, joko heti 
aluksi tai pidemmällä aikavälillä, se tulee vääjäämättä kohtaamaan suurempia vaikeuksia. 
Tulostemme mukaan globaalit tuotantoketjut ovat monimutkaisia, ja järjestelmällinen 
ja kunnianhimoinen hiilitullimekanismi kohtaa huomattavan työn datan keräämisessä ja 
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hallinnoinnissa. Lisäksi tulostemme mukaan hiilitullit koskettaisivat erityisesti Kiinaa, jos 
tullit asetettaisiin koskemaan toimialoja laajasti. Vastatoimet ja välttämistoimenpiteet 
kuten vientitukiaiset alkuperämaissa neutraloisivat nopeasti hiilitullien mahdolliset 
taloudelliset hyödyt. Siten on syytä olla varovainen erityisesti sen suhteen, että 
hiilitullimekanismi voisi toimia EU:n budjettivarojen lähteenä.
Jos EU ottaa käyttöön hiilitullimekanismin rahoittaakseen elpymispakettia tai jostain 
muusta ilmastoon liittymättömästä syystä, joka on WTO:n sääntöjen vastainen, se 
heikentää EU:n uskottavuutta kansainvälisessä ilmastoyhteistyössä, ml. tulevassa 
UNFCCC COP26:ssa. EU:n pitäisikin suunnitella hiilitullimekanismia niin, että se vahvistaa 
monenkeskistä yhteistyötä ilmastomuutosta vastaan vahingoittamatta kehitystä YK:n 
ilmastokonferenssissa ja ottamatta käyttöön menetelmiä, jotka vaikuttavat olevan 
kansainvälisten velvoitteiden ja sääntöpohjaisen kansainvälisen järjestelmän vastaisia.
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Report summary 
In this report, we address the idea of an EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) 
and its economic implications. Such a mechanism, while not yet detailed, has been 
proposed as a solution to emission leakage that may result from the EU’s commitment 
to a stronger climate policy. In a second-best world, there are several ways to implement 
CBAMs with a varying amount of technical difficulties, administrative burden, legal 
problems, and risk of political backlash.
Implementation issues
While CBAMs have been argued to work well—for example, as instruments to put 
pressure on third countries to have less polluting production—our starting point was 
to address the practical problems and uncertainties that overshadow a CBAM’s practical 
implementation and effectiveness.
In technical terms, we found that it may be very difficult to determine both emissions 
and an explicit carbon price for CBAMs in practice. In particular, the availability of reliable, 
appropriate, and timely data is a pressing issue. In legal terms, a CBAM is likely to face 
less problems in implementation when its scope is limited. By covering imports from 
all countries, rather than singling out particular countries, a CBAM can avoid violating 
the most-favored nation principle contained in Article I of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Other than that, however, a broader scope, including many 
semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, dramatically increases the technical and 
administrative complexity of the CBAM, which could render its application arbitrary or 
disproportionate vis-à-vis the intended goals and affect its legal assessment under Article 
XX of the GATT. Finally, the CBAM may need to take into account a carbon price or other 
carbon constraint imposed on imported products in their country of origin.
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We illustrated the implementation issues by using several scenarios. Building on our 
analysis, we titled our first scenario as “the Feasible Scenario”: in this the CBAM is applied 
down to very few industries (cement, lime, and plaster industries) where production 
is most emission intensive and there is less threat of legal or political complications in 
the CBAM’s implementation; the CBAM may have an extension to cover iron, steel, and 
aluminum production. Moreover, we work around the difficulties of the measurement of 
emissions beyond the EU borders by considering EU emission averages as the benchmark 
for the calculation of the carbon tariff. 
As an alternative, we discuss the option of using a wider scenario with a larger number 
of emission-intensive products (covering 14 industries; see Table 4.1) and more detailed 
measurement of the carbon tariff, potentially building on all emissions. As this scenario 
puts less weight on the practical implementation issues and more weight on the potential 
impact of the CBAM, we titled it “the Efficient Scenario.” 
Economic analysis
We started by describing the EU markets that are potentially subjected to the tariffs. We 
saw that the manufacturing of cement, lime, and plaster plays a very small part in the total 
EU economy. Its total value added was seven billion euros in 2017 and its share in total 
business economy value added was just 0.11 %. On the other hand, cement is of course 
very important as an intermediate good for the construction sector. In terms of EU´s own 
production, the manufacturing value added of basic metals and products thereof in the 
EU27 countries was 104 billion euros in 2017, or 1.67 % of the total business sector’s value 
added. This is already significant, as is of course the importance of these products as 
intermediate goods, especially in other metal industries. 
In terms of trade, the value of extra-EU imports of cement, lime, and plaster is very small, 
only about 0.3 bn. euros. The value of iron and steel imports, including products made 
thereof, is much larger (52.5 bn. euros) and equal to 2.7 % of all extra-EU imports. The 
value of aluminum and aluminum product imports is about half the value of iron and 
steel. Our broadest Efficient Scenario extends the CBAM to cover products that constitute 
roughly 60 % of the extra-EU imports.
We use econometric gravity analysis to isolate the historical trade effect of tariffs and 
apply the findings in making projections concerning the effects of the proposed tariff 
increases on EU imports. We find that the variants of the Feasible Scenario (either with 
cement, lime, and plaster or with cement, lime, and plaster, and aluminum and steel) 
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have a limited impact (less than 3 bn. euros) on overall gross imports, partly because the 
products in this scenario constitute such a small share of extra-EU imports. 
The Efficient Scenario exhibits much larger effects of course. The total impact when 
including both direct and indirect CO2 emissions is 93 billion euros or almost 5 % of 
all extra-EU imports. The direct emissions are those that are emitted in the production 
process itself and the indirect emissions are those emitted and embodied in the value 
chain of this production when intermediate products are produced in other sectors. In 
euro terms, the biggest impact comes from the EU import effect on manufacturing of 
chemicals and chemical products (-17 billion euros), the manufacturing of radio, tv, and 
communication equipment (-13 billion euros), the manufacturing of electrical machinery 
and apparatus (-11 billion euros), and the manufacturing of office, accounting, and 
computing machinery (-11 billion euros). When we only include indirect electricity CO2 
emissions along with the direct emissions, the aggregate impact is a decline in extra-EU 
imports worth 53 billion euros.
While the effect of the Feasible Scenario is also small for Finland, in the Efficient Scenarios, 
the value of Finnish extra-EU imports declines by between 1.8 % and 3.6 %, depending on 
the scope of the emissions. These are somewhat smaller figures than for the EU on average 
and are due to differences in the product and country-of-origin structure of Finnish 
imports vis-à-vis the EU average.
In terms of the overall tariff revenues, in the Feasible Scenario it amounts to 0.8 billion 
euros. The much wider Efficient Scenarios yield a tariff revenue of 15.2 billion euros 
and 25.2 billion euros, depending on whether or not all the indirect CO2 emissions are 
included. It is notable that this revenue will be paid to great extent by the European 
importers, companies and consumers.
The impact on the total CO2 content of imports in the Feasible Scenarios is negligible. 
In the Efficient Scenarios, we can see that the impact on the value of imports is the 
greatest for China and across non-EU Europe (excluding the UK, Switzerland, and Russia). 
Meanwhile, the CO2 content of Finnish extra-EU imports declines by between 10.0 and 
13.1 %, depending on whether all or part of the emissions are considered. 
We measure the associated global value chains and the total direct and indirect value 
added in them. Overall, they reflect well the magnitude of gross trade in the scenarios. 
When the tariff is placed, the most important individual-country value-added contribution 
losses through the decline in imports would be experienced by the UK (56.6% of all value 
added lost due to the decline of imports) and Turkey (9.0%) in the case of the narrowest 
Feasible scenario (with cement, lime and plaster). When the basic metal products are 
included to the Feasible scenario, the Chinese value added embodied in the imports falls 
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substantially. In the Efficient Scenarios, China’s role becomes even more dominant. It 
contributes roughly one half of the total value added in products that would cease to be 
imported to the EU according to the changes in the gross trade.
We find that a substantial share of the lost value added contributes to value chains for 
which the final assembly is made in the EU. In these cases, EU production needs to find a 
substitute for the imported intermediate product.
CBAM-induced changes in the value-added content of intermediate product imports to 
Finland would be negligible in case of the Feasible scenario.. Also, in the Efficient Scenario, 
the amount of value added that Finnish firms import from abroad to be used in their final 
products, or their own value added embodied in the imports, is relatively small, varying 
around 100 million euros depending on the scenarios. In relative terms, the most reliant 
industries are the manufacturing industries. This result is comparable to the EU findings, 
albeit the reliance is smaller than for the European industries on average.1
We use a computable general equilibrium model (GTAP2) that incorporates more 
economic structure to the analysis in order to study the impacts on production in the 
EU. When imports of CBAM products from non-EU countries fall, there tends to be a 
substitution effect: Imports are replaced in intermediate production or final use with 
substitute products that are acquired from the EU area (products whose price is not 
directly affected by the tariff ). This effect will boost the demand for EU products. 
In the extended Feasible Scenario, the productions of iron and steel, non-metallic 
minerals, and non-ferrous metals increase in Finland and other EU countries. Production 
also increased in industries that provide a substantial number of inputs to these sectors, 
namely mining and electricity. In the Efficient Scenario, a wide variety of industries belong 
to the CBAM. We found that production increases in most of these industries. 
However, not all industries are winners in EU countries. A substantial share of imports 
are used as intermediate products in EU production. The increase in the price of 
the intermediate products will add to the cost of final products. The weakened 
competitiveness is shown in the Feasible Scenario as production losses in the transport 
equipment, machinery and equipment, and electronics industries that use metals from 
non-EU countries as intermediate inputs. In the Efficient Scenario, the cost impact is 
notably larger due to the wider sectoral coverage and higher tariffs based on the country-
specific carbon contents. The results show that CBAM-protected industries in the EU 
1  Our reliance metric is the imported products’ relative share of the overall production value added in the EU, and 
we acknowledge that in some cases it may not correctly reflect true reliance on them. GTAP model is presented in 
2  GTAP model is presented in https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp
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may also suffer if the negative effect due to the increased production costs exceeds the 
benefits from having a comparative advantage against non-EU producers that face the 
tariff. That is what happens in the production of machinery and equipment, as well as 
electronics, whose benefits from improved competitiveness in the EU remain limited as 
they mainly export to non-EU countries. For other sectors, the impacts are negligible in 
the Feasible Scenario while in the Efficient Scenario the reallocation of resources to CBAM 
sectors implies lower production levels in most of other sectors, including, for example, 
services.
The impact of the CBAM on gross domestic product (GDP) is negligible or slightly negative 
in Finland and other EU countries, depending on its scope. In the case of the non-EU 
area, emission-intensive countries, such as China and the group of Eastern European and 
former Soviet Union countries, suffer slightly from the CBAM in the Efficient Scenario with 
country-specific tariffs based on carbon content in the non-EU countries. For other non-EU 
countries, the impacts are negligible in both scenarios.
The results from trade impact analysis, value chain analysis and economywide GTAP 
analysis are all based on the carbon tariffs calculated with carbon price of 25 EUR/tCO2. 
The effects are mainly doubled if the carbon price increases to a 50 EUR/tCO2.
There is the possibility of a retaliation by countries outside the EU, which may follow if/
when the EU impose the CBAM scheme. The impact was demonstrated with a global 
macroeconomic model (NiGEM3) that was used to measure the potential impacts of trade 
wars. Based on our analysis, it is highly likely that a resulting trade war could wipe out 
any economic benefits of the CBAMs. For example, if the rest of the world retaliates to the 
EU tariff policies with an across-the-board 2 % increase in tariffs in the rest of the world’s 
(non-commodity) goods imports from the EU countries, in the long run Finland and the 
eurozone suffer from a 0.3 % and 0.25 % GDP fall respectively. 
In any case, our empirical analysis with data on emissions embodied in EU’s imports and 
exports points towards a necessity to deal with the carbon leakage problem as we found 
signs in the data of its existence. It appears that the phases of the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) have increased the carbon content in the imported goods, especially in 
Phase 2. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the carbon content of imports has 
increased more in the product groups that are subject to the EU ETS. The carbon leakage 
rate with our estimations would be close to 20 %. This estimate is on the higher range 
compared with previous studies that have used computable general equilibrium methods 
to estimate carbon leakage.
3  https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/
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Equity, efficiency, and administration
In our discussion of the CBAM, we consider three basic aspects of its design: equity, 
efficiency, and administration. At face value, it seems that the design options of the CBAM 
necessarily create trade-offs between them. To overcome the major problems that arise 
from the administration of the CBAM (the major burden of collecting detailed information 
on emissions), there is a need for simplified, second-best, versions of the CBAM. The 
ways to simplify the design may include crude rules for quantifying the adjustment or 
limitations of the scope of the adjustments.
However, a simple design may create problems in terms of the other aspects of good 
design. It may erode the fairness of the system (Would the carbon border adjustments 
[CBAs] treat EU and non-EU countries similarly?), which would easily lead to economic 
inefficiency and legal disputes. A partial solution for that problem would be to offer 
importers the option to individually prove their actual carbon intensity with verified 
emissions data.
Fair and just CBAMs are easier to accept by countries outside the EU and enforce in the 
light of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Fairness, and rather EU´s international 
trade obligations, demand that the chosen mechanism be a pure response to carbon 
leakage, and that no other mechanisms inside the EU are used for the same purpose. In 
implementing the CBAM, it is much harder to justify the continuation of the free allocation 
of the EU ETS allowances as a safeguard for the international competitiveness of industrial 
sectors at risk of carbon leakage. A compromise solution might be the gradual phase-out 
of the free allocation, alongside the introduction of the CBAM.
From the efficiency perspective, the most feasible design would only involve cement 
and related products; this would, in all likelihood, only have a small effect on both trade 
and emissions based on our results. In the case of broader scenarios, the effect of CBAMs 
would, unsurprisingly, become greater, and thus it is expected that they will have a 
substantial impact on carbon leakage and emissions. 
Extension of the system puts increasing pressure on the level of detail in the design of 
CBAMs. For one, the CBAM should account for emissions in all stages of production and 
cover industries that use emission-intensive materials in their downstream production. 
The value chain data suggests that large quantities of emission-intensive materials 
are used in the final production of other products, such as manufactures. If the border 
adjustment is not extended to these products, it may give a competitive advantage to the 
imports to the EU that use emission-intensive materials (which are left outside the CBAM) 
as intermediate goods and thus leaves the system vulnerable to carbon leakage.
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While a carefully designed CBAM for imported products could compensate for the 
competition effect that differences in climate policy ambition has on production costs 
in the EU market, the disparity remains beyond the EU borders if a similarly ambitious 
climate policy is not conducted there. From the global climate-policy perspective this is 
inefficient if countries outside the EU turn to using more emission-intensive products of 
their own that are not burdened by similar carbon costs as those faced by EU products, 
stemming from climate policy.
As an alternative solution to free allocation, complementary tax instruments or direct 
subsidies have been proposed. For example, one way would be to complement the 
current system with an emission-added tax (Stiglitz, 2013). In essence, the emission-added 
tax (in an analogy with a value-added tax) is a consumption tax that is placed on a product 
whenever emissions are added at each stage of the supply chain, until the product is sold 
for final use. The amount of tax that the user pays is based on production emissions, less 
any of the emissions of intermediate products that have already been taxed. If products 
are exported to other regions, they would be taxed at a zero rate. On the other hand, 
imports would be subjected to the same tax treatment as EU products when they are 
sold in the EU area. However, although conceptually appealing, such an alternative policy 
approach also raises complex administrative and methodological challenges and would 
not address the leakage risk stemming from the EU ETS if the ETS remains in place.
Conclusions
Based on our analysis, it is fair to expect that the CBAM will face major implementation 
hurdles in the coming years. From the perspectives of the EU’s international legal 
obligations, efficiency, fairness, and technical challenges, it is reasonable to assume that 
the process of moving towards its full implementation will be gradual and burdensome.
As envisaged by past proposals, the most likely approach would be to test its use with a 
narrow set of imported products that are emission intensive, yet easy to administer and 
simple to produce. After considering a feasible alternative, we find that the economic 
and environmental impact of such a narrow tariff would be likely to be small. Thus, the 
implementation of such a CBAM serves more as a signal of the determination of the EU to 
address the climate problem and attendant carbon leakage than as a true solution to it.
On the other hand, if the EU introduces a more ambitious CBAM, whether initially or 
over time, it will inevitably face greater difficulties. Our results show that the global 
production linkages are complex, and an orderly and ambitious implementation of a 
CBAM faces the significant task of data collection and administration. Moreover, in our 
24
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48
results, China in particular appears as a country that will be strongly affected by the 
tariffs if they are implemented in a more ambitious way. Retaliatory countermeasures or 
avoidance strategies such as export subsidies in the country of origin could easily remove 
any economic benefits of the tariffs. Thus, one should exercise caution, especially when 
considering a CBAM as a possible source of EU budget resources. 
If the EU, implements a CBAM in a way that appears contrary to WTO rules in order to 
finance the relief package or for other non-climate related reasons, it will undermine 
the credibility of any EU efforts towards international climate cooperation, including 
the upcoming United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
conference COP26. Rather, to avoid harming the progress within the UN climate 
conference and taking measures that appear contrary to international commitments and 
the rules-based international order, the EU should design the CBAM in a manner that aims 
at strengthening multilateral cooperation on climate change.
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1 Introduction
In line with the UNFCCC and the Paris Climate Agreement, the European Union (EU) and 
Finland have committed themselves to significantly reducing their human-induced carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions influenced in order 
to mitigate global climate change. This is expected to lead to an increase in the price of 
CO2 through, inter alia, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the tightening of 
carbon/energy taxation. The increase in the price of CO2 emissions should lead to the 
development and use of technologies that displace, or at least reduce, the CO2 intensity of 
production and consumption. 
One of the key risks of the climate policy, both for the climate and for the economy, is 
that rising prices can lead to carbon leakage (i.e., the transfer of polluting production to 
countries that are not committed to strong mitigation measures). One proposed solution 
to the problem is the use of carbon tariffs on imports from non-EU countries. Accordingly, 
on 16 July 2019, Ursula von der Leyen—then candidate for President of the European 
Commission—stated in her political guidelines that she would present a carbon border 
tax to avoid carbon leakage. According to the preliminary plan, the approach would be 
sectoral, step-by-step, and fully in line with international trade rules.
On 23 July 2020, the European Commission launched public consultations on two 
initiatives that aim to maximize the impact of taxation in meeting the EU’s climate 
goals. The revision of the Energy Tax Directive (ETD) and the creation of a carbon border 
adjustment mechanism (CBAM) were identified in the European Green Deal as means 
to help with the transition towards a greener and more sustainable economy, together 
with the European Green Deal investment plan, the just transition mechanism, and other 
measures. In addition, the European Commission indicated that green own budget 
resources—including revenue from the CBAM—could contribute to financing the future 
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EU budget, for recovery and growth in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.4 This report 
studies the feasibility and economic impact of carbon tariffs. Carbon duties have been 
argued to work well in principle, for example, they can be used as an instrument to put 
pressure on third countries to have less polluting production (Hoel, 1996; Kruse-Andersen 
and Sørensen, 2019). However, due to the practical problems and uncertainties associated 
with tariffs, further research is needed on both the feasibility and effectiveness of the 
different models and their possible alternatives, such as a VAT-based carbon tax or a 
carbon-sensitive mechanism for cement (as proposed by France: non-paper, Feb 2016).
From a practical point of view, the implementation of accurate duties requires appropriate 
information on the embedded carbon emissions of products and the CBAM regulation 
of products. The identification of embedded carbon emissions raises challenges in terms 
of the methods used and the availability and reliability of the data to be applied. If the 
CBAM means higher customs duties or other trade restrictions on products from non-EU 
countries in practice, it may violate international trade rules and agreements, and thus 
its use may lead to the use of counter-tariffs that are harmful among others to the EU 
economy. Such measures can also target different EU countries and economic sectors 
through production value chains in different ways, which in turn can also create political 
conflicts within the EU. 
4  https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/news/commission-launches-public-consultations-energy-taxati-
on-and-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en
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2 Background
2.1 Previous literature
A successful fight against climate change requires a considerable decrease in the use 
of carbon-based materials, especially in the various ways they are used to produce 
energy in production and transportation. By raising the relative price of carbon-intensive 
production, consumption patterns and thereby production itself will adjust and the use of 
carbon (oil, coal, natural gas, etc.) and thereby CO2 emissions will decline.
The EU ETS was constructed in order to make it more costly to emit CO2 in production.
5 
If the producer does not decrease the CO2 intensity of its product, the product’s relative 
price increases and it loses market shares. It is market-based policy instrument as it allows 
trade with EU ETS allowances, but it is also an administrative instrument, used in order to 
distribute the allowances and to control their use (Kokko, 2019). The ETS mainly affects 
production within the EU. Although, the EU can make bilateral agreements with third 
countries to build a link between the EU ETS and other trading systems, generally, the EU 
ETS erodes the competitiveness of EU production vis-à-vis production in third countries, 
ceteris paribus. This may lead to carbon leakage (see Section 5). The ETS aims to lead to 
more energy efficient and carbon-neutral production, new technological innovations, and 
new smaller-carbon-print products that will increase competitiveness and market shares 
in the future.6
Carbon border adjustments (CBAs) are a way to balance at the EU’s external border the 
difference between EU and other countries in regard to the production costs that arise 
from the EU ETS as a way to “level the playing field.” However, there are many economic, 
5  Aldy et al. (2010) provided a non-technical discussion of different issues concerning the design of climate miti-
gation policies. Monjon and Quirion (2010) discussed CBAs from the point of view of the EU. Different market-based 
carbon-pricing mechanisms are discussed by, among others, Aldy and Stavins (2011).
6  There are of course other factors that can be thought to have a similar impact of raising production costs, such 
as stricter labor and environmental protection laws.
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legal, technical, and political considerations that need to be addressed. The first 
consideration is an administrative form of the CBAM. In principal, it may have a link to the 
EU ETS and its allowances or it may be based on, for example, separate import tariffs.
When CBAs are thought of as import tariffs, possibly with an addition of export rebates, a 
rise in tariffs raises the price of imports, which affects consumer behavior as well as firms’ 
choices for intermediate inputs and investment goods. Among other things, this may raise 
production costs, decrease competitiveness, and affect productivity growth and thus be 
an economic consideration, even in the EU. As a result, however, foreign firms outside the 
EU should have an incentive to lower their CO2 emissions, which would lead to, not only 
decreased carbon leakage from the EU, but lower global GHG emissions. Foreign countries 
may also be induced to implement their own ETSs or join the EU system. However, 
Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford (2018) argued that the main effect of CBAs is to 
shift the economic burden of developed-world climate policies to the developing world 
through terms-of-trade effects.
Third countries may interpret such higher tariffs as protection for domestic EU production. 
If so they may argue that the CBAM is against World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations 
and thus a legal consideration (this is discussed more thoroughly in Section 3). But even if 
EU measures do abide by WTO regulations, they may still be met with countermeasures, 
most probably with similar or even higher tariffs being set by the affected third countries. 
In the past few years we have seen a rise in tariffs, notably between the United States 
and China. This may also be coupled to a more general lack of respect for the multilateral 
trade rules of the WTO as the Appellate mechanism of the dispute settlement is paralyzed. 
Consequently, a pattern of tit-for-tat tariff hikes has been established. This is a political 
consideration.
There are also technical considerations, at least in the form of difficulties in establishing 
how CO2 intensive the production of a given good is in the EU relative to any given third 
country (see, e.g., the discussion in the study of Houser et al., 2008). A CBA cannot be 
imposed if the imported product is equally or less CO2 intensive than EU production. The 
CBA measures need to be established in a credible, legally just, and fair way. Furthermore, 
given global value-added chains and the use of imported intermediate products, the level 
of CO2 emissions in any given product may rapidly become blurred.
As CBAs have not yet been implemented (with the exception of a limited subnational 
application to electricity imports in the state of California), there is little direct empirical 
evidence of the impact they may have in the short term or the long term. An Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report by Condon and Ignaciuk 
(2013) provided a discussion of earlier literature. CBAs are a second-best solution. The 
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first-best solution is to implement a world-wide carbon tax that would set a price on GHG 
emissions.
According to the results of Babiker (2005), derived using a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model,7 significant carbon leakage may occur from tightening climate 
policy, possibly resulting in an increase in global emissions. The topic was further 
discussed by Babiker and Rutherford (2005). According to Monjon and Quirion (2011), 
output-based allocation (i.e., free allowances in proportion to current production) is less 
effective than border adjustment in diminishing leakage, but more effective in decreasing 
production losses in energy-intensive sectors. The most efficient way to halt leakage is 
auctioning with CBAs. Another way could be to have auctioning in the electricity sector 
and output-based allocation in energy-intensive industries. Winchester, Paltsev and Reilly 
(2011) argued that CBAs are a costly method of reducing leakage, but that they may be an 
effective strategy for coercion. On the other hand, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2009) argued 
that the benefits from CBAs would be too small to justify their administrative complexity 
or their negative effects on international trade. This is because the tariffs would mostly be 
small, they would only make a very little reduction in emission leakage, and they would do 
little to protect import-competing industries.
Manders and Veenendaal (2008) used a global general equilibrium model to assess 
the effects of CBAs that are placed to protect the competitiveness of energy-intensive 
industries in the EU. They only found modest effects on competitiveness because, among 
other things, intra-EU trade is much more important than extra-EU trade. On the other 
hand, if only the EU adopts a strict CO2 ceiling, the impact on global emissions is very 
small. Their results indicate that, if the EU acts unilaterally and without CBAs, the EU gross 
domestic product (GDP) will decrease by 0.7 % and world GDP by 0.3 %. The decline 
in the EU comes from energy-intensive ETS sectors. Output in non-ETS sectors would 
increase slightly. CBAs would mitigate the effects. According to Monjon and Quirion 
(2011), EU climate policy would lead to a decrease in energy-intensive production but this 
would mainly be due to a reduction in European demand rather than a decrease in EU 
competitiveness in the global market.
A number of other research studies indicate that CBAs would not neutralize all the 
negative output effects of the ETS. According to Burniaux, Château, and Duval (2010), the 
effect of CBAs on global welfare is slightly negative. Total energy-intensive production 
declines at the global level, and the effect comes from countries with the ETS. There is 
some output leakage. They argue that CBAs can reduce carbon leakage if the number 
of ETS countries is small because then leakage mainly takes place through a loss in 
7  Balistreri, Böhringer and Rutherford (2018) discussed how different modelling choices affect the results.
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international trade competitiveness rather than through a decline in world fossil fuel 
prices. On the other hand, Gros (2009) found that CBAs increase welfare.
CBAs do not necessarily cover the output losses incurred by the domestic energy-
intensive industries they are intended to protect. On the one hand, these industries 
may use carbon-intensive intermediate inputs produced by energy-intensive industries 
elsewhere. Furthermore, energy-intensive industries are more negatively affected by 
carbon pricing itself and are more prone to the effects of a contraction in market size and 
competitiveness losses (Burniaux et al., 2010). Also, Aldy and Pizer (2015) argued that a 
unilateral domestic climate change mitigation policy would lead to a decrease in energy-
intensive industries’ output and an increase in net imports. 
Finally, the legal implications of CBAs, and notably their compatibility with international 
trade law, have been extensively studied in the related literature, with generally favorable 
but ultimately inconclusive results. Following earlier studies on the legality of border 
tax adjustments (BTAs) for environmental and energy taxes, Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) 
offered one of the earliest analyses of border adjustments and their legality as a tool of 
climate policy, concluding that a CBA for imports and exports would be admissible under 
WTO rules provided it is calculated on the basis of a best available technology standard. 
De Cendra (2006) analyzed the legality of border adjustments and concluded that the 
relevant WTO rules lack clear guidance on the question. A joint report by the WTO and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) of 2009 affirms that WTO rules permit 
the use of CBAs, provided the design avoids an arbitrary and unjustified discrimination or 
disguised restriction on international trade. Likewise, Hillman (2013)—a former member of 
the WTO Appellate Body—echoed the view that CBAs can be legal with the correct design. 
Pauwelyn (2013) and Holzer (2014) shared this assessment and discussed the legality of 
alternative design options. Mehling, van Asselt, Droege, Das, and Verkuijl (2019) reviewed 
the literature and offered recommendations for CBA design that would minimize the risk 
of a legal challenge.
2.2  Previous proposals 
2.2.1  Overview
To date, three policy proposals have been tabled at the European level, reaching various 
stages of the legislative process. The first was floated by the European Commission in 2007 
as part of an unpublished draft amending the EU ETS directive and would have inserted 
a provision outlining a “Future Allowance Import Requirement” (FAIR). The second was 
a political initiative launched by the French government in 2009 to include importers 
into the EU ETS through a “carbon inclusion mechanism” (CIM). The third and most 
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recent proposal was initiated by the French government in 2016 (and circulated again 
in a shortened version in 2019) and targeted leakage from the cement sector. All three 
proposals are summarized briefly in a table at the end of this subsection, and the French 
government proposal of 2016 is described in greater detail in the following subsection. 
All three proposals are structured along similar lines. Firstly—and importantly—instead of 
introducing a new tax or other type of policy constraint, they all seek to include importers 
in the EU ETS. This makes sense because the relevant energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries are already subject to the EU ETS as their main sectoral climate policy. It also 
avoids the requirement of a unanimous vote in the council, something that any measure 
of a primarily fiscal nature would face, and thus faces fewer hurdles in the European 
legislative process.
Secondly, past proposals strike a balance between environmental benefit and ease 
of implementation by only covering products from those energy-intensive sectors 
considered to be at risk of carbon leakage under the EU ETS and, in one case, even suggest 
starting with a subset of products with limited trade intensity. Along the same lines, they 
avoid the need to determine the exact carbon content of foreign products by relying 
instead on the average sectoral emissions of European producers. The 2009 and 2016 
proposals, moreover, envisage giving importers an opportunity to prove that their actual 
emissions performance exceeds the average performance. Not only does this shift the 
administrative burden of emissions measurement to importers, but it is also better aligned 
with the international trade rules discussed in Section 3.
Thirdly, the proposals all begin by extending the duty to surrender allowances under 
the EU ETS to all products from these sectors, regardless of the country of origin. That 
is preferable from the perspective of international trade law as differentiation between 
countries can be construed as being discriminatory. Still, the proposals variously suggest 
exempting imports from countries that have either acceded to an international climate 
treaty or enacted comparable mitigation policies to those in place in Europe, without 
setting out in detail how that determination would be made. Elaborating a robust, 
objective methodology with which to compare climate policy ambition across countries 
is intrinsically difficult as any differentiation between countries may be interpreted 
as arbitrary discrimination. Moreover, it would be likely to be the most vulnerable 
component under international trade law. According favorable treatment to less 
economically less advanced countries—as the 2009 proposal envisioned—can be more 
easily justified.
Fourthly, all three proposals would result in the introduction of a CBA alongside free 
allocation, only adjusting only for the allowances that an average EU manufacturer would 
still need to acquire on the market after obtaining its share of freely allocated allowances. 
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However, the amendment tabled by the Committee on Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety (ENVI) Committee in December 2016 marked a departure from this approach 
in that it would have immediately ended all free allocation to sectors covered by the 
carbon inclusion mechanism, but then would also adjust for the entire compliance 
obligation rather than only for the difference between freely allocated allowances 
and actual emissions. Importantly, none of the proposals would adjust for the share of 
allowances freely allocated to domestic producers—doing so would constitute a double 
benefit for domestic producers and thus risk being considered discriminatory.
The proposals differ in terms of how they would have treated exports, with the 2007 FAIR 
proposal expressly setting out a procedure to issue allowances to exporters and the 2009 
non-paper declaring that the treatment of exports should be decided after further study. 
Favoring exports under a CBA incurs a heightened legal risk under international trade law, 
including a risk under rules prohibiting export subsidies. Possibly in recognition of this 
risk, the 2016 non-paper abandoned the favorable treatment of exports.
Fifthly and finally, the amendment proposed by the ENVI Committee in 2016 recognized 
the importance of a robust process, calling for a prior impact assessment that includes 
stakeholder consultations and a feasibility study. While it does not set out in greater detail 
who would be invited to participate in such stakeholder consultations, the established 
case law of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has repeatedly highlighted the need 
to ensure fair, transparent, and inclusive negotiations with affected countries prior to the 
implementation of environmentally motivated trade restrictions. 
Table 2.2.1.1 Previous proposals
Year & 
Proposal
Sectoral Coverage Country Coverage Exports 
Included?
Calculation
2007 FAIR 
Proposal
Sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage (methodology not 
specified)
All except those taking com-
parable action or operating an 
ETS linked to the EU ETS
Yes, based on 
actual exports
The average carbon intensity 
of relevant EU goods, corrected 
for average free allocation
2009 French 
non-paper
Sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage 
(methodology as used in 
the EU ETS)
All except “less advanced 
countries” and those either 
imposing an equivalent car-
bon cost or participating in a 
(qualified) future internatio-
nal climate treaty
Possibly, pen-
ding further 
study
The average carbon intensity 
of relevant EU goods, correct-
ed for benchmark-based free 
allocation
2016 French 
non-paper
Initially, the cement and 
clinker sector, to be gra-
dually expanded to other 
sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage
All except countries with ade-
quate mitigation efforts and/
or comparable carbon price
No The average carbon intensity 
of relevant EU goods (or less, if 
lower emissions are demon-
strated) corrected for bench-
mark-based free allocation 
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2.2.2 T he CIM (2016)
In February 2016, the French government circulated a non-paper setting out a “carbon 
inclusion mechanism” for the EU ETS that proposed covering imported products based on 
three criteria: (1) a high carbon intensity and a significant share of total GHG emissions in 
Europe; (2) the easy determination of the carbon content; and (3) a limited impact on the 
downstream sector (France, 2016). It also highlighted the need for a gradual introduction, 
starting with sectors that have a low trade impact. Specifically, the French proposal 
therefore envisaged testing the approach with the cement sector, which meets the three 
criteria above and has low and unevenly distributed trade intensity across Europe. Under 
this proposal, importers would be included in the EU ETS so that they have to surrender 
a volume of allowances equivalent to that which an average European manufacturer 
would have acquired in the market for the same quantity of the product. In the absence 
of emissions data for imported products, the volume of allowances to be surrendered for 
imports would thus be based on the difference between the average carbon content of 
European products and the European benchmark-based free allocation value. Importers 
who are able to demonstrate better emissions performance than the European average 
with a “carbon emissions certificate” could lower the required amount of allowances 
accordingly.
For the cement sector, the benchmarks for clinker would have served for calculating the 
adjustment. The non-paper also acknowledged that mitigation efforts in other countries 
would have to be taken into account and indicated that cement importers from countries 
where its carbon content is priced and requires equivalent efforts from manufacturers 
should be excluded. Rather than replace free allocation from the outset, the non-paper 
suggested that this mechanism would allow the progressive reduction of free allocation as 
the volume of auctions increases. Moreover, for its operational implementation, it outlined 
a simplified process building on the existing Single Administrative Document (SAD) 
employed by customs services and linking the EU ETS allowance registry with the EU 
customs database for automatic calculation of the volume of allowances to surrender. The 
non-paper anticipated that this proposal could be adopted by way of a new article in the 
EU ETS directive, describing the basic principles, the criteria for the inclusion of products, 
and the method for calculating the amount of allowances to be surrendered. Technical 
details, such as the designation of included products, could then occur through more 
flexible regulatory acts.
While the European Parliament was deliberating amendments to the EU ETS in December 
2016, ENVI took up the proposal and included it in its recommended amendments to 
the reform package (European Parliament, 2016). Specifically, one amendment called for 
the establishment of an “import inclusion scheme” that “shall require importers in sectors 
not having a trade intensity above 10 % in the years 2009 to 2013 covered by the EU 
ETS to acquire and surrender allowances for imported products.” Unlike the mechanism 
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outlined in the non-paper, this scheme would completely replace free allocation to sectors 
and subsectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage. The amendment further mandated 
the European Commission with adopting a “delegated act,” specifying the exact design 
of such a mechanism based on a prior impact assessment that included a stakeholder 
consultation and feasibility study. Moreover, the scheme was to be “fully compatible with 
WTO rules.” Still, despite the committee endorsement, this amendment was rejected in 
February 2017 when the European Parliament voted against it in the plenary.
Table 2.2.2.1  Details of the French Non-Paper (Feb. 2016) and EP ENVI Committee Amendment Proposal  
(Dec. 2016)
Design Feature French Non-Paper 
(Feb. 2016)
EP ENVI Committee Amendment Proposal 
(Dec. 2016)
Scope and cove-
rage
For imports/exports Imports Imports
Sectoral/product 
scope
Initially, the cement sector (starting 
with products with low trade intensity, 
but a large contribution to emissions & 
an easily determined carbon content)
Sectors covered by the EU ETS with a trade 
intensity no greater than 10% 
Country coverage “Developments on carbon pricing wor-
ldwide” are to be considered, products 
from regions with “equivalent efforts” 
are to be excluded
Not specified
The determination of 
embedded carbon
Emissions scope Not specified (most likely, only direct 
emissions)
Not specified (most likely, only direct 
emissions)
Benchmark The assumption that imported products 
have the same carbon intensity as the 
average EU producer, but with possibility 
for importers to prove the lower carbon 
intensity through a “carbon emissions 
certificate”
Not specified
The determination of 
adjustment level
The carbon price in 
the EU
Not specified (based on the EUA price) Not specified
The carbon price in 
foreign countries
The explicit carbon price taken into ac-
count
Not specified
Revenue use Not specified, although it mentions 
using part of revenue towards free allo-
cation in sectors not covered by the CIM 
Not specified
The process The basic principles in the EU ETS di-
rective, and details in regulatory acts, 
possibly avoiding co-decisions (model: 
Art. 24(1))
The SAD declaration used by customs 
services to interface with the EU ETS re-
gistry, allowing the automatic determi-
nation of compliance needs
The commission adopts the delegated act 
with design details; impact assessment, 
stakeholder consultation and feasibility 
study precede roll-out, which is timed to 
coincide with UNFCCC facilitative dialogue
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2.3 The key characteristics of CBAs
The previous proposals show that there is no single way to implement CBAs. Rather, their 
implementation necessitates the definition of key characteristics (Mehling et al., 2019).
2.3.1  Scope and coverage
Any CBA has to determine its scope and coverage, that is, it has to specify the products 
and trade flows affected by it, the sectors or geographies it applies to, and for which types 
of carbon constraints it adjusts. A number of design considerations emerge from the 
literature and case law.
Trade flow: Imports and/or exports
In terms of trade flow, a CBA can be applied to imports only, exports only, or both. 
Although economic research has suggested that applying a CBA to both imports and 
exports can increase its effectiveness in preventing leakage, the proposals to date typically 
limit the scope to imports. Doing so hedges against classification as a prohibited export 
subsidy under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (de Cendra, 
2006) and avoids providing an incentive for domestic producers to increase the carbon 
intensity of exports, which could potentially result in an emission increase. Even with this 
limitation, a CBA on imports will still secure the majority of its potential benefits.
Sectoral coverage
When designing a CBA, the implementing jurisdiction has to determine which sectors 
and products should be affected by it. Only including products from sectors with a high 
carbon cost and trade exposure, as well as limited ability to pass through the cost through 
to consumers, greatly reduces the administrative and technical burden of any CBA while 
still delivering significant environmental benefits. Such sectors include cement, steel, 
and aluminum where the value of embodied carbon products, as a percentage of value 
added, tends to be relatively high compared with manufactured products. By ensuring 
that the CBA only covers sectors where inclusion affords clear environmental benefits, this 
narrow scope helps meet the conditions set out in international trade law. It should also 
be politically useful, as the affected sectors tend to be influential domestic constituencies, 
yet their inclusion does not cause a strong shift in the terms of trade to the detriment of 
developing countries. 
A caveat of the limited scope is that it may create a competitive advantage for 
extra-EU goods that carry the emission-intensive products as their components to the 
EU, thus avoiding the tariff.
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The geographic scope
Another design choice related to coverage is the geographic scope of the CBA, that 
is, which countries are affected by the CBA. To ensure observance of Article I of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and prevent the avoidance (“trans-
shipment”) strategies of importers, a CBA can opt for a sectoral focus instead of targeting 
or exempting countries based on country-specific attributes, such as domestic climate 
policies or participation in a common climate agreement. However, uniform application 
to all countries can compromise the leveraging effect of a CBA, however. Moreover, the 
exemption of least-developed countries (LDCs)—who only contribute minimally to global 
emissions—would be compatible with the environmental objective of the CBA and has 
been a consistent feature in past policy proposals.
Policy coverage
A CBA aims to adjust for asymmetrical climate policy efforts, but to be viable, it has to 
specify the domestic policies it seeks to adjust for. Determining a differential in ambition 
is easiest with policies that create an explicit carbon price, rendering the latter a natural 
starting point for a CBA. However, less than 20 % of global emissions are currently covered 
by an explicit price on carbon, and price levels tend to be significantly lower than the cost 
of compliance with other non-price carbon constraints (World Bank et al., 2020). Over 
time, as data and methodologies improve, a CBA could seek to adjust for the differential 
between the effective carbon prices faced by domestic and foreign producers in a sector, 
including both explicit and implicit carbon prices. The inclusion of policies addressing 
CO2 emissions would already capture a significant share of the emissions associated with 
imported products, although extension to policies for the emissions of other relevant 
gases and black carbon, converted using accepted global warming potential metrics, 
could be pursued to successively increase the efficiency of the CBA.
2.3.2  The determination of embedded carbon
Because CBAs adjust for differences in embedded carbon and applicable carbon 
constraints, they also have to contain a decision on the scope of the included emissions 
and a methodology to calculate those emissions.
Applying a CBA requires first determining (or estimating) the amount of embodied carbon 
in a given product. The carbon content of a product can be determined by calculating 
the emissions from the production process, which involves emissions from energy inputs 
such as electricity and heat, as well as emissions from the production process itself. Ideally, 
this determination would occur at each production facility based on actual emissions, but 
direct emissions measurement is not always practicable and may face legal challenges. 
Therefore, a CBA can alternatively be based on standardized benchmarks that serve as a 
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proxy for the carbon intensity of products, with the benchmark values reflecting average 
performance and the best or worst available technology in a sector, either at a national, 
regional, or global level.
In the absence of suitable or accurate data, a jurisdiction imposing a CBA could also base 
the determination of embedded carbon on the average direct and indirect emissions 
intensity of its domestic goods. Past policy proposals, such as the 2007 FAIR proposal and 
the 2009 CIM proposal (see above, Section 2.2), avoided technical complexity and legal 
risk by basing the calculation of embedded carbon on the average carbon intensity of 
domestic goods. As aggregate values, however, standardized benchmarks will invariably 
fail to represent the emissions performance of individual emitters accurately. In line 
with judicial precedent (see below, Section 3.1.1), foreign producers can be afforded a 
transparent, accessible process to document actual emissions with third-party–verified 
data and thereby demonstrate that their carbon intensity is lower than a sectoral average 
benchmark. Importantly, that option introduces a permissible element of differentiation 
that contributes to the leveraging purpose of the CBA and incentivizes mitigation in 
exporting countries (Cosbey et al., 2019).
2.3.3  The adjustment level
Once embedded emissions have been calculated, the level of adjustment needs to be 
determined, factoring in any exemptions and rebates afforded to domestic producers. As 
a default, the adjustment can be based on a sectoral benchmark multiplied by the amount 
of product and the explicit carbon price applied in the imposing country, which, in the 
case of a variable carbon price (e.g., in an ETS), can be averaged across a specified period. 
Where no explicit carbon price exists, or when the importing jurisdiction has introduced 
multiple complementary instruments in the covered sector, the determination of the net 
policy differential is considerably more difficult. 
Importantly, the CBA is only meant to adjust for the differential between the foreign and 
domestic climate policy cost in the covered sectors. For that reason, the level of the CBA 
should reflect any exemptions, rebates, or free allocation in the importing country, as well 
as any carbon constraints applied to imports in their country of origin, all of which are 
then deducted from the determined level. Moreover, as with the calculation of embedded 
emissions, each exporting emitter should be given an opportunity to submit third-party–
verified data on marginal abatement cost under all applicable carbon constraints. A 
transparent and impartial process involving independent third parties or an international 
body could help avoid political or judicial challenges.
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2.3.4  Revenue use
Revenue collected under a CBA can accrue to the general budget, be recycled to the 
public or specific sectors, be used to further environmental goals, or be used as climate 
finance for the developing countries affected. For political reasons, it may be expedient 
to at least partly allocate revenue to developing countries in order to support domestic 
mitigation and adaptation efforts, as well as to build capacity for measurement, reporting, 
and verification, ultimately favouring the emergence of a more homogenous climate 
landscape. 
This kind of revenue use can greatly improve the political prospects of the CBA and has 
parallels in international law, for instance, the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol. Moreover, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement encourages developed 
country parties to provide financial resources to assist developing country parties with 
respect to both mitigation and adaptation.
39
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48 CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPACT ON FINLAND AND THE EU
3 Implementation issues
3.1 Legal considerations
This subsection provides a discussion of the different characteristics from the legal 
perspective and provides the basics of the underlying legal framework. 
3.1.1  EU law
The legal implications and risks of the prospective CBAM will greatly depend on the policy 
mechanism used for its implementation, which, at the most general level, could take the 
form of a price-based instrument, a quantity-based economic instrument, or a regulatory 
mandate. In its consultation for the CBAM legislative proposal, the European Commission 
has listed four main options: introducing a new carbon tax on imported and domestic 
products, introducing a new carbon customs duty or tax on imports, extending the EU ETS 
to cover imports, or creating a separate pool of allowances outside the EU ETS from which 
importers would be required to buy allowances at a price mirroring that of EU allowances 
(European Commission, 2020a).
Each option has, for instance, far-reaching implications under EU law, particularly with 
regard to the applicable legislative procedure and revenue use: Under Article 192, 
paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a tax would require 
unanimity in the council unless the council first unanimously exercises a passerelle clause 
contained in that provision, a steep political challenge. The option of a customs duty, 
by contrast, may be adopted with a qualified majority vote, but would potentially affect 
the tariff schedules adopted by the EU under international, regional, and bilateral trade 
agreements. If the CBAM is introduced as a measure related to the EU ETS rather than as 
a fiscal measure, the passage of the relevant legislation would very likely only require a 
qualified majority vote in the council. 
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Similarly, revenue from a tax would accrue to Member States, whereas customs duty 
revenue is shared between the EU budget and the Member States, and EU ETS revenue 
currently falls within the purview of Member States. However, the role of CBA revenue 
has already featured in the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework for the 
EU budget, potentially contributing to the future financing of the EU budget and of the 
Recovery Plan for Europe (European Commission, 2020b).
3.1.2  International trade law
While the introduction of a CBA raises legal questions in more areas than one, 
international trade law is particularly relevant because of how the measure will be applied 
to goods traded across national borders. From the earliest announcement of the European 
CBA in Ursula von der Leyen’s political guidelines to various subsequent statements and 
documents, the European Commission and its president have consistently emphasized 
the need to ensure that it be “fully compliant with World Trade Organization rules” (von der 
Leyen, 2019; similarly European Commission, 2019b; European Commission, 2020a). 
At the heart of the WTO regime lies the GATT, which dates back to 1947 and is a legally 
binding international treaty with broad membership. According to its preamble, the 
GATT aims at a “substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade” and at “the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” A central tenet of 
the GATT—and a cornerstone of the multilateral trading system—is the principle of non-
discrimination in international trade. For trade in goods, it consists of two elements: the 
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment obligation, set out in Article I of the GATT, and the 
national treatment obligation, set out in Article III of the GATT. 
Article I:1 of the GATT prohibits parties from discriminating between “like” products 
originating in, or destined for, any other party, whereas Article III of the GATT prohibits 
discrimination between domestic products and “like” imported products. What constitutes 
the “likeness” of domestic and imported products is not defined in the GATT, but has 
been determined to be based on the following in relevant case law: whether they share 
common physical characteristics and properties, end uses, and tariff classifications; 
whether they compete in the marketplace; and on relevant consumer preferences.8 
8  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 
adopted 1 November 1996, 20-21; Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 99.
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Importantly, differences in the processes and production methods (PPMs) that do not 
leave a physical trace in the final product—such as the source of energy used during 
production—are not generally considered to affect the likeness of products.9 Although 
the jurisprudence on like products remains inconclusive and has seen some evolution in 
recent case law,10 there is a high probability that goods produced with low-carbon PPMs 
and carbon-intensive goods would be considered like products despite their different 
embedded carbon emissions. Any differentiation between such products that leads to a 
competitive disadvantage could thus be considered discriminatory (Pauwelyn, 2013).
Under international trade law, treating domestic and imported goods differently based 
on the carbon intensity of their production therefore incurs a risk of judicial challenge 
(Mehling et al., 2019). A CBA that imposes a greater compliance burden on carbon-
intensive imports than that faced by less carbon-intensive domestic products, for instance, 
could be considered discriminatory because such differentiation on the basis of (actual 
or assumed) carbon intensity is intrinsic to the notion of a CBA. However, and because 
differentiation is critical to its environmental effectiveness, it is difficult to envision 
how an effective CBA can altogether avoid risking a violation of the principle of non-
discrimination set out in the GATT. 
For the same reason, the literature on CBAs has routinely highlighted the importance of 
Article XX of the GATT, which can provisionally justify measures that would otherwise be 
considered discriminatory (Condon & Ignaciuk, 2013). Two such general exceptions relate 
to measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” (Article XX(b)) 
or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption” 
(Article XX(g)). Both the wording of these provisions and their broad interpretation in past 
case law suggest that measures aimed at reducing GHG emissions can fall under either 
exception (UNEP & WTO, 2009). 
However, several conditions need to be met in order for Article XX’s sections (b) and (g) 
to be successfully invoked, including two that have a bearing on the legal implications: 
the need for a sufficient connection between the CBA and its environmental objective, 
which is inferred from the wording “necessary to” and “relating to”; and a requirement that 
the measure not be applied in a manner that would constitute “a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,” which 
is derived from the introductory paragraph—or “chapeau”—of Article XX.
9  Going back to, notably, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Panel Report, DS21/R, DS21/R, 3 Septem-
ber 1991, unadopted.
10  See, for instance, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Prod-
ucts, Panel Report, WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012, para. 7.78; more generally, also see Potts, 2008.
42
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48
For the CBAM currently being elaborated by the EU, this means that if in some cases 
relatively less carbon-intensive EU products face a lower compliance burden than 
relatively more carbon-intensive foreign products, it risks being considered discriminatory 
and the admissibility of the CBAM under international trade law will depend on whether it 
can be provisionally justified by one or more of the general exceptions found under Article 
XX of the GATT. As mentioned above, Article XX sections (b) and (g) are the exceptions of 
greatest relevance in this context, and both require a sufficient connection between the 
measure and the legitimate objective specified in Article XX. Additionally, past case law 
has interpreted the “chapeau” of Article XX to require that application of the measure in 
question be preceded by a transparent, fair, and inclusive process of “across-the-board” 
negotiations.11
In the only formal trade dispute involving an environment-related border adjustment to 
date, the United States v. Superfund case, a GATT panel affirmed a BTA imposed by the 
United States under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 on 
certain imported substances produced from feedstock chemicals subject to a domestic 
excise tax.12 Importers were required to furnish the information necessary to determine 
the amount of feedstock chemicals and thus of tax to be imposed, but if they failed to do 
so, the United States would impose a fixed penalty based on the value of the product. 
While the latter was considered discriminatory, a provision foreseen in the legislation 
enabling the US to apply a baseline rate equal to the predominant method of production 
in the US was seen as sufficient to demonstrate equivalence under Article III of the GATT 
between the domestic excise tax and the border measure applied to imports.13 
In a more recent case, United States v. Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body 
conversely held that a rule under the Clean Air Act regulating the composition and 
emission effects of gasoline in order to prevent air pollution was discriminatory by setting 
out different calculation methods for domestic and foreign gasoline.14 In particular, the 
Appellate Body objected to the fact that importers were subject to a default “statutory 
baseline” that had no connection to the particular gasoline imported, while refiners of 
domestic gasoline were assessed against an individual baseline representing the quality 
of gasoline produced by each refiner. The Appellate Body thought that this constituted 
11  United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, 
adopted 6 November 1998.
12  United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Panel Report, L/6175 – 34S/136, adopted 17 
June 1987. In assessing whether this border adjustment complied with the national treatment obligation, the panel 
cited Article III of the GATT, stating that it “permits the imposition of an internal tax on imported products provided 
the like domestic products are taxed, directly or indirectly, at the same or a higher rate” (see ibid., para. 5.2.7).
13  Ibid., para. 5.2.9.
14  United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS2/AB/R, ad-
opted 20 May 1996.
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an “unjustifiable discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade” in 
the context of Article XX(g) of the GATT.15 It also rejected the practical argument that 
verification on foreign soil, and subsequent enforcement actions, would be so difficult 
as to rule out individual baselines. Here, the Appellate Body pointed to the possibility of 
relying on documentary evidence provided by the foreign refiners themselves—citing, 
inter alia, the option of third-party verification—and also highlighted the importance of 
cooperation on such administrative arrangements.16
International trade law also plays an important role in determining the permissibility of 
a CBAM that applies to exports in addition to, or instead of, imports only. Including both 
imports and exports in its coverage would maximize the ability of the CBAM to address 
competitiveness, impacts, and leakage, because limiting coverage to imports does not 
level the playing field for European products being sold in international markets. At 
the same time, the coverage of exports also incurs considerable legal risk. Exempting 
or rebating the carbon constraint imposed on European producers under the EU ETS 
when their products leave the EU risks that the CBA will be classified as a prohibited 
export subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the 
SCM Agreement). Under that treaty, a subsidy is defined as a financial contribution by a 
government that confers a benefit. This broad definition includes foregone government 
revenue that would otherwise be due, as is the case when a government allocates 
allowances for free where auctioning has otherwise become the default, when it 
compensates for relevant costs, or when it altogether exempts exporters from compliance. 
Such relief will further be considered a prohibited subsidy if its award is made contingent 
on export performance, that is, if there is a relationship of conditionality or dependence 
between the award and exportation. Because an export CBA would be conditional on 
exportation, it could be, prima facie, classified as a prohibited subsidy. Importantly, the 
SCM Agreement contains no environmental justification comparable to Article XX of the 
GATT. Hence a violation of the SCM Agreement cannot be “healed” through recourse to 
a legitimate exception, as it can under the GATT if certain conditions are met. Moreover, 
because a CBAM that extends to exports would narrow the scope of the EU ETS by 
exempting exports, such a CBAM might be less successful in invoking the environmental 
exceptions of Article XX and also increases its chances of violating the GATT in addition to 
the SCM Agreement. 
15  Ibid., 29.
16  An exception could only apply for cases where “the source of imported gasoline could not be determined or a 
baseline could not be established because of an absence of data” (see ibid., 27).
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3.1.3  International environmental law
Legal requirements for CBA can also arise from international rules related to the 
environment. Under the Paris Agreement, an international climate treaty adopted in 2015 
with nearly universal participation, parties agreed that the pace and ambition of domestic 
climate efforts is to be decided at the national level. According to Article 4(2) of the Paris 
Agreement, it is up to each party to “prepare, communicate and maintain successive 
nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve”; Article 4(3) goes on to 
state that successive contributions should reflect each party’s “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”
A CBA could be held to contravene this fundamental principle about common but 
differentiated responsibilities if it is considered a unilateral measure that coerces other 
countries to increase their domestic climate efforts in order to avoid or limit compliance 
obligations for products entering the EU without any exceptions. However, it is debatable 
whether the Paris Agreement, whose overarching objective is to “strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change” (Article 2[1]), can be interpreted to limit 
unilateral action if such action is primarily aimed at increasing climate ambition (like that 
of a CBAM) since all parties to the Paris Agreement have also committed to the goal of 
achieving carbon neutrality in the second half of the century (a measure taken to enable 
stronger domestic climate action without incurring carbon leakage. 
3.1.4  General international law 
Finally, by seeking to influence policy choices in foreign jurisdictions and basing its 
calculation on physical processes taking place on foreign territory, a CBA could be 
considered an extraterritorial measure that infringes on the territorial sovereignty of 
affected trade partners. Territorial sovereignty comprises the right of states to exercise 
state authority within their territory and manifests itself in the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states.17 Unilateral measures that take into 
account circumstances within foreign territory risk being considered a violation of that 
principle and of the domaine reservé of affected states.
In a case involving the inclusion of international aviation in the EU ETS, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) held that a climate policy measure covering foreign entities and 
based on activities occurring, at least in part, over foreign territory “did not infringe the 
principle of territoriality” because the entities were physically located within the EU 
17  Deriving it from the principle of the sovereign equality of states enshrined in Article 2(1) of the Charter of the 
United Nations: International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, para. 202.
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when the measure was applied.18 Although a similar reasoning could be applied to a 
CBA because it will only be applied once imports enter the territory of the implementing 
states, the ECJ decision was by no means free from controversy (Hartmann, 2013). 
Generally, coercive action taken by one state to secure a change in the policies of another 
is likely to constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the latter (Jamnejad & 
Wood, 2009). This suggests that the design of a CBA should be imposition of mandatory 
requirements on the importers of covered products and on the public authorities of other 
countries—such as, for example, reporting and disclosure duties—and should instead rely 
on default values combined with voluntary reporting (cf. the US v. Superfund and US v. 
Reformulated gasoline cases above, cited in Subsection 3.1.1, as well as the French non-
paper of 2016 proposing a similar mechanism based on a presumption about the average 
EU product carbon intensities coupled with an individual carbon emissions certificate for 
the EU, described in Subsection 2.2).
3.1.5  Legal risk and the possibility of a judicial challenge and 
countermeasures
In announcing the CBA, the European Commission specifically mentioned that whatever 
its form, it should be WTO compatible (von der Leyen, 2019). At the same time, however, 
the Appellate Body (AB) of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO was about 
to become paralyzed by the refusal of the US to appoint new members to the AB as the 
terms of previous members drew to a close. By the end of 2019, the AB has had too few 
members to function in accordance with the covered agreements of the WTO. This has had 
the effect of significantly weakening the dispute settlement mechanism, although several 
states have agreed on a mechanism whereby disputes between them may be appealed 
to an ad hoc set of arbitrators. The US, among several other prominent WTO members, 
is not, however, a party to this mechanism. The significance of this is twofold—on the 
one hand, it makes it impossible to get a definitive answer in terms of WTO procedures 
to the question of whether any particular measure contested by one of the parties to the 
covered agreements is indeed in breach of the agreements. On the other hand, those 
member states that have the economic capability to act on their own are more likely to 
start instituting various countermeasures whenever they perceive a need to do so. Both 
of these factors increase the likelihood that any CBA would result in various forms of 
countermeasures regardless of whether it is expressly designed to be WTO compatible. 
18  ECJ, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Judgment of the Court of 11 December 2011, 2011 I-13755, para. 125.
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In contrast to the original announcement by then President-designate of the Commission 
von der Leyen in 2019, the conclusions of the European Council from July 2020 do not 
mention WTO rules. In the conclusions, however, the CBA is mentioned as a source of EU 
“own resources,” which adds a fiscal dimension to the CBA. There is no mention of where 
the resources collected by the CBA should be directed, although it has been discussed 
that they could be a source of revenue for the European post-pandemic recovery package, 
“Next Generation EU.” It may be worth mentioning that although possibly providing the 
EU with resources a CBA on imported goods would be transferred on the price of the 
goods and therefore ultimately be paid by EU consumers. From a WTO legal perspective, 
the fiscal incentive and the uncertainty of where the resources might be used are features 
that do not follow the original environmental aim and as such risk weakening the WTO 
compatibility of the measures. Someone might argue that WTO compatibility has become 
a lesser priority as the paralysis of the Appellate Body drags on and the COVID-19 health 
crisis wreaks havoc on the economies of EU Member States and the EU as a whole 
struggles to come up with the resources to rescue their economies. There is, however, a 
significant risk for more than just trade relations in such an approach.
Even a medium-term perspective should take into account that the climate for 
international economic co-operation might change significantly (i.a., after a change in 
US administration).19 The outcome of the US elections will hopefully be known before 
the commission is due to present its design for the European CBA in the first half of 2021. 
A change in administration might again strengthen the case for stricter adherence to 
WTO rules in order to facilitate reinstating a functioning Appellate Body and renewed 
cooperation at the WTO—possibly even a return to the Paris Agreement and a greater 
dynamic for international agreements on de-carbonization. The continuance of the 
current administration would seem to make the opposite scenario likely, placing greater 
emphasis on unilateral measures such as CBAs rather than on further co-operation for 
multilateral solutions to trade and decarbonization.
In order to follow the original announcement on a European CBA by the President of the 
Commission, we have laid out above (in Section 3.1.1) the key elements of a CBA that are 
likely to lay at the center of a contestation from the WTO. We are thereby assuming that 
there is an inherent value in the EU constructing its CBA so as to avoid any intentional 
19  The importance of the current US administration’s attitude towards climate change, the Paris Agreement, and 
the relevance of this for the EU CBAM is discussed in Bellora & Fontagné’s Possible Carbon Adjustment: An Over-
view (p. 11). The particular political differences between the current administration and other political actors re-
lated to these same subjects are discussed in Sapir & Horn’s Political Assessment of Possible Reactions of EU Main Trad-
ing Partners to EU Border Carbon Measures (pp 6–7, 9 & 12). A briefing paper for the EUP’s committee on trade 
policy at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/603493/EXPO_BRI(2020)603493_EN.pdf (last 
accessed 18 September 2020). 
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or plausible conflict with WTO law. It is worth noting, however, that no matter how well 
a CBA measure is constructed and communicated to EU trading partners, it is likely to 
face challenges from those affected. Whether the challenge is merely at the level of vocal 
protests or goes further, to become a formal complaint and request for a WTO panel or if 
it results in unilaterally determined countermeasures in disregard of agreed WTO rules will 
depend on both the complainant in question and the political climate at the time of the 
event—both international and domestic—of any potential complainant.
Assuming a complaint was lodged against an EU CBA at the WTO—either at a time when 
the Appellate Body has again been rendered functional or lodged into the temporary 
replacement system—it is important to note that it is likely to take anywhere between 
two-and-a-half to three years from the time the case is notified as a formal complaint with 
the WTO secretariat (whereupon a panel is formed that hears the case; a panel report is 
circulated, published, and most likely appealed against, handled by the Appellate Body 
or a surrogate appeals body; and ultimately, a final report of the Appellate Body or a 
surrogate possibly declares such a measure to be in breach of the covered agreements). 
Add to this that the EU is likely to request a reasonable time of implementation, wait 
until that time runs out, wait until a finding of non-implementation is given in a separate 
procedure before, finally, authority to retaliate will be given. We argue that this is not 
the greatest worry any EU institution or Member State currently has. The reason for our 
assessment is that what really matters far more and what is a much more immediate 
concern from a climate change point of view is going to happen outside a WTO dispute 
settlement in the multilateral climate negotiations starting with the next COP meeting 
in Glasgow, UK, in November 2021 - advancing the Paris treaty towards more coherent 
climate solutions. 
The primary concern of the EU and each Member State should be not to harm the 
possibility of progress within the UN climate conference through measures that appear 
contrary to international commitments. If the EU, in order to finance the relief package or 
for other non-climate–related reasons, implements a CBA in a way that appears contrary 
to WTO rules, it will undermine the credibility of any EU efforts at the COP. If there is no 
significant progress in these negotiations between the major emitters of GHGs within the 
next three years, possible WTO retaliation measures will pale in comparison to the dire 
consequences of such a failure.
WTO compatibility therefore will matter not primarily due to the fear of losing a case and 
any subsequent retaliation but because of the harmful effect that a blatant disregard 
for WTO rules is likely to have on the EU and its Member States as credible negotiating 
partners in any other multilateral processes. This is why great care has to be taken—even 
in the absence of a formally functioning Appellate Body—in both the design of any CBA, 
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as well as in the notifications and dialogue with EU trading partners, who are also going to 
be at the negotiating table of the climate conference.
EU regional trade agreements and carbon adjustment
If it is, as we argue, important for the EU to negotiate in general with its trading partners 
whilst constructing a CBAM, both for legal and diplomatic reasons, it becomes even 
the more important with the trading partners with which the EU has various free trade 
agreements. To the extent that these partners have their own carbon pricing mechanisms, 
it is essential that these be taken into account in the implementation of a future CBAM. 
This is not only for the sake of preserving good relations with these trading partners, but 
also because whatever special arrangement is reached, it is likely to be questioned by third 
parties for adherence with the MFN rule enshrined in the first article of the GATT, which 
forbids discrimination among trading partners that are within the WTO. The EU trading 
partners with carbon pricing mechanisms are Canada, Chile, Iceland, Japan, Norway, South 
Korea, and Switzerland. On-going negotiations with New Zealand should also be taken 
into account. 
Environmental cooperation is routinely mentioned in the texts of EU FTA’s. Carbon pricing 
as such, however, is less frequently mentioned specifically in these agreements. Specific 
mentions are to be I.a. found in the agreements with Vietnam (EU-Vietnam, Art. 13.6.2(a-
b) as and the EU-Singapore FTA Article 7.1. Nonetheless various environmental clauses in 
EU free trade agreements could be used to argue for the introduction of carbon-related 
measures. In several, however, the wording of the environmental clauses mirrors the 
language of GATT article XX. This does require, among other things, that the measure not 
be a disguised restriction of trade and the clause has in WTO disputes been considered 
to require adherence to the proportionality-principle. Regarding possible favourable 
treatment of at least developed countries the covered agreements of the WTO do allow 
for more lenient approaches – whether as a matter of climate policy this is considered 
effective is another issue.
It is most likely that any arrangement concluded with trading partners of n EU FTA 
concerning the implementation of a CBAM would be thoroughly scrutinized by third 
countries outside such arrangements. This is notably so with larger repeat players at 
the WTO dispute settlement system who are keen to find fault and discrimination that 
could constitute grounds for a WTO complaint. The US and China are of course the main 
protagonists, but India and Brazil have also frequently made use of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
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China has been testing a carbon pricing mechanism in several of its regions and might 
therefore be amenable to negotiate how the EU could accommodate a CBAM to take into 
account its future nationwide carbon pricing mechanism. Should the US elections result 
in a change of administration in early 2021, it is not unlikely that a federal carbon-pricing 
scheme would be introduced.20 
Nonetheless, even if this were the case, it does not mean that just any EU CBAM would 
be met favorably outright—the devil will very much be in the detail. Extensive and 
probing negotiations with the US Trade Representative are to be expected regardless of 
which administration is in charge. However, should there be a change of administration 
in the US, it is not entirely out of the question that such negotiations in time would be 
incorporated in the framework of renewed negotiations of a larger free trade agreement, 
such as the currently dormant Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
initiative.
Could environmental concerns in the EU related to dumping also include carbon 
adjustment? 
The new EU anti-dumping regulation that entered into force in 2018 includes the 
possibility of taking into account the cost of implementing environmental legislation 
in the EU. Hitherto, this environmental aspect has only been mentioned as part of the 
calculation of anti-dumping duties in one case: Case AD649—Urea and Ammonium 
Nitrate (UAN). This case establishes anti-dumping duties for Russia, the US, and Trinidad 
and Tobago on the importation of certain fertilizers. The price of natural gas is an 
important factor in the establishment of dumping and calculation of the duties. As the 
price of fossil fuel–based energy sources is likely to rise due to stricter measures within 
the EU, we may yet see more cases of this kind. One might speculate about the use of 
anti-dumping measures in parallel with a possible future CBAM or their occasional use as 
an alternative measure to combat indirect carbon leakage. Russia challenged Ukrainian 
anti-dumping duties on the same product in the WTO dispute settlement system 
(DS493: Ukraine—Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate) and prevailed on a 
point concerning the pricing of energy. It remains to be seen whether these EU duties 
will be challenged at the WTO and how they would be viewed by a dispute settlement 
panel. Notably, in the scenario of continued fossil fuel subsidies outside the EU and the 
possible reduction of the same within the EU, such measures may well be necessary to 
complement a CBAM. It is also perhaps worth considering whether the detailed insight 
given by the procedures of anti-dumping investigations into both the production 
methods and prices of various components of the imported products investigated could 
20  See Sapir & Horn, supra note 16.
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provide some of the detailed information necessary for the design of CBAMs. Depending 
on how the EU chooses to compensate exporting industries for the increasing cost of 
carbon emissions of production within the EU, importing countries might also start to 
consider those exports as dumping as they would be selling below cost outside the EU. 
3.2 Technical issues
CBAs adjust for differences in embedded carbon and applicable carbon prices (Mehling et 
al., 2019). A CBAM may be determined by the following equation:
CBAM = weightimported product x carbon intensityimported product or benchmark  
x (carbon priceEU – carbon priceforeign country).
Here, carbon intensity refers to carbon emissions embodied in a product or its 
benchmark per unit of weight of imported product (e.g., mass or monetary value). In 
the determination of CBAMs, two major practical challenges are encountered. First, the 
determination of carbon intensity is not straightforward and is subject to methodological 
choices and issues related to data quality. Second, the determination of carbon price is 
also not straightforward as there may be various types of instruments affecting the carbon 
price and the price is not necessarily easy to detect.
When determining carbon intensity for products, methodological issues typical in life 
cycle assessment (Finnveden et al., 2009) are encountered. These include the selection 
of emission components (CO2, other GHGs, other climate forcers such as aerosols) and 
characterization factors (i.e., how non-CO2 forcers are converted into CO2 equivalents), 
the setting of system boundaries (i.e., which processes from upstream/downstream 
are included), choosing allocation rules (i.e., how the emissions are allocated in the 
case of co-products), and applying representative data. These choices may significantly 
influence the carbon intensity of products, as shown, for example, by Soimakallio et al. 
(2011) for electricity and by Soimakallio and Koponen (2011) for biofuels. In addition, 
the representativeness of data remains a question for each of the processes in which 
emissions take place. For example, which data sources are acceptable, which emission 
factors should be applied, and how accurate actual data should be are questions that need 
to be responded to through given criteria. Similar types of question have been considered 
earlier, for example, in the context of implementing the sustainability criteria introduced 
by the EU for the transportation of biofuels and bioliquids (Soimakallio et al., 2010).
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The more flexibility that exists in determining the carbon intensity of products, the more 
heterogenous data is likely to be applied. On the other hand, as the methodological 
choices required are always (at least to some extent) subjective, it may be difficult to find 
unique choices that satisfy all the stakeholders involved. One option is to set some kind of 
default values that can be used if desired and replaced by actual values in case producers 
want to use their own data. Yet, the questions related to data quality and methodological 
choices that needs to be made remain valid.
In the ideal case, the carbon price is determined based on the explicit carbon price of 
relevant emission components. This means that all the instruments—such as the price 
of emission allowances, taxes, and revenues—explicitly influencing the carbon price 
should be considered. However, different emission components may face various carbon 
prices; for example, some of the emission components may be regulated under emission 
trading scheme, some of them may be less penalized through free emission allowances, 
some of them may be taxed in other sectors, and some of them may be subsidised (or 
less penalized) by tax relief or revenues. Due to these reasons, it may be very difficult to 
determine an explicit carbon price for CBAMs in practice.
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4 Scenarios
Due to the various implementation uncertainties, we argue that the best way to analyse 
the potential impacts of CBAs is to consider several alternative scenarios. First, we 
constructed the Feasible Scenario that aims to represent implementation that is relatively 
practical, based on techno-economic and legal aspects. As it is constructed to avoid 
various hurdles in the implementation process, we consider that this scenario is the easiest 
to implement. Second, in our Efficient Scenario, more products are considered compared 
to the Feasible Scenario, with the aim of imitating global carbon pricing. While this set-up 
allows us to make comparisons between the economic impacts in different scenarios, we 
acknowledge that the techno-economic and legal problems become more pressing in this 
more ambitious scenario.
In addition, a few variants for the two scenarios were considered in order to see how 
sensitive the results are to changes in certain key factors. The key features of the main 
scenarios and their variants are shown in Table 4.1.
In all the scenarios, CBAs are assumed to be implemented for imports from all countries 
outside the EU (including Norway but excluding the UK). That is preferable from the 
perspective of international trade law as differentiation between countries can be 
construed as discriminatory.
Two different sets of explicit carbon prices were considered for all the carbon intensities: 
25 and 50 EUR/tCO2. The lower value corresponds to the price level in early 2020, after 
recent reforms and the introduction of the Market Stability Reserve in the EU ETS, resulting 
in greater scarcity in European carbon markets (Bayer & Aklin, 2020). The higher value 
corresponds the carbon price in the EU in 2040 according to the reference scenario 
published by the European Commission (2016). Here, these price levels illustrate the 
difference in carbon price between the EU and non-EU countries/regions. Implicitly, this 
means that the carbon price in non-EU countries is assumed to be zero. Thus, the influence 
of a varying carbon price is considered, but the difference in carbon price among countries 
outside the EU is not considered. The use of revenues from CBAs is not specified and 
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considered. Furthermore, results from economic analysis arise solely from the introduction 
of the CBAM, and not consider the effects of possible complementary policy reforms, such 
as changes in the allocation of free allowances.
The data for the carbon content of products is derived from EXIOBASE3 data, which is a 
global, detailed, multi-regional environmentally extended supply-use table (MR-SUT) and 
a multi-regional input–output table (EXIOBASE, 2020). In EXIOBASE version 3.4, input–
output tables are provided for the years 1995–2011. It covers 200 product groups (see 
Appendix 1), 44 countries, and five “rest of the world” (ROW) regions. Besides EU countries, 
the UK, the US, Japan, China, Canada, South Korea, Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia, Australia, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Taiwan, Norway, Indonesia, and South Africa are presented separately. 
The ROW is separated into the rest of Asia and the Pacific (EXIOBASE code: WA), America 
(code: WL), Europe (code: WE), Africa (code: WF), and the Middle East (code: WM).
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Table 4.1.  The key features of main Feasible and Efficient Scenarios and their considered variants.
The Feasible Scenario The Efficient Scenario
Scope and cov-
erage
For imports/exports Import CBA Import CBA
Sectoral/product cove-
rage
Feasible 1: cement (incl. li-
me and plaster)
Feasible 2: cement (incl. li-
me and plaster), aluminium, 
iron, &steel
14 manufacturing sectors: non-metallic min-
erals; iron and steel; aluminum and aluminum 
products; textiles; pulp and paper; chemicals, 
plastic, rubber; rubber and plastic products; 
fabricated metal products, except machin-
ery and equipment; electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c.; machinery and equipment 
n.e.c.; medical, precision, and optical instru-
ments; watches and clocks; office machinery 
and computers; radio, television, and commu-
nication equipment and apparatus; furniture; 
other manufactured goods n.e.c.
Country coverage All All
The determination 
of carbon intensi-
ties (contents)
Emissions scope Direct + indirect domestic 
electricity/heat (CO2 only)
Efficient 1: Direct + indirect (except imports 
from the EU) (CO2 only)
Efficient 2: Direct + indirect domestic electri-
city/heat (CO2 only)
Benchmark EU-specific averages 
(weighted by production va-
lue in case of the aggregati-
on of product groups)
Non-EU country/region-specific averages 
(weighted by imports to the EU in the case of 
the aggregation of product groups)
The determination 
of the adjustment 
level
Carbon price in the EU 25 or 50 EUR/tCO2 25 or 50 EUR/tCO2
Carbon price in foreign 
countries
0 EUR 0 EUR
Revenue use Not specified Not specified
4.1 The Feasible Scenario
The Feasible Scenario aims to represent implementation that is relatively practical, based 
on techno-economic and legal aspects. A very limited number of products are included 
(see Table 4.1.) and the description below). Only products from the energy-intensive 
sectors that are considered to be at risk of carbon leakage under the EU ETS are included, 
even starting with a subset of products with limited trade intensity in accordance with the 
previous proposals discussed in Section 2. 
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In its first variant—namely, the Feasible 1 scenario—only cement (including lime and 
plaster) was considered. This choice was based on the following aspects: Internationally, 
cement is only traded in limited amounts and typically only between nearly neighboring 
countries, which is likely to increase the general acceptability of a CBA addressing it, thus 
reducing the risk for countermeasures from non-EU countries. Also, the macro-economic 
impacts of this implementation are likely to be marginal. On the other hand, cement has 
high CO2 emission intensity, which make it an interesting product from a CBA point of 
view. CBA for cement has been proposed by France in its non-paper on a carbon inclusion 
mechanism for the cement sector (see Section 2).
In its second variant—namely, the Feasible 2 scenario—altogether three products were 
considered: (1) cement (including lime and plaster), (2) aluminium, and (3) iron and 
steel. This choice was reasoned for by the fact that all these products have high CO2 
emission intensity yet the number of products considered remains very limited. However, 
compared with the Feasible 1 scenario, the risk of countermeasures being taken by 
non-EU countries is higher as aluminium and steel are internationally traded in significant 
amounts. Consequently, the feasibility of the implementation of the Feasible 2 scenario 
is likely to be lower compared with the Feasible 1 scenario. As another balance between 
environmental benefit and the ease of implementation, the Feasible Scenario avoids the 
need to determine the exact carbon content of foreign products by relying instead on 
the average sectoral emissions of European producers. Carbon intensities (i.e. carbon 
contents) for products were determined based on direct process emissions and indirect 
domestic electricity/heat emissions embodied in products or intermediate products. 
Only CO2 emissions were considered (non-CO2 emissions were excluded). The reason for 
considering these emissions is that the application of CBAs particularly aims to adjust the 
impacts that the ETS has on the competition of emission-intensive sectors. The majority 
of these emissions are included in the EU ETS (only small-scale energy boilers are not 
included in the EU ETS), and they formulate the majority of the emissions covered by the 
EU ETS (only some industrial nitrous oxide emissions not considered here). 
EU-specific averages were used as a benchmark for CBAs in case the carbon intensity of a 
product in an exporting country was higher than the intensity in the EU. If the opposite 
held true, the carbon intensity of a particular country/region was used as the benchmark. 
Thus, the exporting countries face CBAs that correspond at most with the carbon price 
paid in the EU, even if the carbon intensity is higher than in the EU. This makes the system 
likely to be more acceptable by such countries. The categories “Basic iron and steel and of 
ferro-alloys and first products thereof” and “Secondary steel for treatment, Re-processing 
of secondary steel into new steel,” taken from EXIOBASE3, were combined into the 
category “Iron and steel,” and the CO2 emissions were weighted by production volumes in 
order to calculate the carbon intensity for iron and steel.
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The carbon intensities were calculated using EXIOBASE3 data representing the year 2011. 
We acknowledge that the representativeness of such old data is an issue, but at the same 
time, it illustrates the general problem that the implementation of CBAs easily encounters. 
The time lag in statistics is typically a few years, and databases applying data from various 
statistics can thus be few years out of date. In addition, the lack of transparency, sectoral 
cut-offs, and other methodological choices (discussed in Section 3.2) can limit the general 
acceptability and thus the applicability of the databases behind CBAs.
It is notable that in our scenarios we do not allow importers an opportunity to prove 
that their actual emissions performance exceeds the average performance, as suggested 
in previous proposals. We acknowledge that this could decrease the economic impacts 
for high-emission countries if there is large variation in the individual importer firms´ 
emission intensities. We illustrate the impact in our sensitivity analysis.
From a legal perspective, the Feasible 1 and Feasible 2 scenarios only raise limited 
concerns. By only covering imports, there is no risk of this design being considered a 
prohibited subsidy under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
Also, by covering imports from all countries rather than singling out particular countries, 
it avoids violating the MFN principle contained in Article I of the GATT. A relatively limited 
scope of products helps avoid the arbitrary discrimination that might occur with the 
broader coverage of more complex goods as the data will be more readily available and 
the production processes more familiar. Reliance on the average carbon intensity of EU 
producers should be compatible with trade law, based on the 1987 US v. Superfund case 
(see above, Section 3), and this is also the approach proposed in the French non-paper 
of 2016. Not allowing individual adjustment—that is, not having a process for importers 
to prove the actual carbon intensity of their products—need not disqualify the measure 
given the reliance on such a relatively favorable benchmark, again based on the US v. 
Superfund case. The emissions scope is broader than that of the EU ETS, which only covers 
direct emissions, but because the EU ETS also covers the electricity sector and electricity 
used by other covered sectors, it should include the carbon price and including Scope 2 
emissions in this scenario should be justifiable. Finally, this scenario does not take into 
account a carbon price or other carbon constraint imposed on imported products in 
their country of origin. There is no directly relevant case law to assess whether or not this 
increases the legal risk of such a CBAM design, but it is conceivable that not accounting for 
foreign policies—at least the explicit carbon prices paid in the country of origin—could be 
considered “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail,” as indicated in the introductory paragraph of Article XX of the GATT. 
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4.2 The Efficient Scenario
To further illustrate how the balance between the environmental benefit and ease of 
implementation would affect the economic impact of the CBAs, we also considered the 
Efficient Scenario. This scenario puts less weight on the implementation issues and more 
weight on the aim of imitating global carbon pricing. 
Clearly more products were considered compared with the Feasible Scenario, but the 
amount still remained limited (see Table 4.1 and the description below). While being 
broader, the scenario still focused on energy-intensive sectors considered to be at risk 
of carbon leakage under the EU ETS. The selection of the products was based on the 
following process. First, the average carbon intensity of all 200 products produced in 
non-EU countries/regions (excluding Norway and including the UK) were calculated. All 
the direct and indirect CO2 emissions were considered except those embodied in the 
imports of intermediate products from the EU (as these emissions are likely to already 
be priced in the EU ETS). The monetary values of the imports to the EU were used as a 
weighting factor in the aggregation process. Second, products with a carbon intensity 
above the average carbon intensity were selected. However, a few exceptions were made; 
mining was not included as most of the emissions occur in extraction, which does not 
fall under the EU ETS; refined oil products were not included due to the very low (or even 
positive) reaction of imports to tariffs; and electricity was not included due to several 
problems (EXIOBASE3 shows the monetary value of zero for imports to the EU in 2011—
the reliability of the estimated elasticities is unclear and transmission data is lacking). 
Consequently, 14 products were considered (see Table 4.1.).
In the first variant, the Efficient 1 scenario, carbon intensities (i.e. carbon contents) for 
products were determined based on all direct and indirect CO2 emissions, applying 
country/region-specific averages for non-EU countries (excluding Norway and including 
the UK). However, those emissions embodied in the imports of intermediate products 
from the EU were excluded as described above. The inclusion of all the direct and indirect 
non-EU CO2 emissions embodied in products aims to imitate the situation where the 
carbon price affects all the CO2 emissions within the EU. In the second variant, the Efficient 
2 scenario, the carbon intensities were determined dissimilarly to in the Efficient 1 
scenario but only considering direct process emissions and indirect domestic electricity/
heat emissions embodied in products or intermediate products. This is reasoned for in a 
similar way to the reasoning in the case of the Feasible Scenario.
Non-metallic minerals, iron and steel, textiles, pulp and paper, chemicals, plaster, and 
rubber all included two or more products aggregated from EXIOBASE3. The CO2 emissions 
were weighted by production volumes in order to calculate carbon intensities for these 
products.
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From the technical perspective, similar issues related to the data applied are raised to 
those raised in the Feasible Scenarios. However, as more indirect emissions are considered 
in the Efficient 1 scenario than in the Feasible Scenario or the Efficient 2 scenario, data 
issues become even more relevant in the Efficient 1 scenario.
From a legal perspective, all the same considerations listed with regard to the Feasible 
Scenario also apply to the Efficient Scenario with two exceptions: the broader scope, 
including many semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, dramatically increases 
the technical and administrative complexity of the CBAM, which could affect its legal 
assessment under Article XX of the GATT. Parts of the tests involved in the application 
of this provision require balancing the means and end, for instance, balancing whether 
the measure is “necessary” in order to achieve the end state or whether less burdensome 
alternatives might have been used. Likewise, the embedded carbon emissions relative to 
the value of goods diminishes rapidly as a CBAM progresses down the value chain, and 
thus the proportionality of its imposition as an environmentally motivated measure could 
be challenged. The other legally problematic aspect of this scenario is the inclusion of 
Scope 3 emissions: since a border adjustment can only adjust for the burden imposed on 
domestic products and producers, imposing a CBAM on imports that also encompasses 
Scope 3 (and other indirect) emissions is likely to be challenged as producers covered 
under the EU only have to report and surrender allowances for Scope 1 emissions (and 
electricity as a sector is included, meaning that Scope 2 emissions are to some extent 
included indirectly). Ultimately, if a CBAM design were proposed that resembles the 
Efficient Scenario, it would be likely to face greater scrutiny under international trade law 
and incur a greater risk than the Feasible 1 and 2 scenarios.
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5 The gravity estimations of the impact of 
CBAMs on trade
In this section, we study the potential trade effects of the proposed CBAMs. We use gravity 
analysis to isolate the historical trade effect of tariffs and apply the findings in making 
projections concerning the effects of the different CBAM scenarios constructed in Section 
4. The gravity model is the main tool for evaluating the effects of changes in variables that 
in some ways affect barriers to trade between countries. (see, e.g., Anderson and Yotov, 
2010; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008; Egger 
and Larch, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2014; Brakman, Kohl, and Van Marrewijk, 2015; Bekkers 
and Rojas-Romagosa, 2016). As such, they also provide a useful tool for the analysis of the 
CBAMs.
In economics, in an analogy with the gravity theory of physics, the gravity model is used 
to analyze sources of economic gravitational pull in order to explain trade patterns. The 
economic gravitational pull depends on country-specific and pair-specific variables, such 
as economic size (GDP) and the distance between two trading partners. A large GDP, 
a short distance, and close ties tend to increase trade, while a long distance and trade 
barriers increase transportation costs and other trade costs and thereby reduce trade. In 
addition to distance, a selection of other variables—such as a common border, language, 
or religion, or an earlier colonial relationship—have been included in the traditional 
gravity model to capture other trade costs.21
In this report, we use an extensive dataset that contains historical patterns of trade in 
order to empirically assess how much a change in trade costs could change the value of 
imported products. Our focus on EU imports is based on our assessment that the CBAM 
21  More recently, indicator (dummy) variables have been substituted for these gravity variables. When, for exam-
ple, distance is unchanged from year to year, it can be substituted for by an interactive dummy variable between 
the two countries. If a time dimension is included, even changes in trade agreements or exchange rates can be cov-
ered using dummy variables.
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is likely to focus on imported goods, not on exports. We estimate the tariff elasticity of 
the EU’s imports, that is, we estimate how much import demand falls when there is an 
increase in tariffs and other economic factors are kept constant. We apply the analysis in 
order to understand the impacts of the different CBAM scenarios and their underlying 
assumptions.
The trade analysis is useful in several respects. First, the estimated elasticities provide us 
with a first-order assessment on how much it affects EU imports whether or not CBAMs 
are used as a complementary tool in the EU’s climate policy. The detailed, product-specific 
information on tariffs and trade allows us to make inferences on the expected decline in 
imports that would be most consistent with the patterns experienced in the previous two 
decades.
Second, the analysis allows us to study the potential value chain impacts of the CBAMs. 
This perspective is important as the imported products are not merely used in the 
EU for final demand, but rather, they are often used as intermediate components in 
EU firms’ production. Due to global value chains, the complicated interactions and 
interdependencies across country borders in production need to be taken into account 
when considering the economic impact of the CBAMs. Assessment of the economic 
impact with the current production structure allows us to quantify areas where the 
production structure needs to be changed the most if the CBAMs are introduced.
Third, the estimated trade elasticities are used to calibrate a CGE model. The CGE model 
allows us to incorporate the tariff elasticities as a part of an overall assessment of the EU’s 
climate policy. Namely, the model allows us to analyze the tariff effects jointly with the 
impact of climate policy that may, for example, partly neutralize the effect of the ETS. The 
modelling issues are discussed more thoroughly in the next section.
At the end of this section, we will also address empirical evidence on carbon leakage. 
While the evidence of the ETS impact is still preliminary and most of the impact analysis 
is still based on theoretical models, we argue that the empirical view can provide a useful 
complementary view. In particular, it allows us to ask how much the increase in the level of 
ambition in the ETS could affect carbon leakage.
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5.1 The direct impacts of the CBAM on gross imports
To quantify the direct impact of the CBAM on imports, we analyzed two factors. First, we 
studied how sensitive the import demand of different products is on changes in trade 
costs. The effect depends on various substitution and income mechanisms that steer the 
amount of demand and product choices in the EU. We estimate the trade elasticities of 
import tariffs by isolating the historical variation in global imports that is due to changes 
in tariffs. The second factor is the dependence of the different countries on these goods a 
priori. For example, due to geographical and other differences, some EU countries may be 
less dependent on the supply of imports, and therefore the impact of tariffs is smaller. The 
joint analysis of these two factors allows us to make inferences on the changes in imports 
due to the introduction of the CBAM.
5.1.1  Methodology and data
As a first step in the trade impact analysis, we estimated trade elasticities using global 
bilateral trade and tariff data. We used UN Comtrade data for countries’ imports in the 
Harmonized System (2007) six-digit product level for the years 2000–2018. These data are 
for goods trade only and therefore do not include trade in services.22 
Our dataset includes 132 reporter countries23 (including all the EU countries) and all their 
partner countries. There are 236 partner countries and geographic regions. The number 
of reporter countries is limited because we needed to combine the trade data with 
information from the WTO on their MFN import tariffs at the Harmonised System (HS) 
6-digit product level each year. However, the dataset covers almost all global trade.
We also include information on free trade agreements between the countries when 
applicable. Countries that do not have bilateral free trade agreements are assumed to 
trade at MFN tariffs. If they do have a free trade agreement, all tariffs between them are 
22  Our interest is CO2 emissions that only accrue from the production of physical goods. Of course, they do need 
to be transported, which is a service and so is not included in the emissions.
23  The countries are Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, the Central African 
Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Den-
mark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Macao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North 
Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Romania, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, the Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Uru-
guay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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assumed to be zero. In practice this is not necessarily strictly so because there may be 
exceptions and/or transition periods if the agreement is very recent. However, we do 
not have HS6-level product information on this. Any error in this respect is likely to be 
extremely small at the level of global trade.
Next, we introduced information on industry sectors at the two-digit level of the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Rev. 3 
classification for each HS6 product. This industry classification is used in the EXIOBASE 
database (see Section 4 on the scenarios for more details) that provides us with information 
on the CBAM. Average import tariffs for each two-digit industry between any two countries 
are calculated for each year, weighted by the value of imports in each HS6 product. 
We then use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation to estimate global 
tariff elasticities by industry. PPML estimation is a standard estimation method that is used 
in gravity analysis. A more technical presentation of this method is given in Appendix 2. 
As expected, the global tariff elasticities are negative, meaning that higher tariffs decrease 
imports and vice versa. 
Next we introduce information on border carbon adjustment tariffs (see Section 4 on how 
these have been calculated) by product or industry, as required in the different scenarios 
presented in Section 4. These are also calculated as weighted averages in EU imports from 
non-EU countries. The UK is treated as a non-EU country to reflect the post-Brexit reality 
while Norway and Iceland are included in the EU as members of the European Economic 
Area. We note that the tariffs reflect differences in the emission intensity between the EU 
and extra-EU countries, while here we do not consider the possibility of mitigating climate 
policy in the extra-EU countries. We address their role in Section 6.
The global tariff elasticities and the CBAM tariffs are then combined when calculating the 
effect of CBAM tariffs on EU imports.
Because the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) data used in our global value chain 
analysis (see Section 5.2) uses the more recent ISIC Rev. 4 classification, we finally ran the 
results again from the HS6 product level by combining these data with this other industry 
classification. 
5.1.2  Scenarios
We analyze two main scenarios, the Feasible Scenario and the Efficient Scenario, and their 
variations (introduced in Section 4). The Feasible Scenario is much more limited in its 
scope of sectors. Its variants only include the manufacturing of cement, lime, and plaster; 
the manufacturing of iron and steel, and products thereof; and the manufacturing of 
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aluminum and products thereof. Our motivation for only including products from these 
sectors arises from the fact that they have high carbon cost and trade exposure, as well as 
a limited ability to pass through the cost to consumers, and narrowing the scope to these 
goods greatly reduces the administrative and technical burden of any CBA but still delivers 
significant environmental benefits.24
The scenarios Efficient 1 and 2 encompass most manufacturing sectors and put 
more weight on the economic and environmental aspects instead of on practical 
implementability. Table 4.1 collects detailed descriptions of the scenarios. We note that 
two different explicit carbon prices were considered in the calculations of the tariffs for all 
the carbon intensities: 25 and 50 EUR/tCO2. In what follows, we will show the results for 
the baseline price of 25 EUR/tCO2. With 50 EUR/tCO2, the tariffs and correspondingly the 
import impacts, are twice as large.25 Table 5.1.1 collects information on the importance 
of key sectors in the EU economy. That is, it shows the value added in all EU countries in 
2017 for the Feasible Scenarios’ sectors in order to show how important these are for the 
different countries.26 
We can see that the manufacturing of cement, lime, and plaster plays a very small part in 
the total EU economy. Its total value added was seven billion euros in 2017 and its share 
in total business economy value added was just 0.11 %. On the other hand, cement is of 
course very important as an intermediate good for the construction sector.
The importance of cement, lime, and plaster is at least twice as important as the EU 
average for Romania, Croatia, Slovakia, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, and Belgium. New 
member countries and the Balkans are over-represented in this group.
The manufacturing value added of basic metals and products thereof in the EU27 
countries was 104 billion euros in 2017, or 1.67 % of total business sector value added. 
This is already significant, as is of course the importance of these products as intermediate 
goods, especially in other metal industries. The importance of iron, steel, and aluminum 
(including other metals) exceeds the EU average, especially in Slovenia, Slovakia, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Belgium, and Italy. Total manufacturing industry value added in 
the EU27 countries is 17 % of total value added. Consequently, relative to manufacturing 
value added, these sectors are more important.
24  We should acknowledge that while our scenarios aim at grasping the key features of the CBAMs, their economic 
analysis is bound to be stylized. For example, our economic models are calibrated based on historical global emis-
sions and trade linkage data that typically lag behind by several years. 
25  This follows from the fact that our impact model is linear.
26  Note that because of limitations in data availability for many EU countries, we have had to combine iron and 
steel together with aluminum. Furthermore, the data also includes other metals. Even after this, we do not have all 
data for all the countries.
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Table 5.1.1. Value added (factor prices) by sector in the Feasible Scenarios in different EU countries in 2017, 
NACE Rev. 2
Country Billions of euros % of total business economy
B-N_S95_X_K; 
total business 
economy
C235; the 
manufacture of 
cement, lime, and 
plaster
C24, C251; the 
manufacture of 
basic metals and 
of structural metal 
products
C235; the 
manufacture of 
cement, lime, and 
plaster
C24, C251; the 
manufacture of 
basic metals and 
of structural metal 
products
EU27 (from 2020) 6 203 6.9 103.9 0.11 1.67
EU28 (incl. the UK) 7 454 7.0 113.2 0.09 1.52
Belgium 222 0.5 4.8 0.22 2.14
Bulgaria 27 0.1 0.7 0.23 2.51
Czech Republic 103 0.2 2.0 0.18 1.90
Denmark 149 . 1.2 . 0.79
Germany 1 738 1.8 31.0 0.10 1.79
Estonia 13 . 0.2 . 1.59
Ireland 207 0.2 0.9 0.08 0.42
Greece 49 0.1 0.9 0.23 1.87
Spain 500 0.6 8.2 0.12 1.64
France 987 1.0 10.2 0.10 1.03
Croatia 23 0.1 0.4 0.33 1.68
Italy 728 0.6 15.5 0.08 2.13
Cyprus 9 . 0.1 . 0.96
Latvia 12 . 0.1 . 0.90
Lithuania 19 . 0.1 . 0.71
Luxembourg 25 . . . .
Hungary 64 0.1 1.2 0.10 1.89
Malta 7 0.0 . 0.00 .
Netherlands 364 . 4.5 . 1.25
Austria 194 0.1 5.6 0.08 2.88
Poland 216 0.5 4.7 0.25 2.17
Portugal 84 0.1 1.2 0.12 1.47
Romania 67 0.2 1.2 0.37 1.84
Slovenia 23 0.0 0.8 0.12 3.54
Slovakia 38 0.1 1.3 0.29 3.45
Finland 102 0.1 2.5 0.10 2.49
Sweden 234 0.1 4.2 0.05 1.79
United Kingdom 1 251 0.1 9.3 0.01 0.75
Iceland . 0.0 0.5 . .
Norway . . 2.4 . .
Switzerland . 0.3 2.9 . .
Source: Eurostat.
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5.1.3  Estimation results: The potential direct impacts of higher tariffs on 
gross trade
Table 5.1.2 shows descriptive data on the EU imports of the products and industries that 
are analyzed in the scenarios. These are gross value figures, and they are thus not directly 
comparable to the above value-added data.
The scenario Feasible 1 only includes cement, lime, and plaster while some other products 
are added in the scenario Feasible 2. The scenario Feasible 2 includes cement, lime, and 
plaster (HS 4-digit codes 2521–2523); iron and steel, including products thereof (HS4 
codes 7201–7320); and aluminum, including products thereof (HS4 codes 7601–7616). As 
we can see, the value of extra-EU imports of cement, lime, and plaster is very small. Iron 
and steel, including products thereof, is much larger and equal to 2.7 % of all extra-EU 
imports. The value of aluminum and aluminum product imports is about half the value of 
iron and steel.
In the Efficient Scenarios we have a much larger set of industries and products. These 
cover almost 60 % of all extra-EU goods imports. The gross value is 8.5 % relative to the 
EU GDP. The largest sectors at the level of disaggregation we use is the manufacturing of 
chemicals and chemical products, followed by the manufacturing of textiles and wearing 
apparel, and different metal industries. The smallest industries are paper and paper 
products, and other non-metallic mineral products. Taken together, the metal industries 
cover a little over half of all extra-EU imports in the broad Efficient Scenarios.
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Table 5.1.2. Descriptive trade statistics for 2018
Sector Total extra-EU 
imports, bn 
EUR
Share in total 
extra-EU im-
ports, %
Total extra-EU 
imports, % of 
EU GDP
Feasible Scenarios
Cement, lime, and plaster 0.3 0.0 0.00
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof 52.5 2.7 0.39
Aluminum, incl. products thereof 24.1 1.2 0.18
Efficient Scenarios
17. Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, etc. 166.5 8.6 1.24
21. Manufacture of paper and paper products 14.4 0.7 0.11
24. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 229.8 11.8 1.70
25. Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 44.1 2.3 0.33
26. Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 16.3 0.8 0.12
271. Iron and steel, incl. products thereof 52.5 2.7 0.39
272. Aluminum, incl. products thereof 24.1 1.2 0.18
28. Manufacture of fabricated metal products 24.2 1.2 0.18
29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 135.1 7.0 1.00
30. Manufacture of office, accounting, and computing machinery 108.8 5.6 0.81
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 95.2 4.9 0.71
32. Manufacture of radio, television, and communication equipment and 
apparatus 102.9 5.3 0.76
33. Manufacture of medical, precision, and optical instruments, and 
watches and clocks 82.2 4.2 0.61
36. Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 54.0 2.8 0.40
Total extra-EU CBAM imports 1150.0 59.3 8.5
Other goods imports 789.3 40.7 5.9
Total 1939.3 100.0 14.4
Note. The UK is treated as a non-EU country in 2018 to simulate the post-Brexit situation.
Source: Our calculations, based on UN Comtrade data.
Table 5.1.3 shows the estimated global import tariff elasticities. They measure how 
sensitive the import demand of different products is to changes in import tariffs while 
controlling for other factors and trade costs due to various substitution and income 
mechanisms that steer the amount of demand and product choices globally. According to 
calculations by the World Bank, the applied weighted mean tariff rate for all products in 
world trade declined from 4.96 % in the year 2000 to 2.59 % in 2017. Most of the decline 
took place during 2000–2006.
From the first numerical column we can see the elasticity of imports with respect to 
import tariffs. For example, the imports of machinery and equipment have an elasticity of 
–0.031. Consequently, the imports of these products decline by 3.1 % if tariffs are raised by 
one percentage point.27
27  The table approximates percentual changes that can be derived from the table by using the formula exp(x)-1, 
where x is the number in question. However, they are very close to actual percentages, and thus we report the ap-
proximative results. 
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Table 5.1.3. Global import elasticities with respect to tariffs during 2000–2018
Tariff elasticity Statistical sig-
nificance
95 % confi-
dence inter-
val, lower 
bound
95 % confi-
dence inter-
val, upper 
bound
Feasible scenarios
Cement, lime, and plaster -0.0529 *** -0.0690 -0.0367
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof -0.0289 *** -0.0447 -0.0130
Aluminum, incl. products thereof -0.0647 *** -0.0989 -0.0305
Efficient scenarios
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, etc. -0.0071 -0.0175 0.0032
Manufacture of paper and paper products -0.0186 *** -0.0293 -0.0078
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products -0.0386 *** -0.0533 -0.0238
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products -0.0143 *** -0.0250 -0.0036
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products -0.0263 *** -0.0383 -0.0143
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof -0.0289 *** -0.0447 -0.0130
Aluminum, incl. products thereof -0.0647 *** -0.0989 -0.0305
Manufacture of fabricated metal products -0.0239 *** -0.0366 -0.0111
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. -0.0310 *** -0.0400 -0.0221
Manufacture of office, accounting, and computing 
machinery -0.0472 *** -0.0753 -0.0192
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -0.0557 *** -0.0676 -0.0438
Manufacture of radio, television, and communication 
equipment and apparatus -0.0610 *** -0.0874 -0.0346
Manufacture of medical, precision, and optical 
instruments, and watches and clocks -0.0235 ** -0.0437 -0.0033
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -0.0358 *** -0.0497 -0.0219
Note: The first numerical column shows how sensitive the import demand of different products is to changes in im-
port tariffs while controlling for other factors and trade costs due to various substitution and income mechanisms 
that steer the amount of demand and product choices globally. Statistical significance: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1.
The results suggest that there are major differences across products and industries in 
terms of their sensitivity to changes in tariffs. We find that many of the products that are 
in the Feasible Scenario (cement, lime, and plaster; and aluminum) belong to the group 
where the elasticities are the largest, implying that a rise in tariffs has a large negative 
effect on imports. For these products, as well as for electrical machinery and equipment 
(including radio, television, and communication equipment), a one percentage point 
increase in tariffs may lead to a more than 5 % decline in imports. This finding suggests 
that these products are easily substituted for similar products from other countries or their 
overall demand changes significantly when a tariff is introduced.
On the other hand, we find that the imports of textiles and wearing apparel, paper and 
paper products, and rubber and plastic products are much less sensitive to changes in 
tariffs. Also, other non-metallic mineral products, iron and steel, and fabricated metal 
products are relatively insensitive in this regard. In the case of textiles and wearing 
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apparel, the low elasticity could be partly due to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC) negotiated during the WTO Uruguay Round. Its elasticity is not statistically different 
from zero while other estimated values are statistically very significantly different from 
zero. On the other hand, the ATC was only in force up until 2004. Furthermore, we also 
ran an estimation with an ATC dummy. This did not change the results for the textile and 
wearing apparel sector.
Imbs and Mejean (2017) have estimated trade elasticities. Our results show somewhat 
smaller elasticities to theirs. The differences may arise both from dissimilarities in the 
methodology and data. For example, we used a significantly larger number of trading 
countries. Note that our model is best equipped to analyze relatively small tariff changes, 
whereas if the changes are large, their size only provides an approximation that is 
bounded by the non-negativity constraint on trade.
Tables 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 show the effects of CBAM tariffs on extra-EU imports. The CBAM 
tariffs are calculated in the EXIOBASE database using the formulation shown in Section 3.2 
and a carbon price of 25 euros per ton. If the carbon price is higher than this, the CBAM 
tariff will also be higher.
The first table is based on our broadest Efficient 1 scenario (see Table 4.1), which includes 
both direct and indirect CO2 emissions. The negative effect on gross imports is 93 billion 
euros or almost 5 % of all extra-EU goods imports. This is 0.7 % relative to the EU GDP. The 
biggest impact comes from chemicals and chemical products, followed by different metal 
industries.
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Table 5.1.4.  Efficient 1: The impact of CBAM tariffs on extra-EU imports with both direct and indirect CO2 
emissions
CBAM tariff, 
weighted ave-
rages
The effect of the 
CBAM on gross 
imports, bn EUR
The effect of the 
CBAM on gross 
extra-EU im-
ports, % of ext-
ra-EU trade
The effect of the 
CBAM on gross 
extra-EU im-
ports, % of EU 
GDP
Feasible Scenarios
Cement, lime, and plaster 0.0450 -0.1 -23.2 0.00
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof 0.0137 -2.0 -3.9 -0.02
Aluminum, incl. products thereof 0.0047 -0.7 -3.0 -0.01
The Efficient 1 scenario 
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, etc. 0.0181 -2.1 -1.3 -0.02
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.0182 -0.5 -3.3 0.00
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.0192 -16.7 -7.3 -0.12
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 0.0390 -2.4 -5.5 -0.02
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 0.0521 -2.2 -13.5 -0.02
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof 0.0579 -8.6 -16.5 -0.06
Aluminum, incl. products thereof 0.0258 -3.9 -16.2 -0.03
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 0.0366 -2.1 -8.6 -0.02
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.0196 -8.1 -6.0 -0.06
Manufacture of office, accounting, and computing 
machinery 0.0211 -10.6 -9.7 -0.08
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c. 0.0216 -11.1 -11.7 -0.08
Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus 0.0214 -13.0 -12.7 -0.10
Manufacture of medical, precision, and optical 
instruments, and watches and clocks 0.0189 -3.6 -4.4 -0.03
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.0410 -7.8 -14.4 -0.06
Total -92.8 -4.8 -0.69
Note: The CBAM tariffs are calculated using the global import tariff elasticities, information on CO2 emissions is from 
the EXIOBASE database, and a carbon price of 25 euros per ton is used. 
Of course, the Feasible Scenarios again show much smaller effects of less than three billion 
euros in total, mostly arising from iron and steel. The impact on cement, lime, and plaster 
is small in euro terms but very large in relative terms as the decline is almost a quarter 
of total extra-EU imports of these products. However, the Efficient 1 scenario also shows 
industries with double-digit effects that can be deemed considerable. The largest relative 
effects are found in the same sectors that are represented in the Feasible 2 scenario. 
However, the implemented CBAM tariffs are larger in the Efficient Scenarios than in the 
Feasible Scenario, which explains why imports decrease more in the Efficient Scenarios.
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The second table shows the results for our Efficient 2 scenario, which incorporates all 
direct CO2 emissions but only indirect electricity CO2 emissions. Consequently, the indirect 
CO2 emissions that arise other than those resulting from the use of electricity are not 
included in the Efficient 2 scenario. The CBAM tariff is therefore smaller than above, and 
thus, the impact on extra-EU imports is smaller by almost one half. In this scenario the 
CBAM tariffs would decrease extra-EU imports by 53 billion euros. The difference between 
the two scenarios is the smallest in the manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral 
products, furniture etc., rubber and plastics products, and iron and steel. This implies that 
in these sectors there are less indirect emissions other than those arising from electricity.
Table 5.1.5.  Efficient 2: Impact of CBAM tariffs on extra-EU imports with all direct and indirect electricity CO2 
emissions
CBAM tariff, 
weighted 
averages
The effect of the 
CBAM on gross 
imports, bn EUR
The effect of 
the CBAM on 
gross extra-EU 
imports, % of 
extra-EU trade
The effect of 
the CBAM on 
gross extra-EU 
imports, % of 
EU GDP
Feasible scenarios
Cement, lime, and plaster 0.0350 -0.1 -18.0 0.00
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof 0.0137 -2.0 -3.9 -0.02
Aluminum, incl. products thereof 0.0047 -0.7 -3.0 -0.01
The Efficient 2 scenario
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, etc. 0.0081 -1.0 -0.6 -0.01
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.0114 -0.3 -2.1 0.00
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.0119 -10.4 -4.5 -0.08
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 0.0288 -1.8 -4.1 -0.01
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.0404 -1.7 -10.5 -0.01
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof 0.0415 -6.2 -11.8 -0.05
Aluminum, incl. products thereof 0.0171 -2.6 -10.7 -0.02
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 0.0199 -1.1 -4.7 -0.01
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.0088 -3.6 -2.7 -0.03
Manufacture of office, accounting, and computing 
machinery 0.0098 -4.9 -4.5 -0.04
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
n.e.c. 0.0089 -4.6 -4.8 -0.03
Manufacture of radio, television, and 
communication equipment and apparatus 0.0104 -6.3 -6.2 -0.05
Manufacture of medical, precision, and optical 
instruments, and watches and clocks 0.0128 -2.4 -3.0 -0.02
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.0308 -5.9 -10.8 -0.04
Total -52.8 -2.7 -0.39
Note: The CBAM tariffs are calculated using the global import tariff elasticities, information on CO2 emissions is 
from the EXIOBASE database, and a carbon price of 25 euros per ton is used. 
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The difference is the largest in the manufacturing of electrical machinery and apparatus; 
machinery and equipment; office, accounting, and computing machinery; textiles and wearing 
apparel; and radio, television, and communication equipment and apparatus. This implies that 
in these sectors there are more indirect emissions other than those arising from electricity. 
Pyrka et al. (2020) analyzed the effects of a CBAM using a CGE model. Their model 
specification is thus different from ours. They also include a smaller selection of industries 
than we do in our Efficient Scenario. Pyrka et al. included oil, ferrous metals, non-ferrous 
metals, chemical products, paper products, and non-metallic minerals. In terms of the 
effects on extra-EU imports, their results are mostly smaller to ours in the Efficient 2 
scenario, as shown in Table 5.1.5., but similar in regard to ferrous metals (our “iron and 
steel” category), and paper and paper products. According to their results, global CO2 
equivalent emissions decline by just 24 Mt, which is much less than in our scenarios, as we 
will next see. One factor behind these results is the fact that our scenarios include a much 
larger share of manufacturing sectors and trade.
Table 5.1.6  The effects of the scenarios Efficient 1 and 2 on the value and CO2 content of imports from 
different partner countries
The Efficient 1 scenario, The Efficient 2 scenario, Change in CO2, kilotons
% change in … % change in …
the value of 
EU imports
the CO2 
content of EU 
imports
the value of 
EU imports
the CO2 
content of EU 
imports
Efficient 1 Efficient 2
Australia -0.7 -3.4 -0.2 -2.2 -33 -7
Brazil -0.9 -5.3 -0.4 -4.4 -315 -138
Canada -2.1 -6.2 -0.9 -3.2 -455 -109
China -11.6 -15.5 -6.8 -10.0 -100320 -39446
India -6.8 -15.9 -3.6 -11.3 -8458 -3376
Indonesia -3.4 -11.1 -0.9 -7.7 -1222 -333
Japan -3.8 -5.7 -2.0 -3.3 -2729 -836
Mexico -2.6 -5.9 -0.8 -3.0 -538 -78
Russia -1.0 -9.7 -0.5 -7.8 -2710 -1592
South Africa -6.9 -38.1 -6.4 -37.0 -7221 -5930
South Korea -4.8 -8.2 -1.8 -3.8 -3004 -530
Switzerland -1.0 -1.6 -0.2 -0.7 -358 -22
Turkey -2.7 -7.9 -1.4 -7.5 -2612 -1117
United Kingdom -2.0 -4.0 -0.6 -2.3 -2460 -714
United States -3.0 -5.9 -2.2 -4.5 -7350 -3593
The rest of Africa -0.7 -5.9 -0.1 -3.8 -891 -238
The rest of Asia and Pacific -5.2 -17.3 -2.4 -21.4 -29167 -18899
The rest of Europe -10.0 -32.4 -7.7 -27.9 -25566 -17018
The rest of Latin America -0.6 -6.3 -0.3 -5.9 -404 -213
The rest of the Middle East -3.4 -20.3 -2.7 -19.3 -9997 -7714
Total -4.4 -14.4 -2.5 -12.1 -205811 -101904
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What impact would CBAM tariffs have on the CO2 content of extra-EU imports? The next 
two tables show the effects of CBAMs in terms of imports from different non-EU countries 
and regions, as well as in terms of in which sectors the largest effects arise. The effects are 
calculated using trade data from 2014. Table 5.1.6 shows the effects by partner country 
and region. The first two columns show the results for the Efficient 1 scenario. We can see 
that the impact on the value of imports is the greatest for China and across non-EU Europe 
(including the UK, Switzerland, and Russia). The impact on the CO2 content of goods 
imports is the largest on trade with South Africa, non-EU European countries, the Middle 
East, and many Asian countries, followed by India and China. The fifth column shows that, 
in terms of the total tonnage of imported CO2 emissions, by far the largest impact is on 
China which accounts for almost half of the total decrease. Output effects in different 
countries and sectors are discussed in Section 6.
The results in the Efficient 2 scenario are similar to those in the Efficient 1 scenario, but 
only somewhat smaller because indirect non-electricity emissions are excluded there. The 
impact on the total CO2 content of imports in the Feasible Scenarios is negligible.
Table 5.1.7 shows the effects by sector. The Efficient 1 scenario has the biggest impact on 
the value of imports of iron and steel, and aluminum producing sectors. Both decrease 
by about 16 % in value. The impact is also greater than 10 % in the manufacturing of 
furniture, etc.; other non-metallic mineral products; radio, television, and communication 
equipment and apparatus; and electrical machinery and apparatus. The CO2 content of 
imports decreases the most in the iron and steel, and aluminum producing sectors. The 
overall impact on the CO2 content of all the manufacturing sectors that would face the 
CBAM is some 14 %. If we look at the decline in the quantity of CO2 emissions in imports, 
we find the largest cuts in iron and steel, chemicals and chemical products, and furniture 
etc. These three sectors account for almost half of the total decrease. 
We can also calculate the CBAM tariff revenue on the basis of the information presented 
in the above tables. We take the value of trade by sector in 2018, subtract the value of 
imports that the higher tariffs will erase, and multiply the now lower value of imports 
by the average weighted CBAM tariff by sector, as shown in the tables. The CBAM tariff 
revenue in the Feasible 2 scenario is 0.8 billion euros. The much wider Efficient Scenarios 
yield a tariff revenue of 15.2 billion euros and 25.2 billion euros, depending on whether or 
not all indirect CO2 emissions are included. Note that these effects reflect a 25 EUR/tCO2 
baseline price, while the income would double if the baseline price were set at 50 EUR/
tCO2.
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Table 5.1.7  The effects of the scenarios Efficient 1 and 2 on the value and CO2 content of imports by different 
manufacturing sectors
ISIC Rev3 sectors Efficient 1 scenario, Efficient 2 scenario, Change in CO2, kilotons
% change in … % change in …
the value 
of EU im-
ports
the CO2 
content of 
EU imports
the value 
of EU im-
ports
the CO2 
content of 
EU imports
Efficient 1 Efficient 2
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, etc. -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 -1.0 -885 -265
Manufacture of paper and paper products -3.0 -6.0 -2.4 -4.8 -883 -447
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products -7.4 -12.3 -4.6 -10.5 -31737 -16856
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products -5.5 -9.1 -4.0 -7.7 -8931 -5604
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products -13.8 -17.8 -10.8 -14.6 -8175 -5191
Iron and steel, incl. products thereof -16.5 -24.5 -11.8 -20.3 -38164 -22745
Aluminum, incl. products thereof -16.0 -35.7 -10.5 -30.5 -9689 -5497
Manufacture of fabricated metal products -8.6 -12.5 -4.7 -7.8 -6200 -2114
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. -5.8 -9.0 -2.9 -4.8 -13044 -3145
Manufacture of office, accounting, and 
computing machinery -9.6 -11.2 -4.7 -7.1 -15218 -4513
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c. -11.7 -16.0 -4.8 -7.9 -16903 -3432
Manufacture of radio, television, and 
communication equipment and apparatus -12.6 -15.2 -6.1 -8.7 -17812 -4958
Manufacture of medical, precision, and optical 
instruments, and watches and clocks -4.3 -10.6 -3.0 -10.7 -9701 -6614
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -14.4 -23.2 -10.8 -22.3 -28470 -20522
Total -4.4 -14.4 -2.5 -12.1 -205811 -101904
T H E  D I R E C T  I M PAC T S  O F  C B A M  O N  G R O S S  I M P O R T S  F O R  F I N L A N D
The value of Finnish extra-EU imports declines by 3.6 per cent in our Efficient scenario 1 and 
by 1.8 per cent in Efficient scenario 2. These are somewhat smaller figures than for the EU on 
average and are due to differences in the product and country-of-origin structure of Finnish 
imports vis-à-vis the EU average. Meanwhile, the CO2-content of Finnish extra-EU imports 
declines by 13.1 and 10.0 per cent respectively. The share of Finland in the total decline in 
CO2 imports is 1.0 per cent. We study the structure of the Finnish imports more closely in 
Section 5.2 that concerns the global value chains.
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5.2 The impacts of CBAs seen through global value chains
In this subsection, we apply a measurement framework for the analysis of the value-
chain impacts of CBAs. The analysis is necessary due to the complexity and globalization 
of production. In the era of global value chains, the trade effects of CBAs do not merely 
concern extra-EU final products that are substitutes for EU products. Rather, the imported 
products are often used in the EU production as intermediate goods or services. These 
production linkages need to be considered when assessing the EU’s overall economic 
reliance on the emission-intensive imports. Moreover, the analysis of the value chains 
also helps to better understand the importance of EU trade for the extra-EU countries. 
Their exports to the EU often include third-country intermediate products that needs 
to be considered in order to account for the true value of trade for individual exporting 
countries.
Our analysis builds on the CBA-induced changes in the bilateral gross trade flows that are 
analyzed in Section 5.1. In the second stage, we insert them to the world input–output 
data that represents the underlying value chain structure. Ultimately, we can study which 
countries produce value added to the emission-intensive imported products and which 
final producers are the most reliant on them. 
Methodologically, our approach builds on the so-called hypothetical extraction method 
that is based on an input–output representation of the global economy (Los, Timmer, and 
de Vries, 2016). This approach has a clear economic intuition and can be easily applied to 
the data. It compares the actual GDP of a country with a hypothetical GDP in cases where 
all the bilateral effects of the CBAs are introduced. The bilateral gross-trade effects are 
estimated with our sectoral gravity model, after which the global input–output tables 
are used to extract the total amount of value added in all production stages involving 
intermediate goods and services that are embodied in the bilateral trade flows. To yield 
the total value-added content of the CBA’s impact, the difference between the actual 
value added and the value added with CBAs are introduced. 
It is worth noting that our analysis is an accounting exercise that measures the value chain 
impacts of the changes in trade due to the CBAs ceteris paribus. That is, it allows us to 
measure the value chain impacts under the existing value chains and economic behavior. 
However, it is possible that the underlying economic conditions may adjust to the 
changing conditions. We consider these dynamics more closely with our macroeconomic 
model. 
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5.2.1  Methodology
We next briefly introduce the key element of the analysis in a non-technical manner—a 
technical description is available in Appendix 3.
In terms of the bilateral trade impacts of the CBAs, we use tariff-elasticity estimates based 
on the gravity model at the level of the EXIOBASE product groups. The gravity model 
provides an estimate of the average effect of tariffs on trade based on the historical 
variation of tariffs and trade within the product groups. The methodology and the results 
concerning gross-trade elasticities are reported in Appendix 3.
In our analysis, we use the 2016 release of the WIOD database (Timmer et al., 2015; 2016). 
The data contains sector-level world input–output tables (WIOTs) with underlying data 
for 43 countries (and a category that summarizes the rest-of-the world) and 56 sectors, 
including services. The countries were chosen by considering whether there was a 
sufficient level of data availability and by attempting to cover a major part of the world 
economy. The selected countries include 27 EU countries and 15 other major countries. 
Data for the 56 sectors are classified according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification Revision 4 (ISIC Rev. 4). The tables adhere to the 2008 version of the System 
of National Accounts. The dataset provides WIOTs using current prices, denoted in millions 
of US dollars (Timmer et al., 2016). These countries account for more than 85 % of the 
world’s GDP at current exchange rates. WIOTs are built based on National Accounts data, 
which are extended by means of disaggregating imports by country of origin and using 
categories to generate international supply and use tables (Timmer et al., 2016).
Let us next shortly describe how data is transferred between the gravity model and the 
WIOD data. The gravity model, when applied in a global context, provides an estimate 
of the percentual change in the value of trade of all bilateral trade flows involving CBAs 
in our scenarios. We analyze their implications on gross trade in the year 2014, which is 
the latest observation year in the WIOD database, and construct a set of counterfactual 
bilateral trade flows that represents world with the CBAs. The counterfactual is 
constructed by altering the trade flows in the WIOD data according to the percentual 
changes of trade that were forecasted by the gravity model. We alter the trade flows of 
final and intermediate goods in the same proportion in order to build the counterfactual. 
A similar approach has previously been used by Nilsson-Hakkala et al. (2019) to analyze 
the impacts of the EU’s free trade agreements.
It is notable that the transfer of information between the gravity model predictions and the 
WIOD data requires some aggregation. The WIOD data only includes 43 countries, while all 
other countries are aggregated to a ROW category. Therefore, all changes in the bilateral 
trade flows in the gravity model that occur within the ROW category of the WIOD dataset 
have to be aggregated together. In these cases, we use the magnitude of the corresponding 
bilateral trade flows to weight the relative changes of trade within the ROW category.
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5.2.2. Results
We next discuss the value-chain implications of our four main CBA scenarios. We begin our 
analysis by studying how much value-added different countries contribute to the bilateral 
trade flows. We analyze the contributions by measuring how much less value added 
different countries would have if gross trade patterns were to decline according to the 
prediction of the gravity model if the world input–output structure otherwise remained 
the same as in our WIOD data for the year 2014.
Table 5.2.2.1 reports the contributions of different countries to the value added embodied 
in the trade that would be affected by the CBAs in euros (a) and as a percentage of total 
contributions (b). 
In terms of the total contributions, we find that in the Feasible 1 scenario, with CBAs only 
imposed on cement, lime, and plaster, the total value added is only 0.1 billion euros. The 
total contribution increases to 4.9 billion euros when the CBA is extended to also include 
basic steel and aluminum products. The Efficient Scenario with the emission-intensive 
industries and all emissions as the basis for the CBA measurements increases the total 
contribution to 142.5 billion euros. The Efficient Scenario with the emission-intensive 
industries and direct and electricity emissions as the basis for the CBA measurements sets 
the total contribution to 79.9 billion euros.
Overall, we thus find that the Feasible Scenarios have negligible impacts at the aggregate 
level, while in the Efficient Scenarios, the effects are more substantial.
The underlying country-level contributions in Table 5.2.2.1 provide further information 
concerning the potential economic impacts of the CBA-induced changes on trade. First, 
we find that the overall value-added contribution of EU countries to the affected imports 
are small (not exceeding 8 % of all value added). The result suggests that the role of 
back-and-forth trade with the EU and the trade partners does not play a major role in the 
production. For Finland, the corresponding value-added contributions to the products are 
0.1, 5.6, 127.5, and 68.0 million euros.
Second, we study the role of the extra-EU countries. In the case of the narrowest Feasible 
Scenario (Feasible 1), the most important individual-country value-added contributors 
are made by the UK (56.6 %) and Turkey (9.0 %). The ROW category of small developing 
countries contributes 15.7 %. 
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Table 5.2.2.1.  CBA-induced loss in value added by the producer country of value added.
  Value added loss of imports in the different scenarios, 
EUR millions
Value added loss of imports in the different scenarios, 
share of total loss in the scenario
  Feasible 1: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster
Feasible 2: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster + 
metals
Efficient 
1: all 
emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
Feasible 1: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster
Feasible 2: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster + 
metals
Efficient 
1: all 
emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
AUS 0.3 86 1347.6 746.6 0.30 % 1.80 % 1.00 % 0.90 %
BRA 0.3 75 1074.6 515.4 0.20 % 1.60 % 0.80 % 0.70 %
CAN 0.6 163.9 1227 633.4 0.60 % 3.40 % 0.90 % 0.80 %
CHE 2.1 67.2 971.5 259.5 2.10 % 1.40 % 0.70 % 0.30 %
CHN 2.1 905.9 70335 41334.8 2.10 % 18.90 % 50.00 % 52.30 %
GBR 57.1 329.6 2664.4 1310.4 56.60 % 6.90 % 1.90 % 1.70 %
IDN 0.2 37.6 2000.9 853.5 0.20 % 0.80 % 1.40 % 1.10 %
IND 0.4 211.3 4614.7 2646.8 0.30 % 4.40 % 3.30 % 3.40 %
JPN 0.7 463.9 6636.5 3399.4 0.70 % 9.70 % 4.70 % 4.30 %
KOR 0.2 230 6153.9 2577 0.20 % 4.80 % 4.40 % 3.30 %
MEX 0.1 72.6 852.9 393.8 0.10 % 1.50 % 0.60 % 0.50 %
RUS 1.3 435.3 2799 1674.2 1.30 % 9.10 % 2.00 % 2.10 %
TUR 9.1 318.8 2908.3 1458.3 9.00 % 6.60 % 2.10 % 1.80 %
TWN 0.1 15 1546.7 826.8 0.10 % 0.30 % 1.10 % 1.00 %
USA 2.4 267.1 8517.7 5020.1 2.40 % 5.60 % 6.10 % 6.40 %
ROW 15.8 861.7 21959 12651.1 15.70 % 17.90 % 15.60 % 16.00 %
Extra-
EU total 92.9 4540.9 135609.6 76301.3 92.00 % 94.60 % 96.30 % 96.60 %
EU 8.1 260.4 5160.8 2689.4 8.00 % 5.40 % 3.70 % 3.40 %
Total 101 4801.3 140770.4 78990.7 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 %
Note: The authors’ calculations are based on WIOD data. We analyze the losses by measuring how much less value 
added different countries would have if gross trade patterns were to decline according to the prediction of the 
gravity model while the world input–output structure otherwise remains the same as in our WIOD data for the year 
2014.
When the basic metal products are included, the contribution of China increases 
substantially. In the Feasible 2 scenario, its contribution is 0.9 billion euros (18.5 %) while 
other important individual contributor countries are Japan and Russia.
In the Efficient Scenarios, China’s role becomes even more dominant. It contributes 
roughly one half of the total value added in products that would not be imported to the 
EU according to the changes in the gross trade.
Another way to elaborate the potential trade linkages that would be affected by the CBAs 
is to assign the total value added to the corresponding final producer countries. That is, we 
78
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48
sum up the value-added contributions of different countries that are embodied in a final 
good produced by a particular country. This information helps us to further understand 
the intermediate-product linkages between the EU and the extra-EU countries. 
We report the findings in Table 5.2.2.2. It again shows the value-added embodied in 
the trade that would be affected by the CBAs in euros (a) and as a percentage of total 
contributions (b).
Table 5.2.2.2. CBA-induced loss in contributed value added, decomposed by the final producer country
  (a) EUR millions value-added import loss embodied in 
final products of the row country
(b) The percentage of total value-added import loss 
embodied in row country final products, as compared to 
the scenario total.
  Feasible 1: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster
Feasible 2: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster + 
metals
Efficient 1: 
all emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
Feasible 1: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster
Feasible 2: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster + 
metals
Efficient 1: 
all emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
AUS 0.6 24.4 439.9 237.5 0.60 % 0.50 % 0.30 % 0.30 %
BRA 0.8 30.4 740.4 345.4 0.80 % 0.60 % 0.50 % 0.40 %
CAN 0.4 25.8 686.9 348.7 0.40 % 0.50 % 0.50 % 0.40 %
CHE 0.6 22.5 757.3 236.3 0.60 % 0.50 % 0.50 % 0.30 %
CHN 6 359.9 44839.7 25263 5.90 % 7.50 % 31.90 % 32.00 %
GBR 3.1 63.9 2070.3 1068.4 3.10 % 1.30 % 1.50 % 1.40 %
IDN 1 22.9 1100.2 433.8 1.00 % 0.50 % 0.80 % 0.50 %
IND 1.7 59.7 2274.7 1274.8 1.70 % 1.20 % 1.60 % 1.60 %
JPN 2.5 113.1 2765.6 1466.9 2.50 % 2.40 % 2.00 % 1.90 %
KOR 1.4 68.9 2404.3 962.5 1.40 % 1.40 % 1.70 % 1.20 %
MEX 0.3 20.6 860.3 299.9 0.30 % 0.40 % 0.60 % 0.40 %
RUS 0.4 28.9 806.9 494.9 0.40 % 0.60 % 0.60 % 0.60 %
TUR 2.2 47.9 1864.1 828.9 2.20 % 1.00 % 1.30 % 1.00 %
TWN 0.4 15.2 321.4 178.5 0.40 % 0.30 % 0.20 % 0.20 %
USA 3.6 187.4 5247.3 3026.5 3.60 % 3.90 % 3.70 % 3.80 %
ROW 44.8 2463.9 44069.6 25609.1 44.40 % 51.30 % 31.30 % 32.40 %
Extra-EU 
total 69.8 3555.5 111248.9 62075.2 69.10 % 74.10 % 79.00 % 78.60 %
EU 31.2 1245.8 29521.6 16915.5 30.90 % 25.90 % 21.00 % 21.40 %
Total 101 4801.3 140770.4 78990.7 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 %
Note: The authors’ calculations are based on WIOD data. We assign the total value added to the corresponding final 
producer countries. That is, we sum up the value-added contributions of different countries that are embodied 
in a final good produced by a particular country, as shown by the row. We use ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes for 
abbreviation of country names.
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We find that a substantial share of the value added contributes to final products that are 
assembled in the EU. This share is the highest in case of the Feasible 1 and 2 scenarios, 
30.9 % and 25.9 % correspondingly, while the share lowers to roughly 21 % in the Efficient 
Scenarios. Thus, EU production has major dependencies on the imported intermediate 
goods that would be affected by the CBAs in our scenarios. Overall, the shares in the 
Efficient scenarios reflect quite well the average intermediate product shares in the EU 
imports.
In terms of the individual countries, China’s role continues to be large. It is most often the 
final assembly country of the corresponding final products when measured by all value-
added share embodied in its final products. The role of small developing countries in the 
ROW is also substantial. It is notable that the final-producer country, distribution is rather 
similar between the two Efficient Scenarios. 
We further decompose the total value added embodied in the EU final products into the 
contributions of the individual EU final producer country in Table 5.2.2.3. 
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Table 5.2.2.3. CBA-induced loss in contributed value added, as decomposed by the EU final producer country
  EUR millions value-added import loss embodied in final 
products of the row country
The percentage of total value-added import loss 
embodied in row country final products, as compared 
to the scenario total.
  Feasible 1: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster
Feasible 2: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster + 
metals
Efficient 
1: all 
emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
Feasible 1: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster
Feasible 2: 
Cement, 
lime, and 
plaster + 
metals
Efficient 
1: all 
emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
AUT 1.0 28.1 600.2 348.8 3.1 % 2.3 % 2.0 % 2.1 %
BEL 0.6 60.9 1388.8 876.5 1.8 % 4.9 % 4.7 % 5.2 %
BGR 2.5 18.1 230.5 154.0 8.0 % 1.5 % 0.8 % 0.9 %
CYP 0.1 4.4 58.3 40.4 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
CZE 0.2 25.1 858.0 465.5 0.5 % 2.0 % 2.9 % 2.8 %
DEU 2.4 274.4 7045.5 3941.1 7.8 % 22.0 % 23.9 % 23.3 %
DNK 0.4 20.3 535.8 312.8 1.4 % 1.6 % 1.8 % 1.8 %
ESP 1.8 94.5 2142.6 1245.5 5.8 % 7.6 % 7.3 % 7.4 %
EST 0.1 4.6 102.9 63.0 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.3 % 0.4 %
FIN 0.0 5.9 150.3 82.6 0.1 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.5 %
FRA 11.0 150.1 4344.7 2448.7 35.2 % 12.1 % 14.7 % 14.5 %
GRC 0.9 19.0 305.3 193.9 2.9 % 1.5 % 1.0 % 1.1 %
HRV 1.4 9.1 146.4 102.3 4.4 % 0.7 % 0.5 % 0.6 %
HUN 0.3 21.2 785.0 429.4 0.8 % 1.7 % 2.7 % 2.5 %
IRL 0.4 18.6 490.4 258.2 1.3 % 1.5 % 1.7 % 1.5 %
ITA 2.7 189.9 3303.4 2028.8 8.7 % 15.2 % 11.2 % 12.0 %
LTU 0.5 4.7 104.7 69.9 1.6 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.4 %
LUX 0.0 4.5 71.0 40.1 0.1 % 0.4 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
LVA 0.1 5.6 80.8 54.8 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.3 % 0.3 %
MLT 0.0 1.2 47.7 24.8 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
NLD 0.8 81.7 2465.4 1286.1 2.4 % 6.6 % 8.4 % 7.6 %
NOR 0.2 26.7 458.9 255.0 0.7 % 2.1 % 1.6 % 1.5 %
POL 0.8 59.5 1458.0 853.7 2.4 % 4.8 % 4.9 % 5.0 %
PRT 0.4 20.1 314.5 191.2 1.4 % 1.6 % 1.1 % 1.1 %
ROU 2.0 42.5 562.5 354.1 6.4 % 3.4 % 1.9 % 2.1 %
SVK 0.1 14.8 642.6 324.1 0.5 % 1.2 % 2.2 % 1.9 %
SVN 0.1 9.2 139.7 85.4 0.4 % 0.7 % 0.5 % 0.5 %
SWE 0.5 31.1 687.5 384.6 1.5 % 2.5 % 2.3 % 2.3 %
Note: The authors’ calculations are based on WIOD data. We assign the total value added to the corresponding final 
producer countries. That is, we sum up the value-added contributions of different countries that are embodied 
in a final good produced by a particular country, as shown by the row. We use ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes for 
abbreviation of country names.
We find that in the case of the broad cement product CBA, France has a substantial role 
as a final producer (accounting for 35.2 % of the total final goods assembled in the EU), 
whereas in other scenarios, Germany is the largest user of the imported products in its 
final production, followed by France, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
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In Table 5.2.2.4, we provide a perspective on the reliance of the EU countries on the trade 
of the CBA-related intermediate products. In the table, we compare the trade in value 
added to the total value added of the final good’s producer country. If the domestic value 
added is small compared with the value added embodied in the imports, it is more likely 
that the country is reliant on the particular imports in its final production. 
Table 5.2.2.4. The CBA-related value-added imports of intermediate goods by EU final producer country
  % of total value-added import loss embodied in the country’s final products compared to the country’s total value added
  Feasible 1: Cement, lime, 
and plaster
Feasible 2: Cement, lime, 
and plaster + metals
Efficient 1: all emissions Efficient 2: direct + 
electricity emissions
AUT 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.20 % 0.12 %
BEL 0.000 % 0.02 % 0.39 % 0.24 %
BGR 0.007 % 0.05 % 0.62 % 0.41 %
CYP 0.001 % 0.03 % 0.37 % 0.26 %
CZE 0.000 % 0.02 % 0.61 % 0.33 %
DEU 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.27 % 0.15 %
DNK 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.24 % 0.14 %
ESP 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.23 % 0.13 %
EST 0.000 % 0.03 % 0.58 % 0.36 %
FIN 0.000 % 0.00 % 0.09 % 0.05 %
FRA 0.001 % 0.01 % 0.23 % 0.13 %
GRC 0.001 % 0.01 % 0.19 % 0.12 %
HRV 0.004 % 0.02 % 0.40 % 0.28 %
HUN 0.000 % 0.02 % 0.89 % 0.49 %
IRL 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.29 % 0.15 %
ITA 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.23 % 0.14 %
LTU 0.002 % 0.01 % 0.32 % 0.21 %
LUX 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.16 % 0.09 %
LVA 0.000 % 0.03 % 0.39 % 0.26 %
MLT 0.000 % 0.02 % 0.67 % 0.35 %
NLD 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.41 % 0.22 %
NOR 0.000 % 0.01 % 0.14 % 0.08 %
POL 0.000 % 0.016 % 0.399 % 0.234 %
PRT 0.000 % 0.013 % 0.207 % 0.126 %
ROU 0.002 % 0.032 % 0.424 % 0.267 %
SVK 0.000 % 0.022 % 0.937 % 0.472 %
SVN 0.000 % 0.029 % 0.433 % 0.265 %
SWE 0.000 % 0.008 % 0.180 % 0.101 %
Note: The authors’ calculations are based on WIOD data. We analyze the losses by measuring how much less value 
added would different countries have if gross trade patterns were to decline according to the prediction of the 
gravity model while the world input–output structure otherwise remains the same as in our WIOD data for the year 
2014. We use ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes for abbreviation of country names.
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Overall, we find that the value-added ratio is small in the case of the Feasible Scenarios, a 
finding that suggests that the reliance on imports is small (i.e., the value of the imports is 
not high compared with the value of the overall economic activity). The largest ratios are 
seen in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, and Latvia). 
In case of the Efficient Scenarios, the ratios are moderately higher. In several cases, the 
ratio exceeds 0.5 % of the aggregate value added (for Hungary, Malta, Bulgaria, and 
the Czech Republic). Again, these countries are mostly Eastern European countries or 
countries that have close economic ties with the UK. For Finland, the reliance on the 
imports is small with this metric when compared to other countries.
We then decompose the value added according to the producer industry of the final 
product in the EU. In terms of the share of the total embodied value added in Table A3.1, 
we find that the largest final user industry is construction. In particular, in the Feasible 
Scenario with only cement, lime and plaster, the value added that is embodied in its final 
products is 43.8 %. Other important user industries of the affected value-added imports 
are those related to (1) the manufacture of food products, beverages, and tobacco 
products; (2) the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products; and (3) the 
manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers.
When the CBAs are extended to also include basic metal products, the role of various 
manufacturing industries increases. They entail the manufacture of items such as 
computers, electrical equipment, machinery, and vehicles.
In Table A3.1b (which can be found in Appendix 3), we repeat the reliance measurement 
on the industry level. This time, we compare the trade in value added to the total value 
added of the final producer industry. We find that the reliance is the highest in the 
manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, as well as in the production of 
computers, electrical equipment, machinery, and vehicles.
We also repeat the industry-level analysis for Finland. The results can be found in Table 
A3.2. We note that in the case of the narrow Feasible Scenario, the value-added content 
is very small. One explanation is that the Finnish construction industry is not particularly 
reliant on the extra-EU intermediates, as the industry decomposition shows. Instead, it 
appears that manufacturing industries in particular are reliant on intermediate goods. This 
result is comparable to the EU findings, albeit the reliance is smaller than for the European 
industries on average.
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5.3 Carbon leakage: Empirical evidence
As a part of the goal of reducing CO2 emissions and having a carbon neutral economy 
by 2050, the EU has implemented the ETS since 2005. The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade 
system that allocates a limited number of allowances for emissions in specific industries. 
However, as the system only covers production in the EU, there have been worries of 
carbon leakage. In this section, we conduct an ex post empirical study of whether carbon 
leakage has occurred due to the EU ETS. We first briefly describe the EU ETS and review 
previous studies of its impacts, and then describe our data and methodology and discuss 
the results.
5.3.1  The EU ETS
The EU ETS Handbook (European Commission, 2015) explains the history of the system, 
as described next. The first phase of the system was a pilot period during 2005–2007, 
used for testing price formation in the carbon market and establishing the necessary 
infrastructure for the functioning of the system. The second phase, 2008–2012, included 
more actual commitments, although the system still gave most of the allowances for free. 
The third phase, 2013–2020, is close to ending now, and during this time, the system has 
been harmonized across the EU (as previously the allowances had varied nationally).
VA LU E - C H A I N  R E S U LT S  F O R  F I N L A N D
We also characterized the related Finnish value chains. First, we measured total value added 
that would be lost as a result of the decline in imports in the different scenarios (the Feasible 
1: Cement, lime, and plaster; Feasible 2: Cement, lime, and plaster + metals; Efficient 1: all 
emissions; and Efficient 2: direct + electricity emissions). We found that the overall loss in 
value added would be 0.1, 5.6, 127.5, and 68.0 EUR millions, correspondingly. Thus, especially 
in the case of the narrow Feasible scenario, the role of Finnish final production is negligible 
for the value-added losses.
We also repeat the industry-level analysis for Finland. The results can be found in Table 
A3.2. We note that in the case of the narrow Feasible scenario, one explanation for the 
small value-added content is the Finnish construction industry, which is not particularly 
reliant on extra-EU intermediates, as the industry decomposition shows. Instead, it appears 
that especially manufacturing industries are reliable on intermediate goods. This result is 
comparable to the EU findings, albeit the reliance is smaller than for the European industries, 
on average.
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Besides CBAs, the free allocation of emission allowances is another way to prevent carbon 
leakage. In the current EU ETS, about 43 % of emission allowances have been distributed 
free of charge, although auctioning is the general rule in the regime (Directive [EU] 
2018/410). The amount of free allowances allocated in ETS can be calculated in three 
ways. Free allocation can be based on historical emissions only (grandparenting), that 
is to say, on emissions from a certain baseline period. This system was used during EU 
ETS Phases 1–2. Another way to determine the amount of free allowances is to employ 
actual or recent production and an efficiency benchmark for the sector (output-based 
allocation). The third option is a certain hybrid model used in the current EU ETS where 
both historical production levels and an efficiency benchmark for each sector play a role 
(fixed-sector benchmarking) (Acworth, Kardish, & Kellner, 2020). Apart from that, the 
amount of free allowances is affected by the carbon leakage rate of the sector along with 
a linear reduction factor or cross-sectoral correction factor to ensure that free allowances 
are not overallocated and the cap is reduced, that is to say, the total amount of emission 
allowances is lower every year (during Phase 4 the total amount of emission allowances is 
reduced by 2.2 % every year) (Consolidated text: Directive 2003/87/EC).
The amount of free allowances has been decreasing gradually (European Commission, 
2015). Table 5.3.1.1 shows how the amount of free allowances has developed in the third 
phase. 
Table 5.3.1.1. The development of free allowances in EU ETS Phase 3 
The share of free allocation, calculated based on 
benchmarks per sector
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Electricity production 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Industry sectors 80 % 72,9 % 65,7 % 58,6 % 51,4 % 44,2 % 37,1 % 30 %
Industry sectors deemed to be exposed to carbon 
leakage 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Source: EU ETS Handbook
As can be seen from Table 5.3.1, the share of free allowances based on benchmarks 
per sector has been quite high. The benchmark is calculated as the average emission 
level of the 10 % most efficient installations within each sector (European Commission, 
2015). In Phase 3, the total amount of free allocation each installation received has 
been determined by the product-related emission benchmark so that efficient plants 
can have received all (or almost all) of their allocations for free. As already stated, in the 
previous phases, the allowances were calculated based on historical emissions (European 
Commission, 2015).
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In practice most free allowances are allocated for industrial installations because most of 
them are deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage. In principle, no free allowances are 
allocated for electricity production, and district heating is allocated some allowances. 
For industry sectors not deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage, the amount of free 
allocation has been cut substantially during 2013–2020. Sectors and subsectors deemed 
to be exposed to carbon leakage are allocated free allowances 100 % of the benchmark 
(Consolidated text: Directive 2003/87/EC). Consequently, the most efficient installations of 
carbon leakage sectors get all their emissions allowances free of charge, whereas the least 
efficient ones need to buy allowances the most.
In practice, carbon leakage regulation provided for long industrial installations with so 
much free allowances that 2017 was the first year that industrial installations as a whole 
faced direct costs. Until then, there was a surplus of allowances (Marcu et al., 2019). The 
definition of sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage will be tightened at the beginning 
of Phase 4 (2021) (Directive [EU] 2018/410), but the carbon leakage list covers still 94 % of 
industrial emissions (European Commission, 2019a).
The free allowances could decrease the amount of carbon leakage, but in our empirical 
analysis, we will study whether it still occurs. The prices of the allowances have also varied 
significantly over the years. Recently, the spot price has increased from 22 euros in June 
2020 to almost 30 euros in September 2020, but at its lowest, in 2013, the price was 
only approximately 3 euros. For comparison, according to the OECD, a low-end estimate 
of carbon costs in 2018 was 30 euros, and a midpoint estimate in 2020 it was 60 euros 
(OECD, 2018). As such, the system has been criticized for the overallocation of free permits 
and the volatility of carbon prices. However, according to the European Commission,28 
the amount of total emissions in the EU has decreased according to the target for 2020 
(emissions that are 21 % lower than in 2005).
5.3.2  Previous literature
As the EU ETS has now been functioning for 15 years, researchers have been able to study 
its effects with the past data. Especially as the system becomes stricter, the effects should 
be expected to become clearer. It has been shown that emission levels have decreased 
in the EU due to the EU ETS, but at the same time, firm competitiveness has not suffered 
negative impacts (see, e.g., Arlinghaus, 2015, for a survey). For example, Abrell, Ndoye 
Faye, and Zachmann (2011) used firm-level panel data to show that the shift from the 
first to the second phase of the EU ETS reduced emissions by firms while the impact on 
company performance was modest. Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) discussed whether 
28  https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en
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the so-called Porter hypothesis could apply. That is, more regulation and consequent 
innovation in green technologies could in fact increase firms’ competitiveness and thus 
more than fully offset the costs of compliance. However, according to Dechezleprêtre and 
Sato (2017), although the EU ETS has indeed been shown to have fostered innovation, firm 
competitiveness has not been impacted. 
According to the EU, free allocation has prevented carbon leakage (Directive [EU] 2018/410), 
although the low price of carbon has also played a role. Regarding this, it is important to 
note that this data is from the first two phases of ETS, covering 2005–2012. Back then almost 
all emission allowances were distributed free of charge. When all the emission allowances 
were distributed for free, carbon leakage due to the ETS would seem unlikely.
Although the effect of environmental regulation on firm performance has been the topic 
of many studies, research on carbon leakage is still lacking. A rare example of an ex post 
study on this topic is the study of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), who studied the impact 
of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001-2003 on carbon leakage with data from 
1995 to 2007. Their findings suggest that there has been some amount of carbon leakage 
from countries party to the protocol to countries that are not party to it. To be specific, 
they estimated that the amount of imports from the non-participants to participating 
countries were 8 % higher than if the Kyoto Protocol did not exist and that the carbon 
intensity of these imports was also 3 % higher than without the protocol. They also found 
variation between different industries. However, we have not been able to find many ex 
post studies specifically on the EU ETS and carbon leakage, most likely due to the fact that 
the system is still relatively new and has not been strictly enforced. One exception to this 
is the study by Naegele and Zaklan (2017), who used a similar but somewhat adjusted 
methodology to that of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) in order to study the impacts 
of the EU ETS with data from the computable general equilibrium model GTAP (Global 
Trade Analysis) database for the years 2004, 2007, and 2011. Their results did not show 
any significant carbon leakage. In addition, Dechezleprêtre, Gennaioli, Martin, Muûls, and 
Stoerk (2019) studied within-firm carbon emissions data to find the distribution of the 
carbon emissions of multinational firms across countries between 2007 and 2014. Their 
findings showed no significant evidence of carbon leakage with regards to company 
decisions on relocating to different countries. 
Studies that try to estimate the possibility of carbon leakage because of environmental 
regulation most often use a CGE type of model for the ex ante evaluation of future 
changes in policy. The estimates for possible carbon leakage rates (as a percentage of 
the domestic emission reductions that are offset by foreign increases) are generally 
moderate, in the range between 2 and 20 % (Larch & Wanner, 2014). In a review of the 
CGE literature and environmental policy, Carbone and Rivers (2017) found that previous 
studies have mostly been in agreement that there will be some amount of carbon leakage 
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in response to unilateral climate policies. Studies also show variation in carbon leakage 
between different industries. For example, Santamaría, Linares, and Pintos (2014) found 
that the cement sector would be the most vulnerable to carbon leakage, whereas the 
risk of leakage is smaller for steel and oil refining. However, their study only uses Spanish 
data. On the other hand, Fischer and Fox (2012) simulated a US-based carbon tax on a 
multi-region CGE model and found an overall leakage rate of 7 %, while iron and steel 
experience respective leakage rates of 58 and 57 %. The CGE estimates in general can have 
large variations because of different model assumptions.
5.3.3  Data 
We obtain data on the CO2 emission intensities embodied in gross imports (tons of CO2 
per million USD) from the OECD “Carbon dioxide emissions embodied in international 
trade” database. The database covers 60 countries29 and the years 2005–2015. This 
emissions data is then combined with bilateral manufacturing trade data extracted from 
the UN Comtrade database for the same countries and years. Comtrade has data on the 
HS6 level, which we convert to the ISIC Rev. 3 industry classification to match the OECD 
data. Some ISIC categories are further combined if the OECD classification so requires. 
Table 5.3.3.1 shows the final categories we have in the data. Table 5.3.3.2 then shows the 
industries that are included in the ETS. 
29  The countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the People’s Republic of 
China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.
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Table 5.3.3.1.  The industry categories in the OECD data
ISIC Rev. 3 Industry
01–05 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
10–14 Mining and quarrying
15–16 Food products, beverages, and tobacco
17–19 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather, and related products
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21–22 Paper products and printing
23 Coke and refined petroleum products (and nuclear fuel)
24 Chemicals and chemical/pharmaceutical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machines and equipment n.e.c.
30–33 Computers, and electronic and electrical equipment
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers
35 Other transport equipment
In our analysis, we only study the effects of Phases 2 and 3 as Phase 1 was a trial period 
with no actual commitment. The ISIC Rev. 3 categories that match the ETS application are 
21–22, 23, 26, and 27 in the second phase and category 24 in addition to the previous 
ones in Phase 3. It should be noted that categories 21–22 include both paper products 
and printing, although the ETS only applies to paper and pulp, not to printing (due to the 
OECD classification). 
Table 5.3.3.2 The industries and countries included in the ETS. 
Key features Phase 1   
(2005–2007)
Phase 2  
(2008–2012)
Phase 3  
(2013–2020)
Geography EU27 EU27 + Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein
EU27 + Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Croatia from 
1.1.2013 (aviation from 1.1.2014)
Sectors - Power stations and other 
combustion plants ≥ 20MW
- Oil refineries
- Coke ovens
- Iron and steel plants
- Cement clinker
- Glass
- Lime
- Bricks
- Ceramics
- Pulp
- Paper and board
The same sectors as Phase 1 plus 
aviation (from 2012)
- The same sectors as Phase 1 plus:
- Aluminum
- Petrochemical
- Ammonia
- Nitric, adipic, and glyoxylic acid 
production
- CO2 capture, transport in 
pipelines, and geological storage 
of CO2
- Aviation
Source: EU ETS Handbook.
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5.3.4  Methodology
Our econometric estimation model in this analysis is again based on the theoretical 
gravity model. The estimation here uses regressions with fixed effects on country and 
year (and industry) levels in order to take into account both the time-invariant and time-
varying effects of different factors affecting trade between countries. In this estimation, 
we largely follow the methodology of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) who studied the 
effect of the Kyoto agreement on carbon leakage.
We estimate the following regression equation (where m refers to the importer, x to the 
exporter, and t to time):
which includes a full set of country–year fixed effects (, ) and a country-pair–industry effect 
(). We estimate the equation for natural logarithms (ln) of four independent variables, y: 
the value of imports (in USD)
the CO2 intensity of imports (tons per USD million)
the CO2 content of imports (CO2 intensity x import value)
the CO2 intensity of exports / the CO2 intensity of imports
The last variable shows the relative impact on the CO2 intensity of imports compared to 
the CO2 intensity of exports. 
Our dependent variable of interest is , which equals 1 if the importer country is in the 
ETS and -1 if the exporter is in the scheme. It equals 0 if neither party is or if both are 
ETS members. The estimated coefficient  therefore shows the effect of a differential ETS 
commitment. 
The vector  has controls for trade policy (i.e., free trade agreements and joint EU 
memberships, both including policies that have only been applied after 2005). The error 
term  is a mean zero transitory error, and it is clustered at the country-pair–industry level.
ln𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
 
90
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48
5.3.5  Results: Is there evidence on leakage and, if so, how large it is 
expected to be?
We first estimate equation (1) on an aggregate level with pooled sectoral data. The 
estimated coefficients in Table 5.3.5.1, in columns 1–4, show by how many percent (after 
multiplying by 100) the different variables have changed due to the EU ETS from 2008 to 
2015 in the industries that are part of the system. The results imply that both the value of 
imports and the CO2 intensity of imports have increased due to the EU ETS. Consequently, 
the CO2 content of imports has also increased. This is logical considering that the CO2 
content of imports is defined as the CO2 intensity of imports multiplied by the amount of 
imports.
We also divide the general ETS effect into Phases 2 and 3 in columns 5–8. The estimated 
coefficient for the CO2 intensity shows an increase from Phase 2 to 3. This indicates that 
the products that have been imported to the EU ETS countries have become more carbon 
intensive as the enforcement of the ETS has become stricter, although free allocation has 
still been in place for many sectors deemed vulnerable to carbon leakage. At the same 
time, we can see that the amount of imports only shows a statistically significant increase 
in Phase 2 in column 5, although this was not apparent in column 1, for the years 2008–
2015. The increase in imports in Phase 2, together with the increase in the CO2 intensity of 
imports, makes the estimated coefficient for the CO2 content of imports greater in Phase 2 
than in Phase 3. 
The CO2 intensity ratio coefficient has been negative both in general during the ETS, and 
more significantly, when divided into the two phases. This implies that the CO2 intensity 
has increased more for imports than for exports due to the EU ETS, which aligns with the 
EU having decreased its carbon-intensive production due to the ETS, as opposed to the 
non-ETS countries.
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Table 5.3.5.1. Regressions on pooled sectoral data
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln imports Ln CO2 
intensity of 
imports
Ln CO2 
content of 
imports
Ln CO2 
intensity 
ratio 
(exports/
imports)
Ln imports Ln CO2 
intensity of 
imports
Ln CO2 
content of 
imports
Ln CO2 
intensity 
ratio 
(exports/
imports)
Joint EU membership 0.469*** -0.113*** 0.355*** 0.115*** 0.467*** -0.113*** 0.354*** 0.112***
(0.032) (0.005) (0.032) (0.006) (0.032) (0.005) (0.032) (0.006)
RTA 0.060*** -0.002 0.058*** 0.000 0.061*** -0.002 0.059*** 0.001
(0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004)
EU ETS (2008–2015) 0.052*** 0.019*** 0.070*** -0.019***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003)
EU ETS Phase 2 (2008–2012) 0.080*** 0.015*** 0.094*** -0.015***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003)
EU ETS Phase 3 (2013–2015) 0.024 0.023*** 0.047*** -0.022***
(0.017) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004)
Observations 532,820 532,820 532,820 504,537 532,820 532,820 532,820 504,537
R-squared 0.920 0.956 0.919 0.949 0.920 0.956 0.919 0.949
Note. The fixed effects include country–time and country-pair–industry effects. Standard errors are clustered on 
country-pair and industry levels. The regressions include the full set of countries and industries in our data. *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Next, for the robustness of our results, we separate the data into industries that are in the 
EU ETS and the ones that are not. The purpose of this step is to see if the industries that 
belong in the ETS have had more imports with higher CO2 content compared with the 
unaffected industries. Table 5.3.5.2 again first shows the aggregate effect of the EU ETS in 
columns 1–4 and the separate effects of Phase 2 and 3 in columns 5–8. Column 2 shows 
that the estimated coefficient the CO2 intensity of imports is positive for both ETS and 
non-ETS group, with almost the same values. This indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the CO2 intensities of imports between these groups. The CO2 intensity ratios 
are also similar for both groups as a result.
When looking at the value of imports in column 1, we can see that the ETS industry group 
has a positive estimated coefficient (i.e., the value of imports has increased due to the EU 
ETS) while the other group shows no significant changes. When we separate this effect 
into the different phases in column 5, we can see that there was in fact an increase for 
both groups in Phase 2, while in Phase 3 the ETS group shows no statistically significant 
changes, and the non-ETS group has a negative coefficient. It follows that the CO2 content 
of imports also increased more for the ETS group than for the non-ETS group in Phase 2.
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It should be noted that the financial crisis of 2007–2008 occurred at the same time as the 
start of ETS Phase 2, which in fact reduced imports globally (see Figure 5.3.5.1), but these 
types of crises that affect most countries in our data are absorbed by the country–time 
fixed effects. As such, our results still show an increase in imports due to the dummies we 
have defined.
Table 5.3.5.2. Effects on ETS and non-ETS sectors
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln imports Ln CO2 
intensity of 
imports
Ln CO2 
content of 
imports
Ln CO2 
intensity 
ratio 
(exports/
imports)
Ln imports Ln CO2 
intensity of 
imports
Ln CO2 
content of 
imports
Ln CO2 
intensity 
ratio 
(exports/
imports)
                 
Joint EU membership 0.463*** -0.098*** 0.365*** 0.099*** 0.443*** -0.095*** 0.348*** 0.096***
(0.032) (0.005) (0.033) (0.006) (0.032) (0.005) (0.032) (0.006)
RTA 0.061*** -0.004 0.057*** 0.003 0.069*** -0.005* 0.063*** 0.004
(0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004)
Sectors in the EU ETS (2008–2015) 0.046*** 0.034*** 0.081*** -0.032***
(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003)
Sectors not in the  
EU ETS (2008–2015) -0.010 0.029*** 0.019** -0.027***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Sectors in the EU ETS, Phase 2 
(2008–2012) 0.099*** 0.026*** 0.125*** -0.025***
(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003)
Sectors in the EU ETS, Phase 3 
(2013–2015) -0.016 0.044*** 0.028 -0.041***
(0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004)
Sectors not in the EU ETS, Phase 2 
(2008–2012) 0.043*** 0.021*** 0.064*** -0.019***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
Sectors not in the EU ETS, Phase 3 
(2013–2015) -0.108*** 0.044*** -0.064*** -0.040***
(0.013) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003)
Observations 532,820 532,820 532,820 504,537 532,820 532,820 532,820 504,537
R-squared 0.920 0.957 0.919 0.949 0.920 0.957 0.920 0.949
Note. The fixed effects include country–time and country pair–industry effects. Standard errors are clustered on 
country–pair and industry level. The regressions include the full set of countries and industries in our data. *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 5.3.5.1. The value of total imports to EU and non-EU countries (billion USD)
The results above indicate that the possible carbon leakage is mostly apparent in the 
value of imports. The CO2 intensity of imports has also increased, but this holds for both 
industries that have and have not been included in the EU ETS, and as such, it is not clear 
that this would in fact be due to the ETS. The total amount of carbon content that has 
been imported has increased as a consequence, which works against the EU’s climate 
goals.
To put the results into perspective, Figure 5.3.5.2 shows how much carbon was produced 
in the EU versus how much carbon was imported to the EU during 2005–2015 (in all 
industries). This figure uses OECD data on total carbon emissions based on production. 
The imports are from extra-EU countries to EU countries. As can be seen, a much larger 
amount of CO2 is produced in the EU to be used in final consumption and exports than 
the amount that is imported to the EU. This means that even if there is carbon leakage, the 
decrease in CO2 content in EU production due to the EU ETS is not easily offset by carbon 
leakage. 
In Table 5.3.5.2 we estimated an 8.1 % increase in the carbon content of imports in 
the covered industries due to the EU ETS. In our data, the total amount of CO2 content 
imported to the EU from extra-EU countries in the industries that are covered in the 
EU ETS was 3.1 billion tons in total between 2008 and 2015. If the EU ETS had indeed 
increased the carbon content by 8.1 %, this would amount to 234 million tons of carbon 
more than if the system had not been in place. On the other hand, a recent study by Bayer 
and Aklin (2020) estimated that the EU ETS has decreased the carbon content in EU’s total 
production by 1.2 billion tons between 2008 and 2016 compared with the counterfactual 
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with no such system. This estimate includes the year 2016, which our data on imports 
does not, but the scale of the two numbers can still be compared. The carbon leakage rate 
with our estimations would thus be close to 20 %. This estimate is on the higher range 
of previous studies that have used CGE methods to estimate carbon leakage. The carbon 
leakage in our estimation thus does offset some of the carbon content reductions in the 
EU achieved by the EU ETS.
Figure 5.3.5.2. The CO2 content of imports and domestic production in the EU for all industries  
(tons of CO2)
Finally, we separate the analysis into different industries to see industry-level effects of 
the EU ETS. Table 5.3.5.3 shows the estimated coefficients for the EU ETS industries. The 
effects are separated into Phases 2 and 3. The results suggest that the ISIC Rev. 3 category 
27 (i.e., basic metals) has been the most affected by the ETS, both in Phase 2 and Phase 
3. Category 24 (chemicals) was only added to the ETS in the third phase, and the results 
also only show a statistically significant positive coefficient for the CO2 intensity of imports 
in Phase 3. Categories 21–22 are quite wide as they include both paper products and 
printing, but they also shows the increased CO2 intensity of imports in Phase 3 while 
the value of imports first shows an increase in Phase 2 and then a decrease in Phase 3. 
Category 26 also shows a decrease both in the value of imports and in the CO2 intensity of 
imports in Phase 3. Interestingly for our analysis, category 26 includes cement (as well as, 
e.g., lime, glass, and ceramics).
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Table 5.3.5.3. Regressions with separate industries
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln imports Ln CO2 intensity 
of imports
Ln CO2 content of 
imports
Ln CO2 intensity 
ratio (exports/
imports)
Phase 2. 21–22: Paper products and printing 0.060* 0.013** 0.073** -0.010*
(0.034) (0.005) (0.035) (0.006)
Phase 3. 21–22: Paper products and printing -0.165*** 0.047*** -0.118** -0.040***
(0.047) (0.009) (0.048) (0.009)
Phase 2. 23: Coke and refined petroleum 
products (and nuclear fuel) 0.094 -0.023*** 0.071 0.021**
(0.076) (0.009) (0.077) (0.009)
Phase 3. 23: Coke and refined petroleum 
products (and nuclear fuel) -0.122 -0.027** -0.149 0.026**
(0.095) (0.012) (0.096) (0.013)
Phase 2. 24: Chemicals and chemical/
pharmaceutical products 0.034 0.007 0.041* -0.005
(0.025) (0.005) (0.025) (0.005)
Phase 3. 24: Chemicals and chemical/
pharmaceutical products -0.024 0.059*** 0.035 -0.058***
(0.033) (0.007) (0.034) (0.007)
Phase 2. 26: Other non-metallic mineral 
products 0.012 0.003 0.016 0.000
(0.029) (0.006) (0.030) (0.006)
Phase 3. 26: Other non-metallic mineral 
products -0.121*** -0.024** -0.145*** 0.033***
(0.041) (0.009) (0.043) (0.009)
Phase 2. 27: Basic metals 0.199*** 0.074*** 0.273*** -0.070***
(0.038) (0.006) (0.039) (0.006)
Phase 3. 27: Basic metals 0.191*** 0.126*** 0.317*** -0.119***
(0.053) (0.008) (0.054) (0.008)
Note. There are separate regressions for each industry. The regressions include all the countries and years in our 
dataset, but they are conducted separately for each industry with a varying amount of observations available. The 
fixed effects include country–time and country-pair effects. Standard errors are clustered on a country-pair level. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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6 Macroeconomic modelling of the CBA’s 
impacts
6.1 GTAP modelling
6.1.1  Model, data, and scenarios
The multiregion, multisector computable general equilibrium model GTAP was used in 
the following economy-wide analysis of carbon border adjustment mechanism. The GTAP 
model has been developed in Purdue University30. GTAP analysis widens the scope of out 
earlier trade flow analysis by analysing the impacts for the whole economy. In the analysis, 
the adjustments in all markets due to the changes in relative prices (substitution effect) 
and income levels are taken into account. Bilateral trade is handled via an Armington 
assumption, according to which goods from different regions are imperfect substitutes 
to each other. The model is static and describes the long-run impact of the CBAM. Thus, it 
does not take into account the short-term costs during the adjustment process.
We used the GTAP 10 database that is the most recent dataset and mainly for the year 
2014. The database consists of 121 countries and 20 aggregate regions as well as 65 
sectors that for this analysis have been aggregated into 23 countries or regions and 27 
sectors, that are presented in Table 6.1. 
Two scenarios were analysed with the GTAP model. In the Feasible scenario, the CBAM 
covers more products than in the analysis in Chapter 5. In GTAP data, cement and 
aluminium are not included as separate products. Thus, instead of cement, we included 
‘non-metallic minerals’ industry, that covers the manufacturing of glass and ceramic 
products in addition to cement. For aluminium, we included ‘non-ferrous metals’ industry. 
30  GTAP model is presented in https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp
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Table 6.1. Countries, sectors and carbon tariffs in the scenarios examined with the GTAP model.
Countries Sectors CBAM tariffs in 
Feasible 2 scenario
CBAM tariffs in 
Efficient 1 scenario 
(range of count-
ry-specific tariffs)
EU countries Agriculture and fishery
Finland Forestry
Sweden Coal
Germany Oil
France Gas
Italy Mining
Spain Food products
Rest of EU Textiles 0.006–0.025
Non-EU countries Wood products
UK Pulp and paper 0.005–0.049
Switzerland Refined oil products
USA Iron and steel 0.014 0.011–0.143
Northern America, other Non-ferrous metals (including aluminium) 0.005 0.008–0.084
Latin America Non-metallic minerals (including cement) 0.024 0.011–0.141
Russia Fabricated metal products 0.008–0.062
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet 
Union excl. Russia Chemicals 0.004–0.060
Middle East Rubber and plastics 0.003–0.070
North Africa Electronics 0.006–0.030
Sub-Saharan Africa Electrical equipment 0.005–0.031
China Machinery and equipment 0.007–0.040
Japan Transport equipment
Korea Furniture and other manufacturing 0.005–0.040
Rest of Asia Electricity
Oceania Construction
Rest of the world Accomodation
Transport services
Rest of services
For the Efficient scenario, we analyse the impact of Efficient 1 that has higher carbon tariffs 
than Efficient 2. This is due to the fact that in the scenario Efficient 1 carbon tariffs are 
based on all direct and indirect emissions. The carbon tariffs are presented in Table 6.1. In 
the Feasible scenario, the tariffs are the same in imports from different non-EU countries as 
they are based on the carbon contents of the product in the EU. In the Efficient scenario, 
country-specific carbon tariffs are based on the carbon contents in non-EU countries and 
their range is shown in Table 6.1. The tariffs are based on the carbon price of 25EUR/tCO2. 
We analyse the impact of CBAM ceteris paribus, i.e. without any other policy changes. The 
impact of phase out of free allowances is discussed in Section 6.1.5.
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First, we represent the results for Finland in each subchapter. The results for other EU 
countries are compared to the ones obtained for Finland. Finally, we report the outcomes 
in the case of non-EU countries.
6.1.2 The impacts of CBAMs on trade flows
CBAMs affect trade flows, both directly and indirectly. For exports, the direct impacts 
on the competitiveness of CBAM sectors in world markets are twofold. In EU markets, 
EU producers have a notable competitive advantage against non-EU countries whose 
products face the tariff. The direct impact of the tariff for the EU is thus improved 
competitiveness in EU markets while, on the other hand, competitiveness is negatively 
affected both in EU and non-EU markets by more expensive imported inputs from non-EU 
countries that raise the production costs. In addition, changes in factor and product 
prices due to the adjustment in the economy and income affect the export impacts in 
all markets. In the case of a CBAM, the substitution effects due to the changes in relative 
prices are likely to dominate, but the income effect also has some importance. 
A CBAM implies that Finnish imports from non-EU countries are partly substituted with 
imports from other EU countries, as well as with domestic products. In the Feasible 
Scenario with a unified carbon tariff, based on carbon contents in the EU, the reductions 
of Finnish imports from different non-EU countries are almost equal. The impact is largest, 
namely -10 % for non-metallic minerals (including cement) that have the highest carbon 
content. Imports of iron and steel are reduced by 6 % and non-ferrous metals (including 
aluminum) are reduced by 2 %. Due to the substitution between imports from non-EU and 
EU countries, the impact of overall imports is notably smaller.
In the Efficient scenario, the impacts of imports are notably larger as country-specific 
carbon tariffs are based on the carbon contents in the non-EU countries. Imports are 
reduced most from countries with high embedded carbon in their products. For example, 
the imports of non-metallic minerals, and iron and steel from Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, as well as from China, were halved. On the other hand, imports from 
non-EU countries with low carbon content are only slightly reduced (e.g., the imports of 
non-metallic minerals from the UK were reduced by 6 % and imports of iron and steel 
were reduced by 2 %). For products with lower carbon contents, like electronics, the 
variation between countries is smaller. In addition, imports are increased from some 
non-EU countries with low carbon contents, such as USA.
For exports, we first sum up the impacts on Finnish exports. The main findings are that 
Finnish exports to the EU are increased for all CBAM products in both scenarios examined, 
due to the improved competitiveness resulting from the tariff. Exports of non-CBAM 
products to the EU are decreased as the substitution effect exceeds the income effect. 
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Exports of all products to non-EU countries are decreased as both substitution and income 
effects are negative. Below, we present the more detailed results.
In the Feasible Scenario, the CBAM increases the Finnish exports to other EU countries of 
non-metallic minerals by 2.4 %, iron and steel by 1.7 %, and non-ferrous metals by 1.4 %. 
However, the impacts on the total exports of these products are smaller—namely 1.5, 
1.2, and 0.5 % respectively—due to the decrease in exports to non-EU countries. Exports 
of those products that are not under the CBAM are reduced by 0–0.2 %. The reduction 
is largest for electronics, machinery and equipment, and transport equipment using 
imported metals as intermediate inputs and exporting a large share to non-EU countries. 
The reduction is larger for exports to non-EU countries compared to exports to the EU as 
overall demand levels are reduced in non-EU countries and increased in EU countries. 
We found that a decrease in exports due to the increase in the costs of imports remained 
small. Carbon tariffs result in the 2.4, 1.4, and 0.5 % increases for the import prices of non-
metallic minerals, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals from non-EU countries. However, 
the prices of the aggregate imported intermediate inputs of these products are only 
increased by 0.65, 0.3, and 0.25 % as the original shares of imports from non-EU countries 
are low and imports of non-EU products are substituted for with imports from the EU. The 
upward adjustment in wages and the price of capital are negligible.
In the Efficient scenario, the impacts on exports are notably larger. Finnish exports to 
other EU countries are increased for all CBAM products. However, the increase is not 
only dependent on the size of the carbon tariff for products imported from non-EU 
countries. For example, the exports of electronics are increased more than the exports 
of non-metallic minerals. Total exports are increased for iron and steel, non-metallic 
minerals, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, rubber and plastics, and textiles, as well as for 
pulp and paper. On the other hand, a CBAM reduces the total exports of electronics, and 
machinery and equipment as the negative impact of exports to non-EU countries exceeds 
the positive impact on exports to the EU. Exports of electronics to non-EU countries are 
reduced by 5 % and exports of machinery and equipment by 4 %; they export a notable 
share to non-EU countries. 
In the Efficient scenario, the highest increase in the import prices of carbon-intensive 
products from emission-intensive countries is about 15 %. The prices of intermediate 
imports for Finnish industries increase considerably less due to the substitution effect. 
The increase in the prices of imports is highest in the case of non-ferrous metals, rubber 
and plastics, electronics, non-metallic minerals, which have 1.4–1.6 % higher prices. 
Although electronics have a low carbon content, electronics are mainly imported from 
non-EU countries, which explains the fact that the increase in aggregate import price of 
electronics is one of the highest. The prices of labor and capital are increased by 0.3 %. 
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The increases in production costs imply that export prices are increased. The increase in 
production costs increased most the export prices of electronics (by 0.6 %), non-ferrous 
metals, textiles, transport equipment, fabricated metal products, and furniture, as well as 
iron and steel. 
The export and import impacts for other EU countries are similar than the ones for Finland, 
especially in the case of Germany. In the Efficient scenario, there is some variation in the 
impacts on total exports of CBAM products due to the different shares of exports to EU 
and non-EU countries. For example, in the case of France, the total exports of furniture and 
textiles decreases, as do the exports of electronics and machinery and equipment. On the 
other hand, total exports of electronics increase from ‘The rest of the Europe’.
For non-EU countries, the impacts on trade flows are mainly the opposite of those for 
EU countries. In the Efficient scenario with country-specific tariffs, the impact of carbon 
tariffs differs between countries, with the largest reductions in countries with high 
carbon intensity. Exports from China to the EU are reduced by 9–42 % for different CBAM 
products. On the other hand, Chinese exports to non-EU countries are increased by 1–3 %. 
Thus, the total exports of CBAM products are only reduced by 0.1–3 % as the share of 
exports to the EU is small. In contrast, other carbon intensive countries are only able to 
compensate the loss in EU exports with increase in exports to non-EU to a small extent. 
The developed non-EU countries with low carbon intensities might even increase their 
exports of CBAM products to the EU. For example, this applies to electronics from the UK, 
Switzerland, and the USA. The finding is explained by the fact that their competitiveness 
against EU producers only weakens slightly, and they receive some competitive advantage 
in EU markets against other non-EU countries with higher carbon content. 
Finally, we sum up the main impacts on the trade flows of CBAM products in the case 
of Feasible Scenarios in Figures 6.1.1.a and 6.1.1.b The impacts are largest in EU markets 
with a decrease in exports from non-EU countries and an increase in intra-EU exports. 
The impacts in exports to non-EU countries follows from the indirect effects of the CBAM 
and are notably smaller. The adjustment in prices lowers the production costs in non-EU 
countries and increases them in EU countries. Thus, exports of CBM products from the EU 
to non-EU countries are decreased while exports between non-EU countries are increased. 
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Figure 6.1.1.a The impact of the CBAM on the value of exports from non-EU countries and EU countries 
to EU countries for CBAM products in the Feasible Scenario (million USD). 
Figure 6.1.1.b The impact of the CBAM on the value of exports from non-EU and EU countries to non-EU 
countries for CBAM products in the Feasible Scenario (million USD). 
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6.1.3  The impacts of the CBAM on production levels
The results for production are mainly driven by export impacts. The impacts of the 
CBAM on production levels in Finland in both scenarios is presented in Figure 6.1.3, with 
percentage changes. In the Feasible Scenario, production is increased in all CBAM sectors 
and the increase is 0.5–1 % in Finland. This implies that production is also increased in 
those sectors that provides significant amounts of inputs to CBAM sectors. These include 
electricity and mining. For other sectors, production is decreased. In the Efficient scenario, 
the reallocation of resources between sectors is larger as the carbon tariffs are higher and 
almost all industry products from non-EU countries face the carbon tariff. Production is 
increased in most of the CBAM sectors. The highest increase is found in the manufacture 
of iron and steel, with a nearly 4 % increase. The production of non-ferrous metals, non-
metallic minerals, and rubber and plastics is also notably increased. Unlike in the Feasible 
Scenario, some CBAM sectors suffer. These include electronics, and machinery and 
equipment. These are sectors that export a large share to non-EU countries and use other 
CBAM products, like metals, as intermediate inputs. For non-CBAM sectors, production is 
increased for electricity and mining, and reduced for all other sectors. The production in 
service sectors is also slightly reduced, although their private and public consumption is 
slightly increased.
The production impacts are similar to other EU countries for both the Feasible Scenario 
and Efficient scenario, as in the case of exports. However, in other EU countries, machinery 
and equipment form the only CBAM sector that suffers and the production of electronics 
is increased. 
In non-EU countries, the production levels are mainly decreased due to the CBAM. In 
the Feasible Scenario, the productions of CBAM products are slightly decreased with 
the largest effects in the UK, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. For the other 
sectors, the production level is mainly decreased. In the Efficient scenario, the productions 
of CBAM products are mainly decreased. However, the production is increased for those 
products whose production was decreased in the EU area, namely electronics, and 
machinery and equipment. In addition, the production of fabricated metal products is 
increased. The largest production impact is found for iron and steel in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, with a 7.5 % decrease. However, the downward adjustment in 
wages and the price of capital implied that production was notably increased in sectors 
with lower carbon contents. In China, the impacts on production are modest; the largest 
reduction is for fabricated metal products (0.3 %) while the largest increase is for transport 
equipment (0.5 %). For the UK, the largest reduction is in the production of iron and steel 
(0.9 %) while the largest increase was a 1 % increase for electronics. 
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Figure 6.1.2. The impacts of the CBAM on production levels in Finland as a percentage change in the 
Feasible and Efficient scenarios. In the Feasible Scenario, the non-metallic minerals, non-ferrous me-
tals, and iron and steel are under the CBAM, while in the Efficient scenario, the products ranging from 
non-metallic minerals to pulp and paper are under the CBAM. 
6.1.4 The impacts of the CBAM on GDP and welfare
The economy-wide impacts of the CBAM are small and diversified. Taking into account the 
price mechanism and substitution possibilities reduces the impacts compared with the 
value change analysis presented above. 
In the Feasible Scenario, GDP impacts are negligible. The GDP impact is very slightly 
positive for all EU countries while it is mostly negative for non-EU countries (with a 
couple of exemptions: Korea and Russia). In the Efficient scenario, the GDP impact is 
slightly negative for all EU countries, as shown in Figure 6.1.3.a. According to the model 
results, in Finland the GDP would be reduced less than in other EU countries. For non-EU 
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countries, those countries with the highest carbon content, like China and the group of 
eastern European and former Soviet Union countries as well Russia, would suffer slightly, 
as presented in Figure 6.1.3.b. For developed non-EU countries, the impact is close to zero 
while Korea and North Africa would benefit slightly. 
GDP is affected by efficiency loss due to the reallocation of the resources. The model 
assumes that labour and capital are mobile across sectors within a country/region. On 
the other hand, the regional levels of capital and labour are not affected, which limits 
the magnitude of GDP impact. This follows from the model assumptions of non-mobile 
labour and capital between countries. These are typical assumptions applied in economic 
assessment of CBAM, e.g. in Böhringer et al. (2018) and in Pyrka et al. (2020). 
Welfare, as well as consumption, increases in the EU in both the Feasible Scenario and the 
Efficient scenario. This result is in line with Böhringer et al. (2018). For non-EU countries, 
the direction of the impact is same in both scenarios for all countries except the USA. 
Welfare is increased in the USA, Japan, and Korea and decreased in all other countries. In 
the study by Böhringer et al. (2018), welfare was decreased in all countries that face the 
carbon tariff, that includes non-OECD countries in his analysis. The difference might be 
explained by the fact that in the study of Böhringer et al., OECD countries have a climate 
policy and non-OECD countries face the tariff while in our analysis we look at the EU-level 
CBA policy. 
The welfare impacts are driven by the terms of the trade effect. Terms of trade are 
improved for EU countries as export prices are higher and import prices are lower. 
Welfare loss due to the reallocation of resources is also notable. However, in some cases 
this impact is positive. In the Feasible Scenario, the allocation impact is in line with GDP 
impacts as it is positive for all EU countries, Korea, and Russia. On the other hand, in the 
Efficient scenario there is a loss in efficiency due to the reallocation of resources in all 
other countries or regions except in the USA, Canada, Latin America, and Korea. 
105
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48 CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPACT ON FINLAND AND THE EU
Figure 6.1.3.a The impacts of the CBAM on GDP in EU countries in the Efficient scenario, %
Figure 6.1.3.b The impacts of the CBAM on GDP in non-EU countries in the Efficient scenario, %
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6.1.5  Discussion on the results from economy-wide GTAP analysis
The results obtained from the GTAP model are in line with the ones by Pyrka et al. 
(2020) that assessed the impacts of CBAM by using a same type of computable general 
equilibrium model. In Pyrka et al., the carbon tariffs were set to six products (ferrous 
metals, non-metallic minerals, chemical products, non-ferrous metals, paper products 
and oil). Thus, their coverage of products is between the ones in the Feasible and Efficient 
scenarios. The sizes of carbon tariffs are lower in their analysis as indirect emissions 
included only those from electricity. In both analyses, the GDP impacts are found to be 
close to 0 %. The changes in production levels in Pyrka et al. are mostly smaller than in 
our analysis as expected due to the lower tariffs. However, for manufacturing of non-
metallic minerals they find a slightly higher impact. In addition, they find the negative 
impact for production of non-ferrous metals in half of the EU countries, including Finland. 
Manufacturing of iron and steel benefits most also in their analysis, and according to both 
analyses the increase in the production of iron and steel is one of the highest in Finland. 
Consumers in EU countries benefit from CBAM in both analyses due to the improved 
terms of trade.   
The results are based on the carbon tariffs calculated with the carbon price of 25 EUR/
tCO2. In the Feasible scenario, the effects nearly doubled if the carbon price increases to 
a 50 EUR/tCO2. In the Efficient scenario, the production levels doubled for most of the 
industries protected by CBAM. The increase in production due to higher carbon price was 
however lower for those industries that use imported CBAM products as intermediate 
inputs.  
The results on the impacts of carbon border adjustment mechanism are based on the 
ceteris-paribus analysis without taking into account the effects of other policy changes. 
The (gradual) phase-out of free emission allowances would weaken the positive impacts of 
CBAM to some extent. The mechanisms of these two instruments to protect EU industries 
differ partly because CBAM affect the competitiveness between EU and non-EU producers 
in the EU markets, while free allowances improve the competitiveness of EU producers in 
all markets. The impact of free allowances, and thus their phase-out, is dynamic because 
the production decisions today affect the amount of free allowances in the future. In 
addition, profits from free allowances increase the number of firms in the market and thus 
imply the lower price level. 
The magnitudes of the trade flow impacts are highly affected by the values of Armington 
elasticities describing the degree of substitution possibilities between domestic and 
imported products as well as between imported products from different countries. 
The values of elasticities used in CGE models are, however, uncertain and sometimes 
characterized as ‘guesstimates’ rather than estimates. To partly overcome this problem, 
we assessed the sensitivity of the results by using the values of elasticities estimated with 
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gravity model and presented in Table 5.1.3. The elasticities based on the gravity model 
are somewhat higher for non-ferrous metals, chemicals and electronics and lower for 
textiles, pulp and paper products, fabricated metal products, rubber and plastics as well as 
machinery and equipment, compared to the ones in the GTAP model. We found that the 
impacts on production levels are only slightly or not at all affected, with the exception of 
textiles and electronics. The GDP impacts remain the same. In this experiment we could 
not consider the values of elasticities between imports from different countries that affect 
the results in the Efficient scenario with country-specific carbon tariffs.
In the scenarios presented above, all non-EU countries face the full carbon tariff, although 
some of them have emission trading or other pricing mechanisms. If the carbon tariffs 
were set according to the differences between carbon prices, the negative impacts in 
developing countries without climate policy would be larger and some developed non-EU 
countries would benefit.  
6.2 The possible retaliation of other countries: NIGEM analysis
This section analyzes the possible retaliation of the extra-EU countries, which may follow 
if/when the EU imposes a CBAM scheme. The following analysis is done using a global 
macroeconomic model, NiGEM31, developed and maintained at the National Institute 
of Social and Economic Research (NIESR). The NiGEM multi-country macro model 
comprises more than 60 countries. It is based on estimation using historical data. The 
long-term equilibrium properties of the model are built in a way that the model can also 
accommodate forward-looking behavior.
We begin by assuming that the CBAM set by the EU first provokes a counteraction in the 
US trade policy. The US has used tariffs as a policy instrument several times lately and 
has also proved that it can impose them on EU countries’ imports as well. A 25 % tariff on 
steel and a 10 % tariff on all aluminum imports that was imposed by the US government 
in 2018 is a useful reference point for our analysis. This was one of the first round of 
increases in the tariffs between the US and China, which later escalated to the actual trade 
war between these two countries. The EU also retaliated to the US tariffs and imposed 
tariffs on US exports to the EU, covering steel and aluminum products and also selected 
consumer and agriculture products, equivalent of 2.8 billion euros in total. 
31  About the structure of the NiGEM, see https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/.
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To quantify the effects of the US tariffs on the EU’s steel industry, for instance, the US 
Department of Commerce (2018) expected that they will reduce the EU exports of 
steel by the equivalent a little over 1 % of 2017 EU production. While this was probably 
significant for the industry in case, the total effects of tariff increases can be assessed as 
being relatively small on EU economies on average. For China, the initial tariff increases 
represented a somewhat greater issue. Yet, when calculating the effects of the steel and 
aluminum tariff increases on aggregate terms, these represented only a 0.6 % increase in 
total US tariffs on Chinese exports (as analyzed by Bown, 2020). 
All in all, the US retaliation scenario is quite natural. When taking the previous steel and 
aluminum tariff increases as our reference point—that is, comparing these with the CBAM 
scheme assumed in Section 4—we can also presume that the first retaliation from the US 
side could be relatively modest in size. After discussion of the US case, we assume a much 
more severe retaliation scenario where it is the ROW that imposes counter-tariffs on the EU. 
Although maybe not fully realistic, this latter scenario is to illustrate the possible worst-case 
implications of the EU’s CBAM scheme. Finally, we simulate these scenarios with stronger 
policy responses, that is, with counter-tariffs that are double the size of the first two scenarios.
In the following simulations, the effects of tariffs are driven by higher import prices. Thus, 
higher tariffs raise import prices, which reduces demand for imported goods. On the 
other hand, it leads to an increase in the domestic price level while the goods produced 
abroad are replaced with their more expensive domestic counterparts. Hence, in addition 
to foreign producers, domestic consumers are also hurt by higher tariffs. In NiGEM, 
the coefficients of the behavioral equations representing relationships between these 
variables are estimated from macro data. These all are documented on the NiGEM website.
In the Efficient 1 scenario (representing a broader scope of the CBAM compared with the 
Feasible Scenario) analyzed in Section 4 of the report, the CBAM scheme was applied 
to products that cover circa 3 % of the EU countries’ total imports. Using this scenario, 
together with the steel and aluminum tariff increases analyzed above as a reference point, 
the first simulation assumes that, as a retaliation, the US imposes a 2 % increase in tariffs for 
imported (non-commodity) goods from the EU countries. This leads to a clear reduction of 
exports volumes in the eurozone and even more so in Finland alone. Both these areas see 
around a 0.25 % decrease in exports in the long run. The US and Chinese exports are more 
moderately affected amid cuts in global demand due to the increase in tariffs.
The tariffs also reduce the GDP in our selected group of countries. The US suffers the most 
from the tariffs it has self-imposed, but Finland’s GDP also takes a considerable hit. The 
eurozone comes just behind Finland in terms of the size of the effect, whereas the Chinese 
economy is much less affected. All in all, the US GDP declines by almost 0.1 % in the long run, 
that of Finland a little less, while the eurozone’s GDP shrinks by around 0.05 % in the long run.
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Figure 6.2.1. The effect of a 2 % increase in the US tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods from the 
EU countries, expressed as the percentage change in exports 
Figure 6.2.2. The effect of a 2 % increase in the US tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods from the 
EU countries, expressed as percentage change in GDP
In our second scenario, the EU is faced with a more severe confrontation due to the CBAMs 
it has imposed earlier. In this scenario, the ROW retaliates to the EU tariff policies. The 
simulation assumes a 2 % increase in tariffs in the ROW’s (non-commodity) goods imports 
from the EU countries. This kind of retaliation leads to a sharp decrease in Finland’s 
exports, as well as the EU’s and the US’s exports. Finland’s exports decline by 1.2 % while 
both the eurozone’s and the US’s exports decline by 1.1 % in the long run. China’s exports 
decline by circa 0.7 % in the long run.
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The GDP effects also become larger in this scenario. Finland and the eurozone suffer most 
severely with their GDP falling by 0.3 % and 0.25 % respectively in the long run. The US 
and most notably China face smaller declines (even though the long-run decline of the US 
GDP is almost in line with the eurozone’s).
Figure 6.2.3. The effect of a 2 % increase in the extra-EU tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods 
from the EU countries, expressed as the percentage change in exports
Figure 6.2.4. The effect of a 2 % increase in the extra-EU tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods 
from the EU countries, expressed as the percentage change in GDP
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While NiGEM is close to being a linear model, the scenario that assumes a 4 % increase in 
the US tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods from the EU countries produces export 
and GDP effects that are around double the size of the effects shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
Thus, the outcome of the simulation is qualitatively similar to the first simulation: The US 
GDP shrinks the most from the tariffs it has self-imposed and Finland’s and the eurozone’s 
GDP also fall considerably, whereas the Chinese economy is clearly less affected. 
Finally, the scenario that assumes a 4 % increase in tariffs in the ROW’s (non-commodity) 
goods imports from the EU countries produces a 0.65 % and 0.5 % decline in GDP in 
Finland and the euro area, respectively, in the long run. The US is confronted by a clearly 
smaller decline in GDP in the short run but loses almost as much GDP as the eurozone in 
the long run. In contrast, China’s output takes just a minor hit in the long run. 
Figure 6.2.5. The effect of a 4 % increase in the US tariffs for imported (non-com-
modity) goods from the EU countries, expressed as the percentage change in exports
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Figure 6.2.7. The effect of a 4 % increase in the extra-EU tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods 
from the EU countries, expressed as the percentage change in exports
Figure 6.2.8. The effect of a 4 % increase in the extra-EU tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods 
from the EU countries, expressed as the percentage change in GDP
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Figure 6.2.6. The effect of a 4 % increase in the US tariffs for imported (non-commodity) goods from 
the EU countries, expressed as the percentage change in GDP
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7 Synthesis
7.1 The main results
In this report, we addressed an EU CBAM and its economic implications. Recently, the 
mechanism has been proposed as a solution to the emission leakage that may result from 
the union’s commitment to stronger climate policy. We analyzed various CBAMs from 
technical, legal, and economic perspectives. While CBAMs have been argued to work well 
(for example, as an instrument to put pressure on third countries to have less polluting 
production), our starting point is to address the practical problems and uncertainties that 
overshadow a CBAMs practical implementation and effectiveness. 
In a second-best world, there are several ways to implement the CBAMs with varying 
amount of technical difficulties, administrative burden, legal problems, and political 
backlashes. In order to implement a CBAM, one has to determine its scope and coverage, 
that is, one must specify the products and trade flows affected by it, the sectors or 
geographies it applies to, and the types of carbon constraints for which it adjusts. A 
number of design considerations emerge from the literature and case law. When choosing 
the best policy option, these different aspects need to be weighed together with their 
economic impacts.
7.1.1  Legal and technical implementation issues
The first part of our legal analysis discusses the various implementation issues in detail. 
The legal implications and risks of the prospective CBAM will greatly depend on the 
policy mechanism used for its implementation. Each implementation option has, for 
instance, far-reaching implications under EU law, particularly with regard to the applicable 
legislative procedure and revenue use, and legal questions under international trade law. 
In technical terms, we find that it may be very difficult to determine the emissions and 
explicit carbon price for CBAMs in practice. When determining the carbon intensity of 
products, the methodological issues include the selection of emission components (CO2, 
other GHGs, other climate forcers such as aerosols) and characterization factors (i.e., how 
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non-CO2 forcers are converted into CO2 equivalents), the setting of system boundaries 
(i.e., which processes from upstream/downstream are included), choosing allocation 
rules (i.e., how the emissions are allocated in the case of co-products), and applying 
representative data. In particular, the availability of reliable and timely data is a pressing 
issue.
In an ideal case, the carbon price is determined based on the explicit carbon price of 
relevant emission components. This means that all the instruments—such as the price of 
emission allowances, taxes, and revenues—explicitly influencing carbon price should be 
considered. However, different emission components may face various carbon prices; for 
example, some of the emission components may be regulated under an emission trading 
scheme, some of them being less penalized through free emission allowances, some of 
them being taxed in other sectors, and some of them subsidised (or less penalized) by tax 
reliefs or revenues. 
In legal terms, a CBAM is likely to face less problems in implementation when its scope 
is limited. First, when it covers only imports, the design would not be considered a 
prohibited subsidy under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
A relatively limited scope of products also helps avoid the arbitrary discrimination that 
might occur with the broader coverage of more complex goods as the data will be more 
readily available and the production processes more familiar. Meanwhile, by covering 
imports from all countries, rather than singling out particular countries, such a CBAM 
avoids violating the MFN principle contained in Article I of the GATT. Overall, the emissions 
scope of the CBAM should preferably be matched with the EU ETS (direct emissions from 
industrial processes and electricity generation). By relying on the average carbon intensity 
of EU producers, the practical measurement of the tariff should be compatible with trade 
law, while possibly allowing for individual adjustment (that is, allowing for a process for 
importers to prove the actual carbon intensity of their products as a complementary 
feature). 
A broader scope, including many semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, 
dramatically increases the technical and administrative complexity of the CBAM, which 
could affect its legal assessment under Article XX of the GATT. Part of the tests involved 
in the application of this provision require balancing the means and ends; for instance, 
balancing whether the measure is “necessary” in order to achieve the stated end, or 
whether less burdensome alternatives might have been used. Likewise, accounting for the 
full the embedded carbon emissions of production along the value chain is problematic. 
The carbon footprint relative to the value of goods diminishes rapidly as a CBAM 
progresses down the value chain, and thus the proportionality of its imposition as an 
environmentally motivated measure could be challenged. 
115
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:48 CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPACT ON FINLAND AND THE EU
Another legally problematic aspect of the Efficient Scenario is the inclusion of Scope 3 
emissions: since a border adjustment can only adjust for the burden imposed on domestic 
products and producers, imposing a CBAM on imports that also encompasses Scope 3 
(other indirect) emissions is likely to be challenged as producers covered under the EU 
only have to report and surrender allowances for Scope 1 emissions (and electricity as a 
sector is included, meaning Scope 2 emissions are to some extent included indirectly). 
Finally, a CBAM may need to take into account a carbon price or other carbon constraint 
imposed on imported products in their country of origin. It is conceivable that not 
accounting for foreign policies—and at least explicit carbon prices paid in the country of 
origin—could be considered “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail,” as indicated in the introductory paragraph of Article 
XX of the GATT. 
7.1.2  Economic analysis
We proceeded to illustrate the implementation issues in several economic scenarios. 
Based on the implementation analysis, we titled our first scenario the Feasible Scenario: 
the CBAM is narrowed down to few industries (cement, lime, and plaster industries) where 
production is the most emission intensive and there is less threat of legal or political 
complications in its implementation, with a possible extension to cover iron, steel, and 
aluminum production. Moreover, we work around the difficulties of the measurement of 
emissions beyond the EU borders by considering EU emission averages as the benchmark 
for the calculation of the carbon tariff. 
As an alternative, we discussed the option of using a wider scenario with larger number 
of emission-intensive products and more detailed measurement of the carbon tariff, 
potentially building on all emissions. We titled this scenario as the Efficient Scenario. The 
features of the scenarios are collected in Table 4.1 and discussed in Section 4.
We should acknowledge that while our scenarios aim at grasping the results that 
arise from economic analysis, they are bound to be stylized and build on simplifying 
assumptions. For example, our economic models are calibrated based on historical 
global emissions and trade linkage data that typically lag behind by several years. While 
this is likely to bias our results to some extent—for example, due to the recent impacts 
of Covid-19—it also serves as a reminder of the practical informational problems that a 
CBAM would face.
Our economic analysis proceeded in steps that each added more layers of economic 
assumptions and, consequently, allowed us to make a deeper analysis while increasing the 
amount of modelling uncertainty in the results. 
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We started by describing the markets that are potentially subjected to the tariffs. We saw 
that the manufacturing of cement, lime, and plaster plays a very small part in the total 
EU economy. Its total value added was seven billion euros in 2017 and its share in total 
business economy value added was just 0.11 %. On the other hand, cement is of course 
very important as an intermediate good for the construction sector. The importance of 
cement, lime, and plaster is at least twice as large as the EU average for Romania, Croatia, 
Slovakia, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, and Belgium. New member countries and the Balkans 
are over-represented in this group.
In terms of EU´s own production, the manufacturing value added of basic metals and 
products thereof in the EU27 countries was 104 billion euros in 2017 or 1.67 % of the total 
business sector value added. This is already significant, as is of course the importance of 
these products as intermediate goods, especially in other metal industries. The importance 
of iron, steel, and aluminum (and other metals) exceeds the EU average, especially in 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Belgium, and Italy.
In terms of trade, the value of extra-EU imports of cement, lime, and plaster is very small. 
Iron and steel, including products thereof, imports are much larger, equal to 2.7 % of all 
extra-EU imports. The value of aluminum and aluminum product imports is about half the 
value of iron and steel.
In the Efficient Scenario, we included a much larger set of industries and products. These 
covered almost 60 % of all extra-EU goods imports. The gross value is 8.5 % relative to 
EU GDP in 2018. Clearly more products were considered compared to Feasible Scenario, 
but still the amount was limited to 14 industries (see Table 4.1). While being broader, 
the scenario still focused on energy-intensive sectors that are considered to be at risk of 
carbon leakage under the EU ETS.
We used econometric gravity analysis to isolate the historical trade effect of tariffs and 
apply the findings in making projections concerning the effects of the proposed tariff 
increases on EU imports. We found that the variants of the Feasible Scenario (the Feasible 1 
scenario with cement, lime, and plaster and the Feasible 2 scenario with cement, lime, and 
plaster, and aluminum and steel) have a very limited impact on overall gross imports, partly 
because the products in this scenario constitute such a small share of extra-EU imports. 
However, in relative terms, the impact is large for cement, lime, and plaster where we find 
a 23 % decline in imports when both direct and indirect CO2 emissions are included. The 
overall impact on total extra-EU imports is a little less than three billion euros.
It is notable that the estimates arise solely from the introduction of the CBAM as an import 
tariff, and we abstract from the effects of possible complementary policy reforms, such as 
changes in the allocation of free allowances.
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In the same context, the Efficient Scenario exhibits much larger effects of course. The 
total impact when including both direct and indirect CO2 emissions is 93 billion euros 
or almost 5 % of all extra-EU imports. In euro terms, the biggest impact comes from the 
manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products (-17 billion euros), the manufacturing 
of radio, tv and communication equipment (-13 billion euros), the manufacturing of 
electrical machinery and apparatus (-11 billion euros), and the manufacturing of office, 
accounting and computing machinery (-11 billion euros). When we only include indirect 
electricity CO2 emissions along with the direct emissions, the aggregate impact is a decline 
in extra-EU imports of 53 billion euros.
While the effect of the Feasible Scenario is also small for Finland, in the Efficient Scenarios 
value of Finnish extra-EU imports declines by between 1.8 % and 3.6 %, depending on the 
scope of the emissions. These are somewhat smaller figures than for the EU on average 
and are due to differences in the product and country-of-origin structure of Finnish 
imports vis-à-vis the EU average.
In terms of the overall tariff revenues, in the Feasible Scenario it amounts to 0.8 billion 
euros. The much wider Efficient Scenarios yield a tariff revenue of 15.2 billion euros and 
25.2 billion euros, depending on whether all indirect CO2 emissions are included or not. 
The impact on the total CO2 content of imports in the Feasible Scenarios is negligible. In 
the Efficient Scenarios, we can see that the impact on the value of imports is the greatest 
for China and across non-EU Europe (including the UK, Switzerland, and Russia). The 
impact on the CO2 content of goods imports is the largest in trade with South Africa, 
non-EU European countries, the Middle East, and many Asian countries. The fifth column 
shows that in terms of the total tonnage of imported CO2 emissions, by far the largest 
impact is on China, which accounts for almost half of the total decrease. Meanwhile, the 
CO2 content of Finnish extra-EU imports declines by between 10.0 and 13.1 %, depending 
on whether all or part of the emissions are considered. 
Due to the global value chains, the imported products are often used in the EU production 
as intermediate goods or services, that is, the importers contribute their value added 
to the final products that are assembled in the EU. When tariffs are set, their production 
is affected, and the linkages need to be considered when assessing the EU’s overall 
economic reliance on the emission-intensive imports. Moreover, the analysis of the value 
chains also helps to better understand the importance of EU trade for extra-EU countries. 
Their exports to the EU often include third-country intermediate products that need to 
be considered in order to account for the true value of trade for individual exporting 
countries.
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In terms of the total contributions of value added to the imports by the extra-EU and EU 
countries, we find that in the Feasible 1 scenario, with CBAs only imposed on cement, 
lime, and plaster, the total value-added contribution that is lost is only 0.1 billion euros in 
total. The total lost contribution increases to 4.9 billion euros when the CBA is extended to 
also include basic steel and aluminum products. The Efficient Scenario with the emission-
intensive industries and all emissions as the basis for the CBA measurements increases the 
total contribution to 142.5 billion euros. The Efficient Scenario with the emission-intensive 
industries and direct and electricity emissions as the basis for the CBA measurements sets 
the total contribution to 79.87 billion euros.
The most important individual-country value-added contributions that are lost are made 
by the UK (56.6 % of the total value-added contributions in all countries) and Turkey 
(9.0 %) in the case of the narrowest Feasible Scenario (with cement, lime, and plaster). 
When basic metal products are included in the Feasible Scenario, the contribution of 
China increases substantially. In the Efficient Scenarios, China’s role becomes even more 
dominant. It contributes roughly one half of the total value added in products that would 
not be imported to the EU according to the changes in the gross trade. Meanwhile, the 
results suggest that the EU does not play a major role in providing value added to the 
production of imports, thus implying that the role of back-and-forth trade with the EU and 
the trade partners is small. 
We find that a substantial share of the lost value added contributes to value chains for 
which the final assembly is made in the EU. In these cases, the EU production needs to find 
a substitute for the imported intermediate product. The share of intermediate value added 
is the highest in case of the Feasible 1 scenario (with cement, lime, and plaster) and the 
Feasible 2 scenario (with cement, lime, and plaster, and aluminum and steel), 30.9 % and 
25.9 % respectively, while the share lowers to roughly 21 % in the Efficient Scenarios. Thus, 
EU production has major dependencies on the imported intermediate goods that would 
be affected by the CBAs.
We find that in case of the broad cement product CBA, France has a substantial role as a 
final producer. Of the lost value added that is embodied in the imports and are used in 
EU final products, 35.2 % end up in French final goods. In other scenarios, Germany is the 
largest user of the imported products in its final production, followed by France, Italy, and 
the Netherlands. 
We also decomposed the lost value added according to the producer industry of the 
final product in the EU. In terms of the share of the total embodied value added in the 
CBA-related imports, we find that the largest final user is the construction industry. In 
particular, in the Feasible Scenario with only cement, lime, and plaster, the value added 
that is embodied in its final products is 43.8 % of the total value added in imports. Other 
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important user industries are industries that (1) manufacture food products, beverages, 
and tobacco products; (2) manufacture coke and refined petroleum products; and that 
(3) manufacture motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers. When the CBAs are extended to 
other product classes, the role of various manufacturing industries increases.
For Finland, the lost value-added content in the Feasible Scenario goods is negligible. 
Also, in the Efficient Scenario, the amount of value added that Finnish firms export from 
abroad to be used in their final products or their own value added, embodied in the 
imports, is relatively small, varying around 100 million euros depending on the scenarios. 
In relative terms, the most reliant industries are found in manufacturing industries. This 
result is comparable to the EU findings, albeit the reliance is smaller than for the European 
industries on average.
Naturally, the import dynamics only provide hints of the potential overall impacts that the 
CBAMs may have on the production in the EU and beyond. We used a computable general 
equilibrium model (GTAP) that incorporates a more economic structure into the analysis in 
order to study the impacts on production in the EU.
When imports of tariff products from non-EU countries fall, there tends to be a 
substitution effect: In intermediate production or final use, imports are replaced with 
substitute products that are acquired from the EU area (products whose price is not 
directly affected by the tariff ). This effect will boost the demand for EU products. On the 
other hand, the tariff tends to increase the prices of the tariff products in the EU because 
the CBAM will limit the availability of cheap imports and create a cost–push effect in the 
EU. The tariff will distort the prevailing equilibrium in international trade that features 
the comparative advantage of different countries; the resulting decrease in efficiency 
will ultimately lower the purchasing power of the consumers and decrease their overall 
demand. On the other hand, a CBAM would generate revenue in EU, which increases 
demand. 
Indeed, the GTAP model shows how the exports of EU countries to other EU countries 
increases while exports to non-EU countries decreases due to the crowding out effect of 
the EU demand. 
In the extended Feasible Scenario, the production of iron and steel, non-metallic minerals, 
and non-ferrous metals increases in Finland and other EU countries. Production also 
increases in industries that provide a substantial amount of inputs to these sectors, 
namely mining and electricity. In the Efficient Scenario, a wide variety of industries belong 
to the CBAM. We found that production increases in most of these industries. 
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However, not all industries are winners. A substantial share of the imports are used 
as intermediate products in the EU production. In terms of the competitiveness of 
EU producers, the increase in the price of the intermediate products will generate an 
additional cost to final products, which will generate similar substitution and income 
effects for their product demand as the tariff generates for the imported goods. Thus, 
for an EU industry participating in global value chains, the effects of tariffs may be more 
negative than for an EU industry that solely competes with imports in the final product 
market. Moreover, the increased competitiveness results in inflationary pressures that tend 
to hurt industries that are not directly benefitting from the tariffs in the EU market. 
The higher costs of intermediate inputs are reflected in the Feasible Scenario as 
production losses in the transport equipment, machinery and equipment, and electronics 
industries that use metals from non-EU countries as inputs. In the Efficient Scenario, the 
cost impact is notably larger due to the wider coverage of products and higher tariffs 
based on country-specific carbon contents. The results show that industries protected by 
CBAM may also suffer if the negative effect due to the increased production costs exceeds 
the benefits from the comparative advantage against non-EU producers that face the 
tariff. This is what happens in the production of machinery and equipment, as well as the 
production of electronics whose benefits from improved competitiveness in EU area are 
limited as they mainly export to non-EU areas. For other sectors, the impacts are negligible 
in the Feasible Scenario while in the Efficient Scenario the reallocation of resources to 
CBAM sectors implies lower production levels in most of other sectors, including services 
for example.
The overall impact on GDP is negligible or slightly negative in Finland and other EU 
countries, depending on its scope. The result arises from the loss in efficiency that the 
CBAM generates through the reallocation of resources. On the other hand, welfare is 
increased due to the improved terms of trade. 
It is notable that in the all the economic analysis presented above, we have based the 
findings on a 25 EUR/tCO2 carbon price, while the effects are mainly doubled if the price 
increases to a 50 EUR/tCO2 carbon price. Moreover, it should be noted that the carbon 
tariffs only reflect emission intensity differences between the EU and extra-EU countries, 
or the simplified benchmarks, while the measurements do not take into account a carbon 
price or any other carbon constraint imposed on imported products in their country of 
origin.
In the case of the non-EU area, emission-intensive countries, such as China and the group 
of Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries, suffer slightly from the CBAM in 
the Efficient Scenario, with country-specific tariffs based on their carbon content. For other 
non-EU countries, the GDP impacts are negligible in both scenarios. Some developed 
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non-EU countries with low carbon content can increase their exports of CBAM products. 
This is reflected in increased production levels, as well as in slightly improved welfare in 
the US, Japan, and Korea. 
The impacts of the CBAM remain limited as EU countries import a large share of products 
from the EU. This both implies that an increase in production costs in those sectors using 
imported CBAM products as intermediate inputs is modest and the impacts on non-EU 
economies remain small. If the carbon pricing mechanisms in non-EU countries had been 
considered when setting carbon tariffs, the negative impacts on developing countries 
would have been larger while some developed non-EU countries would have benefitted.  
Our gravity and value chain analysis provide a few interesting cases of these effects. For 
example, tariffs imposed on cement, lime, and plaster (the Feasible 1 scenario) would 
result in a marked fall in the imports of intermediate products to France, especially 
from the UK. The main final producer is the construction industry. As a result, we expect 
to see an increase in the demand for local substitutes as these products are not easily 
transferable from a distance. 
We note that these changes are due to the CBAM, ceteris paribus, while it could be 
that the allocative changes are partly offset by the EU climate policy and, for example, 
retaliatory measures from non-EU countries. 
A global macroeconomic model (NiGEM) was used to measure the potential impacts of 
trade war, that is, the possibility of retaliation by the extra-EU countries, which may follow 
if/when the EU imposes a CBAM scheme. Based on our analysis, it is highly likely that the 
resulting trade war could wipe out any economic benefits of the CBAMs. For example, 
when the ROW retaliates to the EU tariff policies with an across-the-board 2 % increase in 
tariffs in the ROW’s (non-commodity) goods imported from the EU countries, Finland and 
the eurozone suffer from a 0.3 % and 0.25 % GDP fall, respectively, in the long run. The US, 
and most notably China, faces smaller declines, even though in the long run, the decline 
of the US GDP is almost in line with the eurozone’s. 
In any case, there is a need to deal with the carbon leakage problem as we find signs in the 
data of its existence. It appears that the phases of the EU ETS have increased the carbon 
content in imported goods, especially in Phase 2. Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that the carbon content of imports has increased more in the product groups that are 
subjected to the EU ETS. The carbon leakage rate with our estimations is close to 20 %. 
This estimate is on the higher range of the estimates of previous studies that have used 
CGE methods to estimate carbon leakage.
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7.2 Discussion
Our approach provides a unique multidisciplinary perspective on the CBAMs. Let us next 
discuss our different perspectives before making our conclusions in the next subsection.
To organize the discussion, we take stock of the public finance theory, a branch of 
economics that, broadly speaking, studies the role of government and the impacts 
of various revenue and expenditure instruments on the functioning of society. When 
discussing the different options for organizing climate policy, Stiglitz (2013) identified 
three basic aspects of instruments that need to be considered in design: 
1. Efficiency—how to design instruments in order to minimize distortions? 
2. Equity—How does the instrument affect different groups (What is its incidence?) 
and is the burden of the instrument, in some sense, fair? 
3. Administration—Is the instrument effectively enforced, at reasonably low 
transaction costs, and relatively immune from corruption? Usually, also 
administrative burden for example from monitoring in the EU member state is 
included the third section. 
It is fair to say that the design of the CBAM is still unclear at the EU level. At face value, 
it seems that the design of CBAMs necessarily creates trade-offs between the different 
features of good public finance instruments. To overcome the major problems that arise 
from the administration of the CBA (the major burden of collecting detailed information 
on emissions), there is a need for simplified, second-best, versions of the CBAs. The ways 
to simplify the design may include crude rules in regard to quantifying the adjustment or 
limitations of the scope of the adjustments. A simple design, however, may create problems 
in terms of the other aspects of good design. It may erode the fairness of the system (Would 
the CBAs treat extra-EU and EU countries similarly?), which can easily lead to legal disputes. 
Moreover, the system may not be economically efficient as the crude rules may distort the 
incentives for climate actions or even lead to moral hazards. Similarly, the environmental 
benefits from the CBAM will be weakened if the EU relies on default carbon intensities to 
simplify implementation; because foreign producers will be treated equally regardless of 
their actual carbon intensity, they have a much more limited incentive to improve their 
environmental performance, whereas those who are already more carbon efficient than 
the default intensity are effectively penalized. A partial solution to that problem would 
be to offer importers the option to individually prove their actual carbon intensity with 
verified emissions data; such an “individual adjustment mechanism” would improve the 
incentive structure of the CBAM without significantly increasing the administrative burden 
for the implementing authorities. 
Let us next discuss these aspects in more detail, based on our analysis.
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7.2.1 Equity considerations
Fair and just CBAMs are easier to accept by third countries outside the EU and enforce in 
the light of WTO rules. Fairness demands that the chosen mechanism is a pure response to 
carbon leakage and no other mechanisms inside the EU is used for the same purpose.
In this respect, a few details are worth discussing. First, after implementing the CBAM, it is 
much harder to justify the commission continuing the free allocation of EU ETS allowances 
as a safeguard for the international competitiveness of industrial sectors at the risk of 
carbon leakage. Still, affected EU sectors have already indicated in their submissions to the 
Inception Impact Assessment consultation on the CBAM roadmap (held by the European 
Commission in spring 2020) that an abrupt ending to free allocation would be met with 
considerable opposition. 
A compromise solution might be a gradual phase-out of free allocation alongside the 
introduction of the CBAM, with the CBAM only adjusting for the share of emissions for 
which EU producers in a sector benefitting from free allocation have to, on average, still 
purchase allowances since the current system of free allocation only ensures that the 10 % 
most efficient producers obtain 100 % emissions coverage, whereas the remaining 90 % 
have to buy a varying amount based on the difference between their actual emissions and 
the product benchmark that applies to them.
When our results suggest that carbon leakage may indeed offset some of the effects of the 
EU’s climate policy and the EU ETS, at least in the current policy context, it is worth noting 
that the new and possible amended policy instruments are also not neutral in this sense 
similarly to the CBAMs. When the use of the Market Stability Reserve raises carbon prices 
in the EU, it may again add the leakage risk if the CBAM tariffs do not properly react to 
the price increase. The possible roles of the reserve should also be transparent in CBAMs. 
Energy taxes and their levels inside the EU may also have at least indirect effects on the 
carbon prices. Thus, although the need for a CBAM is based on wide political reasoning 
about, for example, suitable energy tax levels or even compensation for the Covid-19 
costs, the assessment of CBAM tariffs should be transparent, fair, and just. Moreover, 
international and third countries’ ETSs and international carbon units or credits should 
somehow be considered in the new CBAM and its tariffs. Thus, operative climate policy 
instruments should link up the CBAM in a fair and just way. However, even in spite of the 
possible formal fairness, the CBAM may lead to the above-mentioned countermeasures 
against the EU. The risk of countermeasures is lower if the CBAM is duly justified to the 
non-EU countries. 
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7.2.2 Efficiency considerations
From the efficiency perspective, a well-designed climate policy should aim at correctly 
pricing the societal cost of the emissions and create sufficient incentives for achieving 
environmental sustainability. In a second-best world, where common, global climate 
policy is not in place, the CBAM can be used as one instrument for achieving efficiency.
While previous literature has already broadly discussed CBAMs, in this study we have paid 
special attention to the details of the design and the structure of trade in products that 
would be the most likely to be subjected to the CBAMs. 
The most feasible design would only involve cement and related products; based on our 
results, in all likelihood it would only have a small effect on both trade and emissions. 
Moreover, we do not find particularly strong evidence of carbon leakage in the non-
metallic mineral sector. The narrow CBAM’s strongest impacts would be narrowed down to 
some specific areas, possibly in trade between France and the UK. 
Thus, while the narrowest scenario with only cement and related products might be 
easy to administer and lack some of the legal challenges that would accompany a CBAM 
affecting a broader set of products, it is fair to say that it would be an economically and 
environmentally weak solution to carbon leakage and thus to the climate challenge. In its 
documents and statements to date, the European Commission has repeatedly signaled an 
intention to start with “selected sectors” and gradually expand thereafter. The main merit 
of such an approach would be the opportunity to pilot the CBAM with a limited measure 
that risks fewer diplomatic confrontations and legal challenges, and allows demonstrating 
the “proof of concept” as it were. Still, if effective leakage prevention is the mid- to long-
term objective in an EU with significantly more robust decarbonization targets, then such 
a limited scope will not be sufficient.
In the case of broader scenarios, the effect of the CBAMs would, unsurprisingly, become 
greater, and thus it is expected that they will have a substantial impact on the carbon 
leakage. From the efficiency perspective, the extension of the system puts increasing 
pressure on the level of detail in the design of the CBAMs. In particular, as we observed 
large flows of final and intermediate goods to the EU area from extra-EU countries, an 
efficiently designed CBAM should account for the arising diversity of production linkages.
For one, the CBAM should account for emissions in all stages of production and cover 
industries that use emission-intensive materials in their downstream production. The 
value chain data suggests that large quantities of emission-intensive materials are 
used in the final production of other products, such as manufactures. If the border 
adjustment is not extended to these products, it may give a competitive advantage to 
the extra-EU imports that use emission-intensive materials (which are left outside the 
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CBAM) as intermediate goods and thus leave the system vulnerable to carbon leakage. 
While the inclusion of semi-manufactured and manufactured goods would significantly 
increase the technical complexity of the CBAM, not taking into account such downstream 
substitution and leakage risks would pose a serious environmental and political problem 
that may otherwise necessitate alternative solutions, such as state aid for disadvantaged 
intermediate producers in the EU. 
While a carefully designed CBAM for imported products could compensate for the 
competition effect that differing climate policies have on production costs in the EU 
market, the disparity remains beyond the EU borders if a similarly ambitious climate policy 
is not conducted there. From the global climate-policy perspective, this is inefficient if the 
extra-EU countries turn to using their own more emission-intensive products that are not 
burdened by a similar cost to the cost of the climate policy that the EU products face. The 
problem is the most severe in areas where the extra-EU demand is highly price elastic (i.e., 
where the demand reacts strongly to changes in product prices). Based on our findings 
concerning the sensitivity of imports to tariffs (presented in Section 5), for example 
aluminum and miscellaneous electrical products fall into this category.
In principle, the CBAMs could be extended to involve export rebates to resolve this issue, 
but such a feature would be hard to implement in accordance with international trade law. 
One way to adjust for exports would be to continue the free allocation to products leaving 
the EU, thereby counteracting competitiveness impacts due to EU climate policy. However, 
because such an export adjustment would be contingent on export performance, it risks 
violating the WTO the SCM Agreement as a prohibited subsidy; moreover, unlike the 
GATT, this agreement does not contain an exception clause that would allow justifying 
environmentally motivated measures.
In absence of export rebates, there is still pressure to compensate for the price differences 
by using free allowance allocation to mitigate the cost impacts on EU exports of a more 
ambitious climate policy. Free allowance allocation, on the other hand, weakens the 
effects of the carbon pricing as the amount of free allowance is linked to the amount of 
current economic activity. Due to this design, firms that produce and generate emissions 
more today, tend to receive more free allowances in the future. The resulting expectations 
of future free allowances may, at least in some cases, mute the response of current 
production decisions to changes in the current carbon price. 
In particular, free allocations may distort incentives for climate actions, both in production 
value chains and in final demand. For example, they may induce the allocation of 
resources to carbon-intensive production and thus result in the partial pass-through of 
the carbon price, at least when product market competition is imperfect and firms have 
pricing power. As a result, there may be more carbon-intensive production under the 
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existence of free allowances than the EU ETS would otherwise suggest. As we have found 
that there are strong value chain connections between the EU and extra-EU countries, 
it is possible that the existence of free allocations generates disruptions to the emission 
efficiency of the value chains.
As an alternative solution, complementary tax instruments or direct subsidies have been 
proposed. For example, one way to overcome these problems would be to complement 
the current system with an emission-added tax (Stiglitz, 2013). In essence, the emission-
added tax (in an analogy with value-added tax) is a consumption tax that is placed 
on a product whenever emissions are added at each stage of the supply chain, until 
the product is sold for final use. The amount of tax that the user pays is based on the 
production emissions, less any of the emissions of intermediate products that have 
already been taxed. If products are exported to other regions, they are taxed at a zero rate. 
On the other hand, imports would be subjected to the same tax treatment as EU products 
when they are sold in the EU area. 
The general benefits of the emission-added tax would be that (1) as a consumption 
(rather than a production) tax, it would not generate incentives to divert production from 
countries that have a stricter climate policy and (2) it allows production to be flexibly 
organized into value chains (Stiglitz, 2013). Most of the critique of such a tax concerns 
the challenges of its technical implementation (see, e.g., McLure, 2010). As in the case 
of CBAMs, the system induces a substantial administrative burden when the amount of 
emissions in the imported goods are assessed and the system should be made consistent 
with the EU ETS. The broader the implementation, the bigger the informational problem 
becomes. However, as we have discussed, the CBAM would face similar challenges.
As in the case of CBAMs, the practical implementation issues could be, to some extent, 
resolved by limiting the scope of the tax to specific products and emissions. Indeed, the 
inclusion of consumption (IoC) of carbon-intensive materials in emission trading has 
emerged as one more practical ways of moving ahead. For example, in the proposal by 
Neuhoff et al. (2016), a liability would be created upon the production of carbon-intensive 
materials, and the liability is then passed onto products along the value chain. 
According to the proposal, firms can register with national authorities to receive, handle, 
and dispatch products under duty suspension arrangements or buy products free of 
liability. When a product is sold to a non-registered firm or to a consumer, the seller has to 
pay a charge to a national trust fund that is then to be used for climate action. The same 
liability for the charge is also created upon the import of carbon-intensive products and 
acquitted upon their export. A de minimis rule limits administrative effort.
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Arguably, the proposal would help to compensate for some of the weaknesses of the 
CBAMs. Namely, when combined with a reduction of the free allocations, the proposal 
would increase the symmetry in the treatment of EU and extra-EU products, both in the 
EU market and globally. 
In particular, the possibility to acquit the liability upon exporting to extra-EU countries 
could partially mitigate the cost impact of the EU climate policy, a feature that would allow 
the reduction of the free allocations of emissions (which could be auctioned instead). 
Consequently, in the EU market, the reduction of free allocations could level the playing 
field for the imported and domestic materials and build avenues for the further reduction 
of emissions in the value chains. Moreover, the inclusion of the liability as a consumption 
tax rather than a tariff could calm the political tensions that the tariff would generate. 
However, limiting the system to only a few industries is not without problems. In industries 
that would not be part of the IoC system, the direct emissions would still generate cost 
disparities in the extra-EU market, albeit they may benefit from the cost reductions on 
their intermediate goods. Thus, the cost mitigation effect would not be complete. Also, 
in the EU market the treatment of direct emissions in the other industries would still 
necessitate the use of CBAMs. Without a fully implemented emission-added tax system, 
there would be still a need for both the CBAM and free allocations as complementary 
tools. 
All in all, the benefits of the IoC remain to be seen. In any case, the relative benefits of the 
tax system would increase together with its scope. In the case of having both a CBAM and 
an emission-added tax, the informational and administrational burdens could be broadly 
similar, whereas the tax system would not necessitate the use of free allocations as a 
complementary policy tool if its scope is broad. 
While the emission-added tax could help to decrease the use of free allocations, a 
remaining problem is that it does not incentivize the emission reductions of the EU 
exports. They would be zero-taxed at the EU border, while they may be subjected to less 
stringent climate-policy measures in the extra-EU countries. One option is to use direct 
government support for the financing in the energy efficiency improvements in order to 
foster the reduction of the emissions (Sartor and Bataille, 2019). However, careful attention 
should be given to the design and control of the support as the use of direct research and 
development subsidies easily leads to the inefficient selection of technologies. 
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7.2.3 Administrative considerations
Finally, the administrative burden of the CBAM fundamentally depends on the 
implementation. It can be directly connected to the EU ETS or it can be a tax or tariff set 
at a level to reflect the carbon price in the EU ETS. As there are still large uncertainties, 
detailed conclusions about its administrative burden in Finland and the EU are premature, 
although it is safe to say that, as a policy applied to imports taking into account carbon 
intensity and potentially also carbon prices in the country of origin, it will be more 
complex to administer than most domestic taxes. 
7.3 Conclusions
One of the key risks of climate policy, both for the climate and for the economy, is that 
rising carbon constraints, such as carbon prices, can lead to carbon leakage. In the EU, 
the use of carbon tariffs on imports from non-EU countries has gained momentum as a 
proposed solution to the problem. The creation of a CBAM was identified in the European 
Green Deal as a means to help with the transition towards a greener and more sustainable 
economy. In addition, the European Commission indicated that green own budget 
resources—including revenue from the CBAM—could contribute to financing the future 
EU budget, for recovery and growth in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Based on our analysis, it is fair to expect that the CBAM will face major implementation 
hurdles in the coming years. From the perspectives of efficiency, fairness, and technical 
challenges, it is reasonable to assume that the process towards its full implementation will 
be gradual and burdensome. As envisaged by past proposals, the likeliest approach would 
be to test its use with a narrow set of imported products that are emission intensive, yet 
easy to administer and simple to produce. After considering a feasible alternative, we 
found that the economic and environmental impact of such a narrow tariff would be 
likely to be small. Thus, the implementation of such a CBAM serves more as a signal of the 
determination of the EU to address the climate problem and the attendant carbon leakage 
rather than a true solution to it. 
On the other hand, if the EU introduces a more ambitious CBAM, whether initially or 
over time, it will inevitably face greater difficulties. A CBAM should be constructed in a 
fair and efficient manner that could help it to avoid any intentional or plausible conflict 
with WTO law and unnecessary disruptions of production value chains. However, as our 
results show, the global production linkages are complex, and an orderly and ambitious 
implementation of a CBAM faces the significant task of data collection and administration. 
Further mechanisms to incentivize information gathering (such as self-reporting) and 
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also complementary tools to replace free allowance distribution (an emission-added tax, 
technology subsidies) may be necessary in the future.
No matter how well a CBAM is constructed and communicated to EU trading partners, it 
is likely to face challenges from those who are affected. In our results, China in particular 
appears as a country that would be strongly affected by the tariffs if they are implemented 
in an ambitious way. Retaliatory countermeasures could easily remove any economic 
benefits of the tariffs. Thus, one should exercise caution, especially when considering 
a CBAM as a possible source of EU resources, albeit that the tariff is directly paid by EU 
companies and consumers. The fiscal incentive and the uncertainty of where the resources 
might be used are features that may weaken its value as a source of public revenue. 
The use of a CBAM as a source of revenue generation rather than a mechanism for the 
prevention of leakage does not strengthen the WTO compatibility and may exacerbate 
trade tensions. 
One might, of course, argue that WTO compatibility has become a lesser priority due to 
the paralysis of the Appellate Body and the COVID-19 health crisis. However, it may be 
very harmful for the progress within the UN climate conference if measures that appear 
contrary to international commitments and the rules-based international order are taken 
by an actor simultaneously seeking to strengthen multilateral cooperation on climate 
change. If the EU, in order to finance the relief package or for other non-climate related 
reasons, implements a CBA in a way that appears contrary to WTO rules, it will undermine 
the credibility of any EU efforts at the Conference of the UNFCCC Parties. If there is no 
significant progress in these negotiations between the major emitters of GHGs within 
the next three years, possible WTO retaliation measures will pale in comparison to the 
dire consequences of such a failure. Thus, using an EU CBAM for fiscal purposes rather 
than purely for the prevention of carbon leakage undermines its equity and ultimately its 
efficiency as a policy instrument in international climate law.
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Appendix 1. Product groups in the EXIOBASE3 database 
Table A1. Product groups in the EXIOBASE3 database (EXIOBASE, 2020).
1 Additives/blending components
2 Air transport services
3 Aluminium and aluminium products
4 Aluminium ores and concentrates
5 Animal products n.e.c.
6 Anthracite
7 Ash for treatment, re-processing of ash into clinker
8 Aviation gasoline
9 Basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys and first products thereof
10 Beverages
11 Biodiesels
12 Biogas
13 Biogasoline
14 Bitumen
15 BKB/peat briquettes
16 Blast furnace gas
17 Bottles for treatment, recycling of bottles by direct reuse
18 Bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay
19 Cattle
20 Cement, lime and plaster
21 Ceramic goods
22 Cereal grains n.e.c.
23 Charcoal
24 Chemical and fertilizer minerals, salt and other mining and quarrying products n.e.c.
25 Chemicals n.e.c.
26 Coal tar
27 Coke oven coke
28 Coke oven gas
29 Coking Coal
30 Collected and purified water, distribution services of water
31 Computer and related services
32 Construction work
33 Copper ores and concentrates
34 Copper products
35 Crops n.e.c.
36 Crude petroleum and services related to crude oil extraction, excluding surveying
37 Dairy products
38 Distribution and trade services of electricity
39 Distribution services of gaseous fuels through mains
40 Education services
41 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
42 Electricity by biomass and waste
43 Electricity by coal
44 Electricity by gas
45 Electricity by geothermal
46 Electricity by hydro
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47 Electricity by nuclear
48 Electricity by petroleum and other oil derivatives
49 Electricity by solar photovoltaic
50 Electricity by solar thermal
51 Electricity by tide, wave, ocean
52 Electricity by wind
53 Electricity n.e.c.
54 Ethane
55 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies
56 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
57 Financial intermediation services, except insurance and pension funding services
58 Fish and other fishing products; services incidental of fishing
59 Fish products
60 Food products n.e.c.
61 Food waste for treatment: biogasification and land application
62 Food waste for treatment: composting and land application
63 Food waste for treatment: incineration
64 Food waste for treatment: landfill
65 Food waste for treatment: waste water treatment
66 Foundry work services
67 Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c.
68 Gas coke
69 Gas works gas
70 Gas/diesel oil
71 Gasoline type jet fuel
72 Glass and glass products
73 Health and social work services
74 Heavy fuel oil
75 Hotel and restaurant services
76 Inert/metal/hazardous waste for treatment: landfill
77 Inland water transportation services
78 Insurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social security services
79 Inert/metal waste for treatment: incineration
80 Iron ores
81 Kerosene
82 Kerosene type jet fuel
83 Lead, zinc and tin, and products thereof
84 Lead, zinc and tin ores and concentrates
85 Leather and leather products
86 Lignite/brown coal
87 Liquefied petroleum gases (LPGs)
88 Lubricants
89 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.
90 Manure (biogas treatment)
91 Manure (conventional treatment)
92 Meat animals n.e.c.
93 Meat products n.e.c.
94 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
95 Membership organisation services n.e.c.
96 Motor gasoline
97 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
98 Naphtha
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99 Natural gas and services related to natural gas extraction, excluding surveying
100 Natural gas liquids
101 N-fertiliser
102 Nickel ores and concentrates
103 Non-specified petroleum products
104 Nuclear fuel
105 Office machinery and computers
106 Oil seeds
107 Oil/hazardous waste for treatment: incineration
108 Other bituminous coal
109 Other business services
110 Other hydrocarbons
111 Other land transportation services
112 Other liquid biofuels
113 Other non-ferrous metal ores and concentrates
114 Other non-ferrous metal products
115 Other non-metallic mineral products
116 Other services
117 Other transport equipment
118 Other waste for treatment: waste water treatment
119 Oxygen steel furnace gas
120 P-fertiliser and other fertilisers
121 Paddy rice
122 Paper and paper products
123 Paper and wood waste for treatment: composting and land application
124 Paper for treatment: landfill
125 Paper waste for treatment: biogasification and land application
126 Paper waste for treatment: incineration
127 Paraffin waxes
128 Patent fuel
129 Peat
130 Petroleum coke
131 Pigs
132 Plant-based fibers
133 Plastic waste for treatment: incineration
134 Plastic waste for treatment: landfill
135 Plastics, basic
136 Post and telecommunication services
137 Poultry
138 Precious metal ores and concentrates
139 Precious metals
140 Printed matter and recorded media
141 Private households with employed persons
142 Processed rice
143 Products of forestry, logging and related services
144 Products of meat cattle
145 Products of meat pigs
146 Products of meat poultry
147 Products of vegetable oils and fats
148 Public administration and defence services; compulsory social security services
149 Pulp
150 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
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151 Railway transportation services
152 Raw milk
153 Real estate services
154 Recreational, cultural and sporting services
155 Refinery feedstocks
156 Refinery gas
157 Renting services of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods
158 Research and development services
159 Retail trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair services of personal and household goods
160 Retail trade services of motor fuel
161 Rubber and plastic products
162 Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts, motorcycles, motorcycle parts and accessories
163 Sand and clay
164 Sea and coastal water transportation services
165 Secondary aluminium for treatment, re-processing of secondary aluminium into new aluminium
166 Secondary construction material for treatment, re-processing of secondary construction material into aggregates
167 Secondary copper for treatment, re-processing of secondary copper into new copper
168 Secondary glass for treatment, re-processing of secondary glass into new glass
169 Secondary lead for treatment, re-processing of secondary lead into new lead
170 Secondary other non-ferrous metals for treatment, re-processing of secondary other non-ferrous metals into new other 
non-ferrous metals
171 Secondary paper for treatment, re-processing of secondary paper into new pulp
172 Secondary plastic for treatment, re-processing of secondary plastic into new plastic
173 Secondary precious metals for treatment, Re-processing of secondary precious metals into new precious metals
174 Secondary raw materials
175 Secondary steel for treatment, Re-processing of secondary steel into new steel
176 Services auxiliary to financial intermediation
177 Sewage sludge for treatment: biogasification and land application
178 Steam and hot water supply services
179 Stone
180 Sub-bituminous coal
181 Sugar
182 Sugar cane, sugar beet
183 Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agency services
184 Textiles
185 Textiles waste for treatment: incineration
186 Textiles waste for treatment: landfill
187 Tobacco products
188 Transmission services of electricity
189 Transportation services via pipelines
190 Uranium and thorium ores
191 Wearing apparel; furs
192 Vegetables, fruit, nuts
193 Wheat
194 White spirit & SBP
195 Wholesale trade and commission trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
196 Wood and products of wood and cork (except furniture); articles of straw and plaiting materials
197 Wood material for treatment, re-processing of secondary wood material into new wood material
198 Wood waste for treatment: incineration
199 Wood waste for treatment: landfill
200 Wool, silk-worm cocoons
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Appendix 2. Structural gravity model: A technical introduction
A2.1 The structural gravity model
The structural gravity model is a tractable framework for trade policy analysis in a multi-
country environment. It has been widely used in empirical international trade literature 
(e.g., Anderson and Yotov, 2010; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein, 2008; Egger and Larch, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2014; Brakman, Kohl, and Van 
Marrewijk, 2015; Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa, 2018; and Nilsson Hakkala et al., 2019).
An important element in the structural gravity model is the so‐called multilateral 
resistance (MLR) terms, which are related to price indices. When these price index terms 
are included, changes in tariffs change the MLR terms, thus affecting the entire trading 
system because trade between any pair of countries takes place against the background of 
changed price indices. The fixed effects in the estimation cover country, year, and industry 
factors. We thus have origin–industry–time effects, destination–industry–time effects, and 
origin–destination, industry-specific terms (see Larch, Wanner, Yotov, and Zylkin, 2017). 
They absorb the country and industry-size variables from the structural gravity model as 
well as all other observable and unobservable country and industry-specific characteristics 
that vary across these dimensions, including national policies, institutions, and exchange 
rates. Country-pair fixed effects cover all time-invariant bilateral factors, such as distance, 
a common language, or a historical colonial tie. The pair’s fixed effects can also account for 
endogeneity in trade policy variables (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
A2.2 Model specification
We closely follow the work of Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, and Larch (2016) in the 
exposition of the structural gravity system, and also discussed in Nilsson Hakkala et al. 
(2019). We construct a world with N countries. Each country produces a variety of goods 
that are differentiated by the country of origin (Armington, 1969). These products are 
traded internationally. We omit the time dimension t from the equations to simplify them.
The value of domestic production (the GDP) in country i is given by Yi = piQi, where Qi is 
the volume of output and pi is its factory-gate price. Aggregate expenditure is denoted 
by Ei. If output and expenditure are equal, the country’s trade account is balanced. If 
expenditure exceeds output, the country is running a trade deficit.
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Consumers maximize a homothetic constant elasticity of scale (CES) utility function that is 
identical across all countries. In country j, it is given by:
 
1
1 1
ij
i
c
σ
σ σ σ
σ σα
−
− − 
 
 
∑
 , (1.1)
where 1σ >  is the elasticity of substitution between the different varieties of products 
originating from different countries, 0α >  is an exogenous preference, and cij denotes 
the consumption in country j of products produced in country i. Consumers’ budget 
constraint is given by:
 
ij ij j
i
p c E=∑
. (1.2)
Delivered prices, pij = pitij, are given by the factory-gate prices in the country of origin, 
multiplied by bilateral trade costs tij ≥ 1 between countries i and j. Bilateral trade costs are 
defined as iceberg costs (Samuelson, 1952), meaning that a part of the shipment “melts” 
en route to its destination.
Solving the consumers’ optimization problem, we find that exports Xij from country i to 
country j are given by:
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X E
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σ
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where
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P p t
σσ
α
−− =   
∑
 (1.4)
is a CES consumer price index.
Some conclusions arise from these equations. When all else is equal, larger and/or richer 
countries consume more of all varieties from all source countries. Imports from country i 
are affected negatively by higher factory gate prices and higher bilateral trade costs.
The relatively more expensive other countries’ varieties are, the more consumers 
in country j will substitute away from them and toward the goods from country i. 
Furthermore, a higher elasticity of substitution will increase the trade diversion effects 
from more expensive commodities to cheaper ones.
Market clearance for goods from each origin is given by:
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Accordingly, the value of output at delivered prices in country i, Yi, is equal to the total 
expenditure of this country’s variety in all countries, including i itself. We next define 
ii
Y Y≡∑  and divide the market clearing condition by Y. After rearranging we get
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The term in the denominator can be rewritten as ( )11i ij j jj t P E Y
σσ −−Π ≡∑  (Anderson 
and van Wincoop, 2003). Consequently,
 ( )1 1ii i
i
Y Yp σ σα
−
−= Π
 . (1.7)
The structural gravity system is thus given by three equations:
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The first equation can be divided into two terms, a size term, Yi Ej / Y, and a trade cost term, 
( ) 1ij i jt P
σ−
 Π  . Accordingly, exports X from country i to country j depend positively 
on output Y in country i, expenditure E in county j (i.e., GDP in the two countries) and 
negatively on world GDP. Based on these equations, large producers will export more to all 
destinations, big/rich markets will import more from all source countries, and trade flows 
between countries i and j will be larger the more similar in size the countries are.
In trade cost terms, inward multilateral resistance (Pj) represents importer j’s ease of 
market access (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Outward multilateral resistances, 
Πi, measures exporter i’s ease of market access. These are affected by, among other things, 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers between the countries. Multilateral resistances translate the 
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initial, partial equilibrium effects of trade policy at the bilateral level into country-specific 
effects on consumer and producer prices (Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, and Larch, 2016).
A2.3. The estimation method
We use Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation—more specifically, its 
ppml_panel_sg version in STATA. The use of PPML is encouraged by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). This method allows us to use pair-fixed effects in a multiplicative space. 
Importantly, PPML also allows for the existence of trade flows that are equal to zero. In a 
linear, logarithmic ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, these would impose a problem 
because one cannot calculate their logarithms. This is particularly important when we 
estimate the impact on different sectors because in this case there are a lot of zero trade 
flows between countries.
PPML also accounts for heteroscedasticity, its additive property ensures that the gravity-
fixed effects are identical to their corresponding structural terms, and the estimator 
can also be used to calculate the theory-consistent general equilibrium effects of trade 
policies (Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, and Larch, 2016).
The estimated model is given by:
( )1 2expijkt ikt jkt ijk ijktM tariff CBAM eπ χ µ β β= + + + + ∗
where Mijkt are the imports of product/sector k by reporter country i from partner country 
j in year t. The term iktπ  represents the time-varying reporter-country dummies by sector, 
which controls for the outward multilateral resistances, output shares, and, potentially, 
other observable and unobservable factors that may affect bilateral trade. jktχ  is the 
same for partner country j. The term ijkµ  denotes the set of country-pair fixed effects by 
sector. In the equation tariff is the tariff elasticity of imports calculated by sectors from 
global trade during 2000–2018, and CBAM is the CBAM tariffs by sector, calculated in the 
EXIOBASE database using the formulation shown in Section 3.2.
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Appendix 3: Global value chains – A technical introduction and 
appendix tables
We next formally represent the exclusion method that we use to analyze the global value 
chains. Similar to Los, Timmer, and de Vries (2016) and Ali-Yrkkö and Kuusi (2020a, 2020b), 
we partition the global input–output table. In our case, we have a region s that sets up a 
carbon border adjustment (CBA) for trade with a region r. Each region consists of countries 
c. After noting that we refer to input–output tables in a certain year t, while abstract from 
the further use of time indices, we construct a matrix A as follows:
In the equation A contains the input coefficients , which give the value units of 
intermediate goods from industry i required to produce one value unit of gross output 
in industry j. In the equation  represents the domestically purchased requirements of 
industries in country s, while  gives the requirements by industries in r of products bought 
from industries in s. For the final demand block, we can similarly write the following:
in which the vectors  and  represent the values of flows from industries in country s to all 
domestic final users and to final users in r.
For any country c, ratios of value added to gross output in industries in country c are 
contained in a row vector . The length of this vector equals the numbers of industries in s 
and r (with r containing multiple countries), with value-added ratios for industries in c as 
elements () and zeros elsewhere: =. The actual value added in country c () then equals 
in which i is a column vector wherein all elements are unity, implying that it sums the 
two elements in each of the rows of the matrix Y. The element  is the well-known Leontief 
inverse, in which I is the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions. The expression is 
the key to accounting for the complexity of the trade patterns. In particular,  can be 
interpreted as the limiting value of the infinitely long sum of value-added contributions, 
with the number of stages varying from 1 to ∞. 
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Our estimation of the value-added impact builds on the sector-level gravity model. The 
gravity model allows us to build a counterfactual that measures trade flows in the absence 
of the trade agreement. Let us denote the counterfactual of trade from country-industry i 
to country-industry j with the symbol *. Then, the corresponding final trade is denoted by  
and the intermediate use by . 
It is notable that our trade model does not allow us to distinguish the effects of the CBAs 
on intermediate and final goods separately. Therefore, the percentual effect on both flows 
is the same and given by the overall impact in the gravity model. For example, if the trade 
model forecasts an x % decrease in the volume of this particular bilateral trade, we adjust 
the amount of final demand to be  and .
After constructing all the bilateral counterfactual trade flows, we create hypothetical 
global value chains with the impact of CBAs by collecting the bilateral flows into our 
expression of the aggregate value added. We define the matrices and  as
and
where we have replaced bilateral trade flows from r to s, and vice versa, with the 
counterfactuals. More generally, s can be a group of countries corresponding with all 
extra-EU partners that will be subjected to the CBA.
The hypothetical GDP in c can be obtained by post-multiplying the hypothetical Leontief 
inverse with the hypothetical final demand as
Following the logic of hypothetical extraction, the domestic value added in exports of r 
that result from the free trade agreement with country s can be derived as the difference 
between the GDP in the actual and hypothetical situations:
 correctly measures the indirect and direct effects on the value chains and trade routes 
that follow from the exclusion of the direct trade linkage for region r.
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Table A3.1. The CBA-related value-added loss in intermediate products, decomposed by the final pro-
ducer industry in the EU
Sector
 
(a) Intermediate value-added import loss: 
Loss of value-added contribution for the row 
final producer industry, as relative to the 
total value-added loss in the scenario, %.
(b) Intermediate value-added import loss: Loss of 
value-added contribution for the row final producer 
industry, as relative to the total value of the same 
industry, %.
Fea-
sible 1:
Fea-
sible 2:
Efficient 
1: all 
emissi-
ons
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
Feasible 
1:
Feasible 
2:
Efficient 1: 
all emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
Crop and animal 
production, hunting and 
related service activities
1.0 % 0.6 % 1.1 % 1.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Forestry and logging 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Fishing and aquaculture 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Mining and quarrying 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
The manufacture of food 
products, beverages, and 
tobacco products
5.1 % 3.6 % 4.6 % 4.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.6 % 0.4 %
The manufacture of 
textiles, wearing apparel, 
and leather products
0.7 % 0.6 % 1.2 % 1.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.6 % 0.3 %
The manufacture of 
wood and of products 
of wood and cork, 
except furniture; the 
manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting 
materials
0.2 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
The manufacture of paper 
and paper products 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Printing and reproduction 
of recorded media 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
The manufacture of coke 
and refined petroleum 
products 
5.6 % 2.3 % 2.2 % 2.4 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 3.0 % 1.9 %
The manufacture of 
chemicals and chemical 
products 
1.2 % 0.8 % 2.2 % 2.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.3 %
The manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical 
preparations
0.7 % 0.5 % 1.9 % 2.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.6 % 0.4 %
The manufacture of 
rubber and plastic 
products
0.4 % 0.4 % 0.9 % 1.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.2 %
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The manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral 
products
1.6 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
The manufacture of basic 
metals
0.2 % 1.5 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
The manufacture 
of fabricated metal 
products, except 
machinery and 
equipment
0.8 % 6.7 % 2.1 % 2.3 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
The manufacture of 
computer, electronic and 
optical products
0.8 % 2.1 % 8.0 % 6.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 2.6 % 1.2 %
The manufacture of 
electrical equipment
0.8 % 3.7 % 3.0 % 2.8 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 1.0 % 0.5 %
The manufacture 
of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
2.1 % 11.8 % 7.6 % 7.4 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 1.1 % 0.6 %
The manufacture of 
motor vehicles, trailers, 
and semi-trailers
3.5 % 13.8 % 9.9 % 9.8 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 1.7 % 0.9 %
The manufacture of other 
transport equipment 1.2 % 3.2 % 2.6 % 2.4 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 1.5 % 0.8 %
The manufacture 
of furniture; other 
manufacturing
1.0 % 2.5 % 2.4 % 2.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.9 % 0.6 %
The repair and 
installation of machinery 
and equipment
0.6 % 1.8 % 1.3 % 1.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.3 %
Electricity, gas, steam, 
and air conditioning 
supply
3.0 % 1.6 % 1.6 % 1.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Water collection, 
treatment, and supply
0.2 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Sewerage; waste 
collection, treatment, 
and disposal activities; 
materials recovery; 
remediation activities and 
other waste management 
services 
0.3 % 0.9 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Construction 43.8 % 18.0 % 14.0 % 14.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.7 % 0.4 %
Wholesale and retail 
trade and the repair 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
0.9 % 1.1 % 1.2 % 1.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Wholesale trade, except 
trade of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles
1.9 % 2.1 % 2.3 % 2.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
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Retail trade, except trade 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
1.9 % 1.6 % 2.0 % 2.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Land transport and 
transport via pipelines 1.6 % 1.1 % 1.0 % 1.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Water transport 0.5 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.2 %
Air transport 0.6 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
Warehousing and 
support activities for 
transportation
0.5 % 0.6 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Postal and courier 
activities
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Accommodation and food 
service activities 2.3 % 1.5 % 1.9 % 1.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Publishing activities 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
Motion picture, video, 
and television program 
production; sound 
recording and music 
publishing activities; 
programming and 
broadcasting activities
0.2 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Telecommunications 0.5 % 0.7 % 1.8 % 1.5 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
Computer programming, 
consultancy, and related 
activities; information 
service activities
0.4 % 0.5 % 1.0 % 0.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Financial service activities 
except insurance and 
pension funding
0.2 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Insurance, reinsurance, 
and pension funding, 
except compulsory social 
security
0.3 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Activities auxiliary to 
financial services and 
insurance activities
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Real estate activities 2.8 % 2.3 % 2.0 % 2.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Legal and accounting 
activities; the activities 
of head offices; 
management consultancy 
activities
0.2 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Architectural and 
engineering activities; 
technical testing and 
analysis
0.3 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Scientific research and 
development
0.8 % 0.5 % 0.8 % 0.8 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.2 %
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Advertising and market 
research
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Other professional, 
scientific, and technical 
activities; veterinary 
activities
0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Administrative and 
support service activities 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Public administration 
and defense; compulsory 
social security
2.4 % 2.7 % 2.9 % 2.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Education 1.1 % 0.8 % 1.1 % 1.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Human health and social 
work activities
2.9 % 2.5 % 7.2 % 7.5 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.2 %
Other service activities 1.5 % 1.3 % 2.1 % 2.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 %
The activities of 
households as employers; 
undifferentiated goods- 
and service-producing 
activities of households 
for their own use
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Note: The authors’ calculations are based on World Input-Output Database (WIOD) data.
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Table A3.2. The CBA-related value added of intermediate products, decomposed by the final producer 
industry in Finland
Sector (a) Intermediate value-added import loss: 
The loss of value-added contributions for 
the row’s final producer industry, relative to 
the total value-added loss in the scenario 
(%)
(b) Intermediate value-added import loss: The loss 
of value-added contributions for the row’s final 
producer industry, relative to the total value of the 
same industry (%)
Fea-
sible 1
Fea-
sible 2
Efficient 
1: all 
emiss-
ions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
Feasible 1 Feasible 2 Efficient 
1: all 
emissions
Efficient 
2: direct + 
electricity 
emissions
Crop and animal 
production, hunting, and 
related service activities
0.2 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Forestry and logging 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Fishing and aquaculture 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Mining and quarrying 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
The manufacture of food 
products, beverages, and 
tobacco products
4.7 % 1.6 % 2.5 % 2.8 % 0.0001 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
The manufacture of 
textiles, wearing apparel, 
and leather products
1.9 % 0.6 % 1.3 % 1.5 % 0.0001 % 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.3 %
The manufacture of 
wood and of products 
of wood and cork, 
except furniture; the 
manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting 
materials
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
The manufacture of paper 
and paper products 0.5 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
The printing and 
reproduction of recorded 
media
0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
The manufacture of coke 
and refined petroleum 
products 
19.4 % 2.2 % 2.4 % 2.7 % 0.0015 % 0.0 % 1.0 % 0.6 %
The manufacture of 
chemicals and chemical 
products 
1.9 % 0.3 % 0.9 % 1.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
The manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical 
preparations
0.8 % 0.2 % 0.8 % 0.9 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
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The manufacture of 
rubber and plastic 
products
1.0 % 0.4 % 0.8 % 0.9 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
The manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral 
products
1.2 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
The manufacture of basic 
metals
0.9 % 1.9 % 0.5 % 0.6 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
The manufacture 
of fabricated metal 
products, except 
machinery and 
equipment
2.5 % 6.8 % 1.9 % 2.2 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
The manufacture of 
computer, electronic, and 
optical products
6.9 % 4.3 % 22.3 % 20.6 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.8 % 0.4 %
The manufacture of 
electrical equipment 9.4 % 16.5 % 16.4 % 15.8 % 0.0002 % 0.1 % 1.5 % 0.8 %
The manufacture 
of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
22.1 % 40.9 % 29.1 % 29.0 % 0.0001 % 0.1 % 1.0 % 0.6 %
The manufacture of 
motor vehicles, trailers, 
and semi-trailers
5.4 % 7.7 % 5.2 % 5.3 % 0.0004 % 0.1 % 1.9 % 1.1 %
The manufacture of other 
transport equipment 4.6 % 7.4 % 4.6 % 4.8 % 0.0003 % 0.1 % 1.5 % 0.8 %
The manufacture 
of furniture; other 
manufacturing
2.8 % 4.0 % 2.5 % 3.0 % 0.0001 % 0.0 % 0.6 % 0.4 %
The repair and 
installation of machinery 
and equipment
0.8 % 1.4 % 1.2 % 1.2 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Electricity, gas, steam, 
and air conditioning 
supply
0.2 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Water collection, 
treatment, and supply 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Sewerage; waste 
collection, treatment, 
and disposal activities; 
material recovery; 
remediation activities 
and other waste 
management services 
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Construction 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Wholesale and retail 
trade and the repair 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
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Wholesale trade, except 
trade of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles
0.7 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Retail trade, except trade 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Land transport and 
transport via pipelines 1.6 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Water transport 2.6 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.0001 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Air transport 2.8 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.5 % 0.0001 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Warehousing and 
support activities for 
transportation
0.5 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Postal and courier 
activities
0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Accommodation and food 
service activities 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Publishing activities 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Motion picture, video, 
and television program 
production; sound 
recording and music 
publishing activities; 
programming and 
broadcasting activities
0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Telecommunications 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Computer programming, 
consultancy, and related 
activities; information 
service activities
1.1 % 0.6 % 1.8 % 1.7 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Financial service 
activities, except 
insurance and pension 
funding
0.3 % 0.1 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Insurance, reinsurance, 
and pension funding, 
except for compulsory 
social security
0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Activities auxiliary to 
financial services and 
insurance activities
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Real estate activities 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Legal and accounting 
activities; the activities 
of head offices; 
management consultancy 
activities
0.4 % 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
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Architectural and 
engineering activities; 
technical testing and 
analysis
0.1 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Scientific research and 
development 0.4 % 0.2 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Advertising and market 
research 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Other professional, 
scientific, and technical 
activities; veterinary 
activities
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Administrative and 
support service activities 0.9 % 0.3 % 0.7 % 0.7 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Public administration 
and defense; compulsory 
social security
0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Education 0.3 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Human health and social 
work activities 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Other service activities 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
The activities of 
households as employers; 
the undifferentiated 
goods- and services-
producing activities of 
households for their 
own use
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0000 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Note: The authors’ calculations are based on WIOD data.
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